USA v. Maddox

Decision Date12 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-30284.,09-30284.
Citation614 F.3d 1046
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal MADDOX, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Aine Ahmed, Office of the United States Attorney, Spokane, WA, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Matthew Campbell, Office of the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, Spokane, WA, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00159-RHW-1.

Before: MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, CARLOS F. LUCERO, * and

N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals the suppression of evidence found inside closed containers-themselves inside a motor vehicle stopped for a traffic violation-after the driver was handcuffed and securely placed in the rear of the arresting officer's patrol car. We affirm.

FACTS

Officer Scott Bonney had pulled over to the side of the road to finish writing a police report, when he saw Neal Maddox's (Maddox) Chevy truck enter the intersection. Maddox stopped abruptly in the intersection, then immediately proceeded in reverse. As he was moving in reverse towards the stop sign, Maddox nearly collided with a small blue car going westbound in the intersection. He made a three-point turn, blocking traffic, turned around, and accelerated. Maddox slowed once the officer activated his overhead lights, and stopped at the side of the road.

When Officer Bonney exited his patrol car, Maddox exited his vehicle and began yelling at the officer. Officer Bonney instructed Maddox to sit in the driver's seat and remain still, approached the vehicle, and told Maddox he had stopped him for driving recklessly. Maddox identified himself, but was unable to produce a driver's license. When asked whether the vehicle belonged to him, Maddox admitted ownership, noting his friend gave him the truck a few weeks before. He added he had yet to register the truck, and had no bill of sale. Officer Bonney noticed the vehicle's tags were expired, and the temporary sticker in the rear window was not only a photocopy, but also valid for longer than was normal for a temporary sticker (31 rather than 30 days). A computer check revealed that Maddox's license had been suspended. When Maddox ignored the officer's request to step outside the vehicle, the officer took away Maddox's key chain and cell phone, tossing them on the front seat of Maddox's vehicle. Officer Bonney placed Maddox under arrest, handcuffed him, and escorted him to the patrol car. He then searched Maddox's person and found $358 in cash inside Maddox's pants pockets, putting Maddox in the back of the patrol car after the search. It is undisputed that, at this point, Maddox posed no threat to officer safety and there was no danger of evidence destruction.

Officer Bonney then returned to Maddox's vehicle, reached inside, and retrieved the key chain and cell phone. Hanging on the key chain was a metal vial with a screw top. Removing the top and the vial's contents, the officer discovered a substance he believed to be methamphetamine. Entering the interior of vehicle, the officer found a closed computer case which he opened, and discovered a handgun and still more of the substance he had found in the key chain vial.

Following a hearing, the district court determined that neither probable cause, exigent circumstance, nor the incidents of Maddox's arrest or impoundment of his vehicle justified a warrantless search of the interior of Maddox's vehicle, and ordered suppression of the items found there. This interlocutory appeal followed. 1

DISCUSSION
The Key Chain

The Government argues the search of Maddox's key chain was proper as incident to lawful arrest.

A search incident to lawful arrest is one of the “few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and is conducted for the twin purposes of finding weapons the arrestee might use, or evidence the arrestee might conceal or destroy. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The determination of the validity of a search incident to arrest in this circuit is a two-fold inquiry: (1) was the searched item “within the arrestee's immediate control when he was arrested”; (2) did “events occurring after the arrest but before the search ma[k]e the search unreasonable”? United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1991). 2

Contrary to the dissent's opening description, this was not a search of Maddox's person incident to arrest. Maddox's person was handcuffed in the back of the squad car, incapable of either destroying evidence or presenting any threat to the arresting officer. While the key chain was within Maddox's immediate control while he was arrested, subsequent events-namely Officer Bonney's handcuffing of Maddox and placing Maddox in the back of the patrol car-rendered the search unreasonable. In Turner, we found valid the search of baggies found after the defendant was handcuffed and taken into the next room because of a legitimate concern for the officers' safety: they had already discovered a concealed weapon beneath the bedding.” Id. at 888; accord United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1420 (9th Cir.1996) (search of bedroom valid search incident to arrest even after defendant had been arrested and removed from the room, where [w]hen Hudson was called out of his bedroom and arrested, one of the arresting officers noticed a rifle case near his feet”). No such weapon or threat was found here, and Maddox's demeanor, as the dissent argues, see Dissenting Op., at 11445 n. 1, did not provide such legitimate concern for Officer Bonney's safety, as after initially yelling, Maddox subsequently cooperated with the officer and the arrest. Mere temporal or spatial proximity of the search to the arrest does not justify a search; some threat or exigency must be present to justify the delay. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 571, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (“warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the search is remote in time or place from the arrest, or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). With Maddox handcuffed in the backseat of the patrol car, no possibility of Maddox concealing or destroying the key chain and the items contained therein, and no sighting of weapons or other such threats, Officer Bonney's search of Maddox's key chain was not a valid search incident to arrest. 3

The Laptop Bag

The Government contends the officer's seizure of the laptop bag was the result of a valid inventory search. 4 Vehicular inventory searches must be conducted “in accordance with the standard procedures of the Washington State Patrol in order for procured evidence to be admitted in federal court. United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir.1989). Once a vehicle is impounded, police may conduct an inventory search. Id. Police may impound a vehicle in Washington state: if the officer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the commission of a felony; ... as part of the police ‘community caretaking function’ ... [provided] neither the defendant nor his spouse or friends are available to move the vehicle; and ... if the driver has committed one of the traffic offenses for which the legislature has specifically authorized impoundment. 5

State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065, 1071-72 (1984). With the verification of the vehicle identification number and plates, and Maddox's own assertion of ownership, any suspicion the vehicle was stolen was but a “mere suspicion.” See

State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (1980) 6 . Moreover, the vehicle here was impounded for reasons other than to carry out the community caretaking functions of the police: it was not abandoned, impeding traffic, or threatening public safety or convenience. See

id. at 1224. Finally, because Maddox offered to have his friend move the vehicle, the officer did not sufficiently consider alternatives before impounding Maddox's truck. The officer's impoundment of Maddox's vehicle violated Washington Law, and, therefore, did not qualify as a valid inventory search in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.

AFFIRMED.

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The undisputed facts of this case establish that Officer Bonney's search of Maddox's key-chain container was a search of an arrestee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest-a search that needs no warrant to be valid under established Fourth Amendment law. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). I therefore dissent.

In review of the pertinent facts in this case, Maddox does not dispute that Officer Bonney had probable cause to arrest him. He does not dispute that Officer Bonney first took possession of Maddox's keys when Officer Bonney removed...

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