A. v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 07 July 1972
• Citation: 31 N.Y.2d 83,286 N.E.2d 432,335 N.Y.S.2d 33
• Parties: , 286 N.E.2d 432 In the Matter of Patricia A., a Person Alleged To Be In Need of Supervision, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent. * * State Report Title: Matter of Patricia A.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 33

335 N.Y.S.2d 33

31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432

In the Matter of Patricia A., a Person Alleged To Be In Need of Supervision, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent. * * State Report Title: Matter of Patricia A.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 7, 1972.

Rena K. Uviller, William E. Hellerstein, New York City, and Charles Schinitsky, Brooklyn, for appellant.

J. Lee Rankin, Corp. Counsel (Edmund B. Hennefeld and Stanley Buchsbaum, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Chief Judge.

The appellant Patricia A. has been adjudicated a person in need of supervision (referred to at times as PINS) pursuant to section 712 (subd. (b)) of the Family Court Act. Such a person is there defined as 'a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accord with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law (relating to truancy or other nonattendance) or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority.' The appellant, 16 years old at the time of her PINS adjudication, contends, first--as does 15-year-old Tomasita in the companion appeal (Matter of Tomasita N., 30 N.Y.2d 927, 335 N.Y.S.2d 683, 287 N.E.2d 377, also decided today)--that the statute offends against the requirements of due process in that it is unconstitutionally vague and, second, that it discriminates against the 16 and 17-year-old female in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions. We treat each claim separately.

A statute is void for vagueness, the Supreme Court has stated, if it 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' (United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, see, also, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230--232, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886; People v. Bergerson, 17 N.Y.2d 398, 403, 271 N.Y.S.2d 236, 239, 218 N.E.2d 288, 290; People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64, 67, 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26, 215 N.E.2d 345, 347; People v. Salisbury, 18 N.Y.2d 899, 276 N.Y.S.2d 634, 223 N.E.2d 43; Matter of Mario, 65 Misc.2d 708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659.) In the Bergerson case (17 N.Y.2d 398, 271 N.Y.S.2d 236, 218 N.E.2d 288, Supra), we rejected the claim of vagueness in section 483 of the former Penal Law--which made it a misdemeanor to 'cause' or 'permit' the life of a child to be endangered or its health to be injured--and quoted the rule laid down in Byron that "(t)he test is whether a reasonable man subject to the statute would be informed of the nature of the offense prohibited and what is required of him. Such warning must be unequivocal but this requirement does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding" (17 N.Y.2d, at p. 403, 271 N.Y.S.2d at p. 239, 218 N.E.2d at p. 291). And, in People v. Salisbury, 18 N.Y.2d 899, 276 N.Y.S.2d 634, 223 N.E.2d 43, Supra; see, also, People v. Duke, 23 N.Y.2d 780, 297 N.Y.S.2d 144, 244 N.E.2d 711, we upheld the former wayward minor statute (Code Crim.Proc., § 913--a et seq., omitted from present CPL) against the charge that the term 'morally depraved or * * * in danger of becoming morally depraved' was unconstitutionally vague. ¹

The appellant contends that the PINS statute does not meet essential tests or guidelines; more specifically, that it does not give potential offenders notice of what they may not do and that it does not provide adequate standards for the guidance of Family Court judges in applying the statute. In this connection, the appellant declares that what one parent or judge might consider grounds for a PINS adjudication--violation of midnight curfews, for example--another parent or another judge might be willing to overlook.

We find these arguments less than persuasive. The terms, 'habitual truant,' 'incorrigible,' 'ungovernable,' 'habitually disobedient and beyond * * * lawful control', as well as the sort of conduct proscribed, are easily understood. ² The danger that Family Court judges may make an unduly restrictive application of the statute in marginal cases seems unrealistic. As the Supreme Court declared in Harriss (347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, Supra), a 'statute will not be struck down as vague even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.'

The conclusion that the PINS statute is sufficiently definite to pass constitutional muster finds further support in the circumstance that, prior to 1962, the conduct there prohibited had long constituted grounds for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency (former Children's Ct. Act, § 2; former Social Welfare Law, § 371). Thus, the Supreme Court, in upholding the term, 'moral turpitude' against a charge of vagueness in the Jordan case (341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703, Supra), declared that it was 'significant that the phrase has been part of the immigration laws for more than sixty years', even though it recognized that this was only 'an element to be considered in deciding the question of vagueness' (p. 229, 71 S.Ct. p. 707). And a California statute, couched in terms quite similar to our PINS statute (Welfare and Institutions Code, § 601), has been upheld against a claim of unconstitutional vagueness by an appellate court of that State. (See, e.g., In re S, 10 Cal.App.3d 944, 89 Cal.Rptr. 685.) Other States, as well, have approved legislation containing equally broad language in legislation defining juvenile delinquency. (See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 16 Alaska 368, 374, 143 F.Supp. 1; State in Interest of L.N., 109 N.J.Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150, affd. 57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409, cert. den. 402 U.S. 1009, 91 S.Ct. 2194, 29 L.Ed.2d 431; E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Ct. of Civ.Apps.), cert. den. 398 U.S. 956, 90 S.Ct. 2171, 26 L.Ed.2d 540.)

Concluding, then, that the statute is sufficiently definite, we turn to the charge that it unconstitutionally discriminates against females.

Discrimination by the State between different classes of citizens must, at the very least, 'have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.' (Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 763, 15 L.Ed.2d 620; see, also, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, decided April 3, 1972; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, decided March 22, 1972; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225; Matter of Jesmer v. Dundon, 29 N.Y.2d 5, 9; Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, D.C., 308 F.Supp. 1253; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529; Matter of Louise B. 68 Misc.2d 95, 326 N.Y.S.2d 702.) Phrased somewhat differently, the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstances shall be treated alike." (Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, Supra.)

The object of the PINS statute is to provide rehabilitation and treatment for young persons who engage in the sort of conduct there proscribed. This affords no reasonable ground, however, for differentiating between males and females over 16 and under 18. Girls in that age bracket are no more prone than boys to truancy, disobedience, incorrigible conduct and the like, nor are they more in need of rehabilitation and treatment by reason of such conduct.

The argument that discrimination against females on the basis of age is justified because of the obvious danger of pregnancy in an immature...