USA. v. Weston

• Citation: 255 F.3d 873
• Decision Date: 27 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01-3027,01-3027
• Parties: (D.C. Cir. 2001) United States of America, Appellee v. Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., Appellant
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Page 873

255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

United States of America, Appellee v. Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., Appellant

No. 01-3027

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 16, 2001

Decided July 27, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (98cr00357-01)

Gregory L. Poe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher and Ronald L. Walutes, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Sentelle, Randolph, and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph, with whom Circuit Judge Sentelle joins.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Randolph, Circuit Judge:

Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause there is a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs." Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990). This appeal requires us to decide whether the government may administer such drugs to a pretrial detainee against his will in order to render him competent to stand trial.

I.

On July 24, 1998, an assailant armed with a .38 caliber revolver forced his way past security checkpoints at the United States Capitol. He shot and killed Jacob Chestnut and John Gibson, both officers of the United States Capitol Police. He shot and seriously wounded Douglas McMillan, also an officer of the United States Capitol Police. Russell Eugene Weston, himself seriously wounded by gunfire, was arrested at the scene. The federal government indicted Weston on two counts of murdering a federal law enforcement officer, one count of attempting to murder a federal law enforcement officer, and three counts of using a firearm in a crime of violence.

The government wants to try Weston for these crimes but is presently unable to do so because the district court found him incompetent to stand trial. See United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 117 (D.D.C. 2001); 1 Joint Appendix 4546 (competency order). The district court accepted the conclusion of a court-appointed forensic psychiatrist that Weston suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, and that the severity of his symptoms renders him incapable of understanding the proceedings against him and assisting in his defense, as required to bring a defendant to trial. See 18 U.S.C. 4241(a) (statutory competence requirement); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (constitutional competence requirement). The court committed Weston to the custody of the Attorney General "for treatment in a suitable facility for a reasonable period of time." 1 Joint Appendix 46; see also 18 U.S.C. 4241(d).

Weston is currently incarcerated "for treatment" at the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina. He is not being treated. Rather, he was placed in solitary confinement under constant observation when he arrived at FCI Butner and remains there today. The Bureau of Prisons apparently placed him in seclusion to "mitigate [his] dangerousness." Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 130. As an Assistant Director of the Bureau explained, Weston's "mental health seclusion status" is "for very vulnerable inmates, and typically ... reserved for those who present a substantial danger to themselves or somebody else...." 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 59. The district court characterized Weston's confinement situation as "simply the warehousing of Weston in a psychotic state. It is not treatment; at best it contains dangerousness." 134 F. Supp. 2d at 130-31; see also 4 Joint Appendix 103 (Report of court-appointed expert that "the field places severe limitations on the use of seclusion in clinical psychiatry because [it] is considered to be inherently aversive when used for prolonged periods of time.").

There is treatment available for Weston's illness and its symptoms in the form of antipsychotic medication. The parties agree that such medication is likely the only treatment that can mitigate his schizophrenia and attendant delusions, and thus restore his competence to stand trial. See Brief for Appellant at 5; Brief for Appellee at 12-13. Weston is not currently receiving any such medication because, at a time when he was considered medically competent to make a determination, he refused them. The district court prohibited the Bureau of Prisons from forcibly medicating Weston without a court order.

After two administrative hearings and two district court hearings, the government obtained an order authorizing it to administer antipsychotic medication against Weston's will. See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 1999). The district court held that forcible medication was "medically appropriate" and "essential for [Weston's] own safety or the safety of others." Id. at 118. It also found that "the government has a fundamental interest in bringing the defendant to trial," but determined that the dangerousness holding made it unnecessary to decide whether that interest outweighed Weston's right to refuse antipsychotic medication. See id. at 118-19. The court declined to consider Weston's claim that forced medication would interfere with his right to a fair trial, holding it was not ripe. See id. at 107.

A panel of this court reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding that the district court's dangerousness finding was not supported by the record. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The panel also reversed the district court's determination that Weston's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial claim was not ripe, holding that "because antipsychotic medication may affect the defendant's ability to assist in his defense, postmedication review may come too late to prevent impairment of his Sixth Amendment right." Id. at 14 (citations omitted). The panel also directed the district court to consider Weston's argument that medical ethics preclude forcibly medicating a defendant to make him competent for trial in a case that might carry the death penalty. See id. at 14 n.3.

On remand, the district court again held that the Bureau of Prisons could forcibly medicate Weston. It concluded that antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and "essential to control and treat Weston's dangerousness to others." Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 127, 131. The district court also held that the "government has an essential interest in bringing Weston to trial" given "the serious and violent nature of the charges, that the immediate victims were federal law enforcement officers performing their official duties, and that the killings took place inside the U.S. Capitol amid a crowd of innocent bystanders." Id. at 132. The court concluded that forcible medication would not interfere with Weston's right to a fair trial, and could in some respects enhance his ability to exercise that right by improving his mental function. See id. at 132-38.

In this appeal, Weston claims that administering antipsychotic drugs against his will violates his Fifth Amendment due process liberty interest "in avoiding unwanted bodily intrusion" and implicates his right to a fair trial. See Brief for Appellant at 37-38. In earlier stages of this case, Weston asserted a First Amendment right to freedom from compulsory medication and challenged the Bureau of Prisons' administrative procedures under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.¹ He has not raised either issue here so we do not consider them. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the government's interest in administering antipsychotic drugs to make Weston competent for trial overrides his liberty interest, and that restoring his competence in such manner does not necessarily violate his right to a fair trial.

II.

The due process liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication may be "significant," but it is not absolute. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982). In Washington v. Harper and later in Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court recognized that the government may, under certain circumstances, forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a prisoner or criminal defendant despite his liberty interest, provided such medication is "medically appropriate." See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220, 222-23 & n.8, 226-27 (1990). With respect to Weston, there is no doubt that this latter condition has been met.

Whether a proposed course of action is "medically appropriate" obviously depends on the judgment of medical professionals. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 231, 233-34; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07, 609 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). The district court relied on several experts in concluding that "[a]ntipsychotic medication is the medically acceptable and indicated treatment for Weston's illness." Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 122.

The district court measured the medical appropriateness of antipsychotic medication by examining the capacity of antipsychotic drugs to alleviate Weston's schizophrenia (the medical benefits) against their capacity to produce harm (the medical costs, or side effects). See id. at 123. Numerous experts testified that antipsychotic medication is the medically appropriate treatment for Weston's illness.² While there are potential side effects,³ the professional judgment of the medical experts was that "each of these potential side effects is generally manageable." Id. at 123, 125. The short of the matter is that the record leaves no basis for doubting...