US v. Joiner

• Citation: 847 F. Supp. 604
• Decision Date: 23 March 1994
• Docket Number: 88 CR 555-2.,No. 93 C 3422,93 C 3422
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michael JOINER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

847 F. Supp. 604

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michael JOINER, Defendant.

Nos. 93 C 3422, 88 CR 555-2.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

March 23, 1994.

Michael Joiner, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEINENWEBER, District Judge.

FACTS

On October 12, 1987, a masked man approached Thelma Tetter ("Tetter") from behind a building as she was returning home from work. The man shot at Tetter five times and consequently wounded her in her left leg. She was not pursued nor were any of the contents of her purse taken. Tetter was the mother of Anthony Sumner ("Sumner"), a former high-ranking El Rukn member. At the time of the shooting of Tetter, Sumner had been cooperating with law enforcement authorities in their investigation of the El Rukn organization and was in protective custody. The prosecution planned to call Sumner as a witness in the trial of Jeff Fort, the leader of the El Rukns, as well as other El Rukn members.

Loretta DeJean ("DeJean") and Nicole Clark ("Clark") had seen Michael Joiner ("Joiner") and two other men outside their apartment building with a gun just before the shooting. U.S. v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.1990). Both women knew of the three men's affiliation with the El Rukn organization, and one of the women knew the rank each man held in the organization. Id. at 1085-86. Based on the incident described above, Joiner and two codefendants were charged in an indictment returned on June 16, 1988, with intimidating a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (Count II), retaliating against a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (Count III), using a firearm in commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count IV), and conspiring to commit these offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count I). On October 27, 1988, a jury found Joiner guilty on all counts, and on February 1, 1989, he was sentenced to a term of twenty years imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals then affirmed Joiner's conviction and sentence on June 4, 1990. Johnson, 903 F.2d at 1092.

On June 7, 1993, Joiner filed a habeas corpus petition on the printed form provided by the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division, for use in habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In this petition, Joiner asked for leave to proceed without payment of the filing fee and for a Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), hearing and a new trial. Joiner's petition was initially assigned to Judge Milton I. Shadur. In a Memorandum Order dated June 29, 1993, Judge Shadur granted Joiner leave to proceed in forma pauperis and construed Joiner's petition as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. Judge Shadur then transferred Joiner's petition to this court which is the court that sentenced Joiner. In transferring Joiner's petition to this court, Judge Shadur followed the requirements of section 2255 Rule 4(a), which states that a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence "shall be presented promptly to the judge of the district court who presided at the movant's trial and sentenced him."

DISCUSSION

The court examined Joiner's petition and gave it initial consideration pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Proceedings in the United States District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Consequently, in a Minute Order dated July 21, 1993, the court ordered the United States Attorney to file an answer to Joiner's petition.

Joiner bases his petition for relief under section 2255 on numerous claims. First, he alleges that there was insufficient evidence to convict and sentence him for using a firearm in commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because no weapon was ever offered into evidence against him at trial. Next, he contends that he was the victim of much publicized prosecutors misconduct that has taken place in many of the cases involving the El Rukns. Joiner also claims that the prosecutors offered into evidence against him statements concerning another retaliation shooting case (in which Joiner was subsequently found not guilty) and that this evidence was admitted for use in sentencing Joiner for his conviction in the Tetter shooting. Thus, he claims that the court relied on inaccurate information in his presentence investigation report ("PSI") in sentencing him.

Joiner then claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. He contends that he was left defenseless during his trial because of his counsel's failure to call his only defense witness. He alleges that his witness, Delores Howard ("Howard"), was at the same location as DeJean and Clark on the evening of the shooting.

Finally, Joiner asks for a Franks hearing; however, because Judge Shadur construed Joiner's petition as a section 2255 petition, it is proper to assume that what Joiner was really requesting was a section 2255 hearing under Rule 8(a). Joiner alleges that the testimony of DeJean and Clark was impeachable and, thus, there was insufficient evidence to convict him.

In his reply to the government's answer, Joiner notes that the Seventh Circuit erred in its first opinion of May 29, 1990, affirming his conviction and sentence. This error was corrected when the court amended its decision on June 4, 1990. The error consisted of a misstatement of the date of the return of his indictment.

DISCUSSION

Pro se litigants are not bound by the stringent standards governing trained attorneys; therefore, the court liberally construes petitioner's section 2255 petition. Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1047 (7th Cir.1989); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). However, "arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived." U.S. v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 235 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also In re Bear, 789 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir.1986) ("We do not allow an appellant to raise new issues in the reply brief....") Thus, those issues not addressed in Joiner's petition, but raised for the first time in his reply to the government's answer, are not considered. Joiner's claim that this court never had subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over him is not considered by the court because Joiner presented it for the first time in his reply brief. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4. This claim was not mentioned in, and could not be liberally construed from, Joiner's original petition.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, federal prisoners can challenge the imposition or length of their detention "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack...." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. If the court determines that any of these grounds exist, "the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." Id. After reviewing the prisoner's motion, the United States Attorney's answer, and any transcripts or records of prior court actions in the matter, the judge shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing section 2255 Proceedings. Under section 2255, "if there is no reason to suppose that a hearing would produce evidence justifying the grant of a new trial, there is no reason to hold a hearing." U.S. v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 419 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, McDonnell v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2040, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991). In other words, "a judge should dismiss the petition without a hearing if it plainly appears from the facts of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief." Liss v. U.S., 915 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). "If it appears that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the motion as justice dictates." Id.

The court rules that Joiner's section 2255 petition should be dismissed without a hearing. As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, relief under section 2255 is only available if the trial court is guilty of "an error which is either jurisdictional or constitutional. It must be a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice...." Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424, 427, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). It is crucial to note that a motion under section 2255 is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Belford v. U.S., 975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). Thus, there are three types of issues that a section 2255 motion cannot raise: "(1) issues that were raised on direct appeal, absent a showing of changed circumstances; (2) nonconstitutional issues that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal; and (3) constitutional issues that were not raised on direct appeal, unless the section 2255 petitioner demonstrates cause for the procedural default as well as actual prejudice from the failure to appeal." Id. (emphasis in the original) (footnote and citations omitted).

Joiner bases his section 2255 motion on three constitutional issues that he did not raise on direct appeal, and one constitutional issue that he previously did raise on appeal. The court addresses the previously raised issue first.

Joiner alleges that the prosecution offered evidence of a prior retaliation shooting for which he was charged and that the evidence was accepted by this court for sentencing purposes. Joiner claims that this was improper because he was subsequently found not guilty in that previous shooting. Thus, he claims that the court relied on inaccurate information in his PSI when sentencing him. Joiner did raise this claim on direct appeal and ...