United States v. Callison

• Decision Date: 29 January 2020
• Docket Number: 4:19-cr-00081-3
• Citation: 436 F.Supp.3d 1218
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. David Alan CALLISON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

436 F.Supp.3d 1218

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.David Alan CALLISON, Defendant.

4:19-cr-00081-3

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed January 29, 2020

Joseph G. Bertogli, Attorney at Law, Joseph Bertogli, Des Moines, IA, Chad R. Frese, Kaplan & Frese LLP, Marshalltown, IA, for Defendant.

Mikaela J. Shotwell, Mallory Elizabeth Weiser, Craig P. Gaumer, Amy L. Jennings, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge

Before the Court is Defendant David Alan Callison's Motion to Suppress, filed on January 14, 2020. ECF No. 202. The Government filed its resistance on January 21. ECF No. 220. The Court held a suppression hearing on January 23. See ECF No. 226. The matter is fully submitted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Des Moines Police Officer Kilgore spotted a broken license-plate light just before 1 a.m. on April 25, 2019. ECF No. 202-1 at 2. He entered the plate number in his squad car's computer. ECF No. 230 Ex. 1 at 0:26. He followed the car for a couple of blocks and noticed the plate went dim when the car turned beyond his headlights. ECF No. 230 Ex. 2 at 0:25–50. When the car entered a driveway, he activated his emergency lights and boxed-in the vehicle. Id. at 1:02. He also turned off his headlights, briefly, to confirm the license-plate light was unlit. Id. at 1:05. He examined police vehicle records further. ECF No. 230 Ex. 1 at 1:03.

Officer Kilgore then approached the car's driver, Timothy Rios. ECF No. 202-1 at 2. Defendant sat in the back seat and Kelly Nicole Shannon sat in the front passenger seat. Id. Officer Kilgore told Rios about the broken light—Rios professed ignorance—and asked for the customary license, registration, and insurance. ECF No. 230 Ex. 1 at 1:50–58. Officer Kilgore then pivoted to other topics. He asked if Rios owned his car. Id. at 1:55. He asked what Rios was "doing here." Id. at 2:08. "Dropping off a friend," Rios said. Id. at 2:10. Rios provided his driver's license but could not find proof of registration or insurance. Id. at 2:40–53. Officer Kilgore returned to his car to view records that, as he later testified, showed Rios had a valid license, valid registration, and no outstanding warrants.

When Officer Kilgore returned, Rios still had not found proof of insurance. Id. at 4:45. Regardless, Rios gave Officer Kilgore, as he put it later, the "heebie-jeebies." Id. at 10:59. So, he examined the car's backseat with his flashlight and then began to ask Rios, Shannon, and Defendant a series of questions. Id. at 4:53.

"What's the address here? Tell me what's the address here, without looking," Officer Kilgore said. Id. at 5:00. Rios said he could not do this. Id. at 5:02. Officer Kilgore responded: "Then why did you stop here? Why are you sweating profusely?"¹ Id. at 5:05. "I'm dropping off a friend," Rios said as he calmly nodded his head. Id. at 5:10. Officer Kilgore asked for the friend's name. Id. at 5:18. Defendant said, "Neil." Id. at 5:22. Shannon said, "Rob." Id. at 5:26.

Officer Kilgore continued to comment on Rios's sweat, the temperature, and the unknown address while asking what was "illegal in the car or on [Rios] that [he] need[ed] to know about?" Id. at 6:04. Officer Kilgore asked for backup and for permission to search the car. Id. at 6:16–45. The questioning continued, leading Shannon to note that this seemed a bit extensive for a license-plate light. Id. at 7:20. Officer Kilgore then ordered Rios out of the car and continued to ask him why he was sweating. Id. at 8:30, 10:02. "Because I'm nervous, maybe," Rios said.² Id. at 9:55. More and more officers continued to arrive. Id. at 10:00, 14:00. Officer Kilgore ordered the two passengers out, too. ECF No. 225 at 1.

After Shannon exited the vehicle, Officer Kilgore said he saw her drop a cigarette pack on the ground. Id. at 1–2. Inside, he found a small bag containing a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 2. He then searched the vehicle and found a red duffle bag in the back seat. Id. Inside that bag, he found two prescription bottles that listed Defendant's name; five small plastic bags with a substance that also field-tested positive for methamphetamine; a lot of U.S. currency; digital scales with methamphetamine residue; and male clothing. Id.

Police took Defendant into custody. Id. Another officer then included many of the facts described above into a search warrant application for Defendant's home. Id. at 1–2. A magistrate judge approved that warrant, although it is unclear what evidence police found during the search.

Defendant now seeks suppression of (1) any incriminating evidence found inside Rios's vehicle; (2) any incriminating evidence found in his home; and (3) any incriminating statements he made to police. ECF No. 202-1 at 4.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Initiation of Stop

The Constitution's Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure. United States v. Jones , 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001).

That seizure is a reasonable one "if it is supported by either probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred." United States v. Washington , 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006). "[A ]ny traffic violation, regardless of its perceived severity, provides an officer with probable cause to stop the driver." United States v. Jones , 275 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 2001), as corrected (July 25, 2001). The actual motivations of the officer matter not. United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez , 474 F.3d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). Like a car's driver, a "passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop." Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007).

On any passenger vehicle, Iowa law requires that:

Either the rear lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. When the rear registration plate is illuminated by an electric lamp other than the required rear lamp, the two lamps shall be turned on or off only by the same control switch at all times when headlamps are lighted.

Iowa Code § 321.388.

There are at least two ways to violate § 321.388. State v. Lyon , 862 N.W.2d 391, 398 (Iowa 2015). First, the motorist's license plate may be illuminated, but not clearly legible at fifty feet. Id. Alternatively, the vehicle's license plate may be legible but nonetheless lack the requisite working lamp. Id. This case involves the latter violation.

Here, Officer Kilgore reasonably initiated the traffic stop because he had at least "an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation ha[d] occurred." Washington , 455 F.3d at 826. As Officer Kilgore tailed Rios, the officer's headlights made his license plate clearly legible. However, as the Government demonstrated at the suppression hearing, dashboard camera footage shows the plate appeared dim when Rios turned beyond the scope of police headlights. Officer Kilgore also testified—and the dashboard footage confirms—that he briefly turned his own headlights off to confirm Rios lacked a working license plate lamp.

To be sure, Defendant offered three witnesses to show this cannot be so. First, Rios testified that he checked the light the day after the stop and saw that it worked.³ Second, Rios's sister testified that she took possession of her brother's car in August 2019, when police arrested her brother. She also testified that no one used the car until Jonathan Stewart, Defendant's private investigator, examined the car in January 2020. Finally, Stewart, a former U.S. Marshal, testified that the license-plate lamp worked when he examined the car. Even so, taking the credibility of all witnesses into account, the Court is not willing to look past the dashboard camera footage showing an unlit license plate. For these reasons, the Court concludes Officer Kilgore's initiation of the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment.

B. Extension of Stop

Yet a traffic stop initiated lawfully can become unlawful. As with any seizure, the Fourth Amendment preordains no quantified time limits. See United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Rather, circumstances dictate a given traffic stop's permissible length. See id. "A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation."⁴ Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 350–51, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ).

1. Rodriguez v. United States

The facts and procedural history of Rodriguez show how the Fourth Amendment places firm but reasonable limits on an officer's ability to turn any routine traffic stop into a full-blown narcotics investigation. In that case, Nebraska police stopped the defendant for driving on the shoulder and issued a mere written warning. Id. at 351, 135 S.Ct. 1609. Regardless, police then delayed the defendant another seven-to-eight minutes so they could walk a drug-detection dog around his car. Id. at 352, 135 S.Ct. 1609. They found drugs, and the government charged the defendant with drug possession. Id. He moved to suppress, arguing the drugs were the fruit of a detention prolonged without the required reasonable suspicion. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of suppression, concluding the slight delay qualified under the Circuit's...