US v. Williams, IP 91-145-CR-01

• Decision Date: 09 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. IP 91-145-CR-01,IP 91-145-CR-02.,IP 91-145-CR-01
• Citation: 792 F. Supp. 1120
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. GARY D. WILLIAMS, Sheila J. Williams, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

792 F. Supp. 1120

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. GARY D. WILLIAMS, Sheila J. Williams, Defendants.

Nos. IP 91-145-CR-01, IP 91-145-CR-02.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

April 9, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cale J. Bradford, Melanie C. Conour, Asst. U.S. Attys., Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

Scott E. Shockley, DeFur Voran Hanley Radcliff & Reed, Muncie, Ind., Bradley L. Williams, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ENTRY DISCUSSING ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

TINDER, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on Defendants' Gary D. Williams and Sheila J. Williams joint motion to compel discovery. On October 30, 1991, this Court entered a preliminary order providing for discovery pursuant to applicable rules, statutes, and law. Defendants now request this Court to order the Government to produce specific items to supplement that previous order. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

On October 30, 1991, a grand jury issued a ten-count indictment alleging that the Defendants knowingly and wilfully conspired to violate Title 18, United States Code, sections 2 and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), Title 31, United States Code, section 5322(a) and 5324(3) and Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, section 103.53. The indictment concerns the Defendants allegedly receiving money, derived from an illegal source, to secure a bail bond. The indictment alleges that the Defendants knew that the money was from an illegal source and that the Defendants willfully conspired to hide the source of the funds.

Immediately after the indictment was issued, this Court issued a preliminary order containing discovery requirements for each party. The Defendants have now filed this motion to compel discovery which is comprised of nine specific requests for materials.

DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Pre-trial discovery in criminal prosecutions is authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. This rule provides the only mechanism for either the defendant or the government in a criminal case to procure information held by the opposing party prior to trial. Once the trial begins, the defendant may invoke the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which requires the government to produce "any statement ... of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). The Jencks Act requires the production of any statement of any witness "after a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). Accordingly, a defendant has no right, statutory or otherwise, to pre-trial discovery of witness statements.

Beyond the statutory framework of discovery, the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), imposes Constitutional significance upon the actions of the government during a criminal prosecution. In Brady, the Court held that due process requires that the prosecution disclose to the accused any evidence which is favorable to his defense. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Although Brady imposes a Constitutional duty on the prosecution, "there is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one...." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court discussed the Brady rule and stated:

We are not considering the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or the wisdom of amending those Rules to enlarge the defendant's discovery rights. We are dealing with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Id. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399. Brady merely creates a remedy which is implicated if the prosecution violates an accused's rights under fundamental due process:

The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilty or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.

Id. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Although the standard practice by defendants is to request that the government produce all "Brady Materials", such a request is merely a statement of the duty which befalls the prosecution.

Lastly, a court has a certain inherent authority to order and supervise discovery in a criminal case above and beyond any of the mentioned rules. In United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals held that a trial court has the "inherent power, exercisable under appropriate circumstances, to assure the proper and orderly administration of criminal justice." Id. at 1007.¹ This authority has been repeatedly reaffirmed as in United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.1985), where the Court of Appeals stated "this Court is mindful that the decision whether to grant or deny a motion for discovery is within the district judge's discretion." Id. at 1276.

Three of these doctrines, Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, the Jencks Act, and the court's inherent authority, constitute the foundation of the law of criminal discovery in the federal courts. They are supplemented by the rule of Brady which defines the Government's duty to produce favorable information in criminal prosecutions. The Defendants' discovery requests must be analyzed in light of these rules to determine the appropriate disposition.

DISCUSSION

Request No. 1

Defendants' first request seeks:

Any relevant written or recorded statements or copies of statements made by the defendant, within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government. This request calls for discovery of written or recorded statements and recordings of defendant's sic conversations by any means of mechanical recordation or electronic surveillance, whether made before or after arrest and/or indictment and whether or not in response to interrogation. The term "statement" is not limited to verbatim recordings and transcriptions, but also includes handwritten notes, interview memoranda, reports of investigation, and administrative pages.

Defendants assert as the basis of this request Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A). Over the Government's denial, the Defendants claim that two such statements must exist. First, the Defendants believe the "defendants were interviewed by arresting officers in route to the jail and their statements should have been preserved." Second, Defendants assert that an Internal Revenue Service Special Agent, Pat Hinkle, may have conducted an interview from which a statement was taken.

In the initial court order entered on October 30, 1991, this Court directed the government, inter alia, to:

(a) Permit the defendant(s) to inspect and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant(s) ... within the possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral statement which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant(s) whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant(s) to be a government agent.

Further, this duty to disclose was not intended to be limited to pre-trial proceedings, but to extend throughout the proceeding. The Court Order states:

If prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or material previously requested or ordered, which is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule, such party shall promptly notify the other party or that other party's attorney or the court of the existence of the additional evidence or material.

The government was given an order at the initiation of the prosecution which continues until the trial is complete. This order was substantially similar to the language of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) which the Defendants cite as authority for their discovery request. Because this Court has already ordered discovery to the extent permissible under current law, the issue is whether the Government is complying with the initial order.

Rule 16 provides a remedy for a violation of discovery orders:

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the moving party bears the burden to bring a discovery failure "to the attention of the court." Determination of whether the movant satisfies this burden is left to the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir.1990).

Defendants merely assert their belief that additional statements exist. Although they state with particularity two different statements believed to exist, they offer no evidence from which the Court could find that the statements do indeed exist.² The Government states that they have produced all material required by order of this Court and Rule 16. However, the Government contends that Rule 16(a)(1)(A) only requires discovery of statements made "in response to interrogation by a person known to the defendant as a government agency" and that "there is no authority for the defendant's request for non-interrogation statements." In this...