US v. Garcia-Beltran, Crim. No. 94-274 (HL).

• Decision Date: 16 June 1995
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 94-274 (HL).
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. David GARCIA-BELTRAN, Miguel A. Collazo-Diaz, and Marina Santiago-Rivera, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

890 F. Supp. 67

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. David GARCIA-BELTRAN, Miguel A. Collazo-Diaz, and Marina Santiago-Rivera, Defendants.

Crim. No. 94-274 (HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 16, 1995.

Joseph C. Laws, Hato Rey, PR, for David Garcia-Beltran.

Rafael F. Castro-Lang, San Juan, PR, for Miguel A. Collazo-Diaz.

Peter J. Satz-Hanley, San Juan, PR, for Marina Santiago-Rivera.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Before the Court are motions to dismiss the indictment filed by codefendants Miguel A. Collazo-Diaz (Collazo-Diaz), Marina Santiago-Rivera (Santiago-Rivera), and David Garcia-Beltran (Garcia-Beltran), and the government's opposition thereto.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 24, 1994, all defendants were present at a party at Karla Rodriguez' house, located in Toa Alta, Puerto Rico. At approximately 9:15 p.m. that night, Abner Polanco Alicea (Polanco) and Karla arrived at Karla's house, where there was a party. Polanco parked his wine-colored Toyota Tercel in front of Karla's house and he and Karla went inside.

While Polanco was in one bedroom of Karla's house, defendants went into another bedroom and discussed taking Polanco's pistol. Defendant Garcia-Beltran stated that it was necessary to kill Polanco, because if defendants only were to beat up Polanco and take away his pistol, a gang war would start. When Polanco came out of the bedroom and sat down on the sofa in the living room, defendant Rafael Rivera (Rivera) walked out of the other bedroom and sat behind Polanco. Polanco loaded his pistol while looking at Rivera, and then Polanco returned the pistol to his waistband. Rivera then left the living room, went into the bedroom where the other defendants were, and told Garcia-Beltran what Polanco had done. Rivera asked for Garcia-Beltran's 357 Magnum. Garcia-Beltran gave Rivera the gun, and told Rivera to watch himself.

Later on that night, as the party continued, Garcia-Beltran stated that he was going to shoot Polanco on the sofa. Karla asked Garcia-Beltran to not shoot Polanco in her house. Defendant Fernando Rodriguez Reich (Fernando) suggested a plan to defendants that they take Polanco to another place and leave him there.

Following Garcia-Beltran's orders, defendants Collazo-Diaz, Manuel de Jesus Garcia (de Jesus) and Jose Rodriguez Rodriguez (Rodriguez) bolted out of the bedroom and attacked Polanco, who was still sitting on the sofa in the living room. They all struggled for Polanco's pistol, which was finally taken away from Polanco by Rivera. Rivera pointed the pistol at Polanco's stomach. Thinking that Rivera and the others were joking, Polanco told them not to play around. Defendant Collazo-Diaz slapped Polanco across the mouth and said that it was not a joke. Collazo-Diaz also asked Polanco for his car keys, which Polanco gave to de Jesus.

Defendants Collazo-Diaz, Rodriguez, and Rivera took Polanco to Polanco's Toyota Tercel and placed Polanco inside the car. De Jesus drove the car, and defendants Collazo-Diaz, Rodriguez, and Rivera were passengers. As they drove away from Karla's house, Collazo-Diaz and Rivera repeatedly hit Polanco. Rodriguez asked for Polanco's pistol from Collazo-Diaz. When the defendants arrived at Palo Blanco, they took Polanco out of the car. Collazo-Diaz asked Polanco for his wallet. Taking Polanco's wallet, Collazo-Diaz told Polanco to take off his shirt and to lie down on the ground. Collazo-Diaz then instructed Rivera to shoot Polanco. Rivera shot Polanco once with the 357 Magnum. Then Rodriguez shot Polanco repeatedly until all the rounds from the gun were expended. Having been ordered by Collazo-Diaz to ensure the death of Polanco, Rivera fired another shot at Polanco with the 357 Magnum.

Returning to Karla's house, defendants Collazo-Diaz, Rivera, Rodriguez, and de Jesus ran into Fernando. They all went back to Karla's house together. When said defendants arrived at Karla's house, they briefed Garcia-Beltran on their actions and handed Garcia-Beltran Polanco's pistol, bullets, and money. Giving Fernando twenty dollars out of Polanco's wallet, Garcia-Beltran told Fernando to buy the gasoline with which they would burn Polanco's car.

DISCUSSION

A. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 — the Commerce Clause

Under section 2119 of title 18,

Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so ...

shall be subject to federal criminal liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2119.¹

This Court has held section 2119 to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Nunez Rodriguez, 871 F.Supp. 545, 548 (D.P.R.1994). However, this case was decided prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), where the Supreme Court struck down a congressional criminal statute under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the First Circuit has not spoken, neither prior to nor after Lopez, on the issue of whether or not the carjacking statute is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the Court looks to recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause precedent and sister circuit and district court cases to determine the constitutionality of this statute.

Under the United States Constitution, the Congress has the authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States...." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2383, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981).

The Supreme Court has defined three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause authority. "First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce." Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (citations omitted). "Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Id. (citations omitted). And "finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at ___ - ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (citations omitted). In other words, whether or not the regulated activity "`substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1630.

Numerous circuit courts have held that the carjacking statute is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 109 (6th Cir.1994) ("carjackings as a category of criminal activity have an effect on interstate travel and the travel of foreign citizens to this country"); United States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 458, 130 L.Ed.2d 366 (1994) ("because of the obvious effect that carjackings have on interstate commerce, we hold that the carjacking statute is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers."); United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th Cir.1995) (upheld section 2119 because (1) the court could not "say that Congress had no rational basis for its findings" and (2) "a present nexus between a regulated activity and interstate commerce is not required under the Commerce Clause"); United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding the "nexus between section 2119 and interstate commerce in: 1) the effect of carjacking on interstate travel and the travel of foreign citizens in this country ...; 2) the impact of the sale of stolen cars and parts in interstate commerce; and 3) increased insurance premiums that result from carjackings"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1970, 131 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995); United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (11th Cir.1995) (adopting the reasoning in the above cases).²

As seen above, there is a lot of support from the other circuit and district courts to support a finding that the carjacking statute is constitutional. However, the Court is aware that said cases were all decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, which struck down a statute for exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.

In Lopez, the Supreme Court had before it the issue of whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988), was a constitutional exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Act states "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed. Supp. V). As noted by the Supreme Court, "the Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce." Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1626.

The Court applied the three broad categories of constitutional congressional regulation to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. First, as schools nor gun possession deals with the "channels of interstate commerce" the Court quickly dismissed this statute's applicability to the first broad category. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. The Court also found that the Act did not deal with an instrumentality, or a person or thing in interstate commerce. Id.

The Court next turned to the third category to determine whether gun possession in a school zone substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. The Court stated that the pattern of past Supreme Court cases show that "where...