US v. Sanchez, CR 91-906 AWT.
Decision Date | 03 January 1992 |
Docket Number | No. CR 91-906 AWT.,CR 91-906 AWT. |
Citation | 782 F. Supp. 94 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo Palayo SANCHEZ, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Lourdes G. Baird, U.S. Atty., Robert L. Brosio, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chief, Crim. Appeals Mark D. Larsen, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.
Peter M. Horstman, Federal Public Defender, Gerald C. Salseda, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.
Defendant Eduardo Palayo Sanchez is charged in a single count indictment with bank robbery and use of a dangerous weapon and kidnapping in committing the robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) and (e). He pleaded guilty to the (a) and (d) charges, but pleaded not guilty to the subsection (e) charge of kidnapping. Trial by jury has been waived and the matter has been tried to the court.
The facts in this case are simple and are largely undisputed. They are fairly summarized in the government's trial brief, as follows:1
The distance, within the bank, over which defendant forced Ms. Serafian to accompany him, was estimated by eyewitnesses as being 15 feet, or less. The entire robbery took approximately two to three minutes. The duration of the forced accompaniment was approximately 10 seconds.
Will the above facts, which the court finds, support a finding of kidnapping in aid of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)?
The federal kidnapping in aid of bank robbery statute provides:
Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section i.e., bank robbery, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, ... forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years....
18 U.S.C. § 2113(e).
There are not a great many reported cases interpreting the asportation requirement of this statute. The court agrees with the government's position that this offense is similar to the federal statutory crime of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1202, and the common law. United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir.1982) ( ); United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986, 94 S.Ct. 2391, 40 L.Ed.2d 764 (1974) ( ). Marx further held that some asportation requirement had to be met.
The government contends that the asportation "need only be more than slight." However, the cases cited in support of this proposition paint a different picture. The government relies first on Government of the Virgin Islands v. Alment, 820 F.2d 635 (3d Cir.1987). While the court there reversed the district court's vacatur of a kidnapping conviction, the facts regarding asportation were quite different from those in the case at bench. There the defendant dragged the victim by the neck from her lighted office, along an outdoor corridor and down a flight of steps, a distance of 31 feet. He then carried her another 44 feet into an area of bushes. Id. at 636. The Third Circuit applied its earlier announced two-prong test2 to determine whether a kidnapping had been committed: (1) The duration of the asportation, and (2) Any significant danger to the victim independent of the underlying offense. Id. at 637. In our case, the duration of the asportation, 10 seconds, could hardly be any more minimal. No doubt there was significant danger to the victim teller by the presence of the knife, but that danger was present by virtue of the § 2113(d) offense, assault by the use of a dangerous weapon, and not by reason of any trivial movement over a distance of 15 feet.
The government also relies on People v. Stender, 47 Cal.App.3d 413, 422, 121 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1975). But there, the victim was forced out of her home, past three houses, over a seawall and across a beach to underneath a pier, a distance of approximately 200 feet. The court characterized the asportation as "substantial in character" and not trivial. Id. The California cases involving both "simple" kidnapping, under Cal.Pen.Code § 207, and "aggravated" kidnapping, under Cal.Pen.Code § 209, are consistently of the same view. Movements which are trivial or merely incidental to other crimes do not constitute kidnapping. People v. Stanworth, 11 Cal.3d 588, 600, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058 (1974); People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225 (1969); Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 465, 15 Cal.Rptr. 65, 364...
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