US v. Marenghi
Citation | 893 F. Supp. 85 |
Decision Date | 26 June 1995 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 94-68-P-C. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michelle T. MARENGHI, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Helene Kazanjian, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, ME, for Government.
Daniel J. Perry, Warren M. Silver, P.A., Bangor, ME, for defendant.
Defendant Michelle T. Marenghi faces charges for conspiring to possess and distribute a controlled substance containing cocaine base and for the underlying substantive offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Now before the Court is the Government's Motion In Limine to Exclude Expert Witnesses and in the Alternative for Discovery (Docket No. 23). The Government argues here that Defendant has indicated her intent to present expert testimony regarding her mental capacity and the role of "battered woman syndrome" in the alleged commission of the above charges. The Government asks this Court to exclude such expert testimony as irrelevant to any issue or defense or, in the alternative, to require Defendant to produce the results of certain physical or mental examinations and tests pursuant to Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(B) and to submit to a psychological examination pursuant to Rule 12.2(c).
Defendant provided to the Government, and filed with the Court, a notice pursuant to Criminal Rule 12.2(b) indicating that she will present, through expert testimony, evidence relating to "a mental disease and/or defect and/or other mental condition of hers that bears upon the issue of guilt." Specifically, Defendant states that she will elicit testimony from the following expert witnesses:
Defendant's List of Expert Witnesses. It is anticipated by the Government that Defendant will argue at trial that she was physically, mentally, and emotionally abused by her boyfriend, Freddie "Pit Bull" Long, who was arrested with Defendant and with whom it is alleged that she conspired to possess and to sell crack cocaine.1
The Government argues that the above expert testimony is inadmissible on two bases: (1) under the Insanity Defense Reform Act ("IDRA"), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17, evidence of a mental disease or defect is admissible only to demonstrate the elements of the insanity defense; and (2) expert testimony on "battered woman syndrome" is not relevant to establishing the defense of duress.
The Government argues that, as a result of the IDRA's enactment in 1984, expert testimony on a defendant's mental disease or defect is not admissible to establish a defense other than insanity and that, unless she intends to assert an insanity defense, Defendant cannot offer such expert testimony. The IDRA establishes a specific standard for the defense of insanity and then provides, "Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense." 18 U.S.C. § 17(a). This language is interpreted by the Government to preclude the use of any evidence of mental disease or defect as part of a defense case, including negating the presence of mens rea. Defendant responds that the IDRA abolishes only true affirmative defenses based on a mental disease or defect but permits a defendant to present evidence to negate mens rea.
The Government claims that there is support for its position in the case law of the IDRA in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The first case in this circuit, and apparently in any federal appellate court, interpreting the IDRA is United States v. White, 766 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.1985). The defendant in White was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine. Id. at 24. At trial, she attempted to introduce psychiatric testimony, purportedly to "establish lack of specific intent." Id. Specifically, she sought to demonstrate that she "knowingly chose to break the law ... but that her motive for knowingly breaking the law was to help her mother." Id. (brackets in original). The Court of Appeals panel upheld the exclusion of evidence. First, it stated that such "good motive" evidence is irrelevant in a "diminished capacity" defense "if the defendant is in fact cognizant that the law is being violated." Id. More important in White, however, was the panel's observation that the exclusion of expert testimony in a "diminished capacity" defense had been upheld by the Court of Appeals earlier that year in United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 227, 88 L.Ed.2d 227 (1985),2 and that such a rejection was in line with Congress's decision to abolish the defense through the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, of which the IDRA was a part. Id. at 24-25. This dictum has been interpreted by the Government and other jurisdictions3 as an indication by the court of appeals that it interprets the IDRA to preclude the admission of any psychiatric evidence, including evidence to negate mens rea, by a defendant except to demonstrate insanity.
Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1066 (quoting Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 890), and that Congress "distinguished such evidence from `psychiatric evidence to negate specific intent.'" Id. These courts also noted that the entire field of law regarding the validity of the so-called "diminished capacity" defense is muddied by the confusion resulting from courts' use of the term "diminished capacity" to describe several distinct defenses or defense theories. See, e.g., Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1062-63; Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 903-04; Frisbee, 623 F.Supp. at 1221.
The First Circuit has not, as of this time, provided any clear indication of whether it would join in the interpretation of the IDRA followed by the above courts if squarely confronted with the issue. The Court of Appeals decisions cited by the Government for authority in this case do not provide a clear answer on this issue since none of those cases required the court to determine the admissibility of evidence properly characterized as negating mens rea.
In White the panel concluded that the excluded evidence would demonstrate only a "good motive" for the defendant's criminal acts rather than an absence of mens rea. The Court of Appeals was not required to reach the issue in United States v. LopezPena, 912 F.2d 1536 (1st Cir.1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 912 F.2d 1552 (1st Cir.1990) (en banc), since the proffered evidence would have shown that the defendant did not have the intelligence to plan the conspiracy but nonetheless retained the capacity to participate in it. Id. at 1542. The panel there observed that, on another record, it may have been required to reconsider the courts' remarks in White in light of more recent opinions from other circuits, such as Twine and Pohlot.
In addition, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion,4 affirmed a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico which granted a new...
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