USA v. West

Decision Date18 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-4135,99-4135
Citation219 F.3d 1171
Parties(10th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff -Appellee, v. WILLIAM G. WEST, Defendant-Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 99-CR-6-B) [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Alan P. Caplan, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laurie J. Sartorio, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah,(Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, with her on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before EBEL, PORFILIO, and MAGILL,* Circuit Judges.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

William G. West was indicted for one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The indictment was subsequently dismissed and West pled guilty to possession of amphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). West appeals the district court's1 denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his vehicle.2 We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 19, 1997, Deputy Sheriff Phil H. Barney was on routine patrol on I-70 near Richfield, Utah. Deputy Barney had a dispatcher trainee, Candice Baker, with him. At milepost 29 at about 1319 hours, Deputy Barney stopped a green Pontiac which was going eastbound at eighty miles per hour in a seventy-five miles per hour zone.

After stopping the Pontiac, Deputy Barney approached the driver's side of the car, intending to issue the driver a speed warning.3 West was the only occupant in the vehicle. Deputy Barney asked West for his driver's license and vehicle registration. West provided a valid license and a rental agreement for the vehicle in his name. Deputy Barney observed that West was very nervous and his hands were shaking. Deputy Barney also detected a distinctive odor of air freshener, which Deputy Barney suspected might be an effort by West to mask a controlled substance.

Deputy Barney took West's documents to his vehicle. Deputy Barney ran a background check on the Pontiac and a criminal history check of West. An answer came back on the checks indicating that the vehicle was clear, and while West was not currently wanted, he did have a criminal history for property crimes, burglary, and an assault. Deputy Barney had Baker prepare a warning citation for speeding. Deputy Barney returned to West's vehicle and advised West that he was only giving him a warning, with no court appearance or fine required. Deputy Barney gave the warning ticket, driver's license, and rental agreement back to West in sequence. During this time, Deputy Barney asked West about his travel plans. West said that he had been in Las Vegas and was returning to Minnesota. Deputy Barney observed that West continued to shake in a nervous manner. Deputy Barney was standing back from the vehicle and was bent over towards the driver's side window. Because of his suspicion that West might be involved with drugs, Deputy Barney asked West if he had any firearms with him. West replied that he did not. Deputy Barney then asked West if he was transporting drugs and West said that he was not. At this point, Deputy Barney observed that West was shaking very visibly. Deputy Barney asked West if he could look in the vehicle. West paused for a period of time and then said yes.

Deputy Barney asked West to get out of the vehicle and step to the back and side of the vehicle. Deputy Barney performed a quick patdown of West. Deputy Barney then conducted a search of the inside of the vehicle. As he did so, he could detect a strong odor of air freshener. Deputy Barney then took the vehicle keys and opened the trunk of the vehicle. At that time, Deputy Barney could detect the distinct odor of methamphetamine. Deputy Barney observed two bags and a briefcase in the trunk. Deputy Barney asked West whose bags they were and West replied that all three bags were his. Deputy Barney asked if he could look in the briefcase, which was locked, and West said no. West, however, did not otherwise ask Deputy Barney to stop his search or restrict the areas in which West could search. Deputy Barney took the locked briefcase and put it in the patrol car so it would not be accessible to West during the search.

Deputy Barney returned to the trunk of West's vehicle. Deputy Barney picked up a zippered bag that had a lock on it but that was not fully closed. The bag was locked and zippered but had a three inch gap. Deputy Barney could detect the distinct sour odor of methamphetamine emanating from the bag. Deputy Barney put his fingers in the three inch gap and could feel smooth plastic and a package which Officer Barney believed contained methamphetamine. West did not object to Deputy Barney's handling of the zippered bag and the lock on the bag was not forced. The briefcase, previously placed in Deputy Barney's vehicle, was placed back in the trunk of West's vehicle. Deputy Barney arrested West and impounded his car.

On February 26, 1997, West was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After chemical analysis by the government, it was determined that the substance seized was not methamphetamine but amphetamine, a separately scheduled controlled substance. The indictment was subsequently dismissed and a felony information was filed charging West with possession of amphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). West filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from his vehicle by Deputy Barney during the traffic stop. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Boyce who entered a Report and Recommendation on June 1, 1998, recommending that the defendant's motion be denied. On July 10, 1998, the district court adopted Magistrate Boyce's report in its entirety and denied West's motion to suppress. West entered into a plea agreement with the government and was sentenced to eighty-seven months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a fine of $15,000. Subsequently, West filed the present appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

West offers the following reasons why the seizure of the amphetamine must be suppressed: (1) he was unlawfully seized after being stopped for speeding; (2) he did not voluntarily consent to the warrantless search of his rental car; and (3) even if he did voluntarily consent to the search of the car, the consent was withdrawn or revoked prior to the seizure of the amphetamine. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's determination. See id. The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, however, is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. See id.

A. Initial Stop and Detention

West's first argument is that Deputy Barney's questions unlawfully exceeded the scope of the traffic stop, and that he was unlawfully detained after the completion of the traffic stop. A routine traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 945. It is characterized as an investigative detention, the reasonableness of which is judged under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). See id.

The Terry inquiry involves a two-part test. See id. The first part of the test analyzes whether the stop was justified at its inception. See id. In this case, there is no dispute about the first part because West does not challenge the district court's finding that probable cause existed to stop him for speeding. The second part of the test analyzes "whether the officer's actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. A driver must be permitted to proceed after a routine traffic stop if a license and registration check reveal no reason to detain the driver unless the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of other crimes or the driver voluntarily consents to further questioning. See United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1996). West argues that he was unlawfully detained because Deputy Barney did not immediately hand all of the papers back to West, and, without reasonable suspicion, questioned West for approximately fifteen seconds before all of the papers had been returned. The district court found that as Deputy Barney was handing the papers back to West, he informed West that he was issuing him a warning ticket for speeding, that there would be no fine associated with the ticket, and that the traffic infraction would not appear on his record. The court also found that Deputy Barney engaged in conversation regarding West's travel plans. West argues that this questioning was improper and exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. However, questions about travel plans are routine and "may be asked as a matter of course without exceeding the proper scope of a traffic stop." Id. at 1499. The district court found that Deputy Barney returned all of West's papers before questioning West about drugs or seeking consent to search. Deputy Barney, therefore, did not exceed the permissible scope of the traffic stop. See United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 1997).

After the initial justification for the stop was legally concluded, Deputy Barney continued to question West. An officer may extend a traffic stop beyond its initial scope if the suspect consents to further questioning or if the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. See United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999). A traffic stop may become a consensual encounter, requiring no reasonable...

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