Urquhart v. State
Decision Date | 24 January 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 16, 2018,16, 2018 |
Citation | 203 A.3d 719 |
Parties | Everett URQUHART, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Esquire and Elise K. Wolpert, Esquire, (argued), Eugene J. Maurer, Jr. P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant, Everett Urquhart.
Abby Adams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellee, State of Delaware.
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
A New Castle County grand jury indicted Everett Urquhart for the armed robbery of a corner grocery store in Wilmington. Urquhart was poor and needed a public defender. In the five months before trial, three different public defenders represented Urquhart at preliminary court hearings. A fourth public defender would be his trial counsel, assigned to defend Urquhart against charges carrying a lengthy minimum prison sentence.
Because of a trial the preceding week, and other professional commitments before that, Urquhart's trial counsel did not meet with Urquhart to prepare for trial. The morning of trial was also the first time trial counsel showed Urquhart the State's key evidence against him. Before jury selection, Urquhart expressed frustration and confusion to the court about seeing his trial counsel for essentially the first time the morning of trial and seeing the State's evidence against him. Trial went ahead, and a Superior Court jury convicted Urquhart of all charges. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. We affirmed the convictions on direct appeal.1
Urquhart moved for post-conviction relief, and claimed that his trial counsel's absence before trial denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion. The question is now before us—whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in a serious felony trial requires more than the mere presence of a defense attorney the day of trial. We find that it does, and reverse Urquhart's conviction and remand for a new trial.
On July 15, 2014 a masked man wearing a black hooded North Face jacket robbed a corner store in Wilmington. A security camera captured the robbery. A witness told police she saw someone flee the area in a four-door green sedan and gave police the license plate number. The car belonged to Caree Matsen, who told police she loaned the car to her sister's boyfriend, Urquhart. The police found Urquhart's belongings in Matsen's sister's bedroom, and found cell phone photos of him wearing a black hooded North Face jacket. Police arrested Urquhart on July 18, 2014.
The State charged Urquhart with first degree robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony, first degree reckless endangering, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. Urquhart could not afford a private attorney, and was assigned a public defender. Before his arraignment, Urquhart had the following contacts with defense counsel:2
After arraignment and leading up to trial, Urquhart had the following contacts with defense counsel:
Trial counsel's supervisor represented Urquhart at his final case review. At the review, the State offered Urquhart a plea with "a minimum of 15 years of prison."13 Urquhart had not seen the State's evidence against him, and rejected the plea offer. In an e-mail after the review, trial counsel's supervisor warned trial counsel that Urquhart had received "[n]o video or prison visit since his July 18, 2014 arrest"14 and "[a]s soon as you can, I would suggest you turn your attention to this case to determine what you need to be prepared for trial."15
Urquhart was evidently frustrated with his lack of contact with trial counsel and the progression of his case. On November 5, 2014, Urquhart filed a pro se motion to compel discovery materials.16 Additionally, his only two-way contact with trial counsel were calls he initiated.17 The week before trial, Urquhart's trial counsel sent him the State's supplemental discovery responses which contained the surveillance footage and photos. Given prison mail delays, Urquhart did not receive the evidence until his trial counsel brought copies for Urquhart the morning of trial.18
Despite his supervisor's warning to get on top of the case, trial counsel did not speak to or meet with Urquhart until February 3, 2015—the morning of trial. Trial counsel showed Urquhart the State's surveillance footage and photographs.19 The State also offered Urquhart a five-year plea deal.20 Urquhart turned it down.21 Before jury selection, Urquhart addressed the court, expressing his frustration with his current situation:
He next asked to address the court about the evidence trial counsel showed him that morning—the video surveillance and cell phone photos:
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