V. L. Dodds Co. v. Consolidated School Dist. of Lamont

• Decision Date: 19 November 1935
• Docket Number: 42634.
• Citation: 263 N.W. 522,220 Iowa 812
• Parties: V. L. DODDS CO. v. CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. OF LAMONT.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

263 N.W. 522

220 Iowa 812

V. L. DODDS CO. v. CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. OF LAMONT.

No. 42634.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 19, 1935

Appeal from District Court, Buchanan County; A. B. Lovejoy, Judge.

Plaintiff brought suit for a bill of goods, part to be delivered in 1931 and part to be delivered in 1932, receiving discount from the total price of both bills of goods of $17.50. Jury waived and tried to court; finding and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant excepts and appeals.

Affirmed.

Roy A Cook, of Independence, for appellant.

John L. Cherney, of Independence, and B. D. Silliman, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

PARSONS, Justice.

The plaintiff is engaged in the business of selling school and office supplies, and the defendant is a consolidated school district, organized under the laws of the state of Iowa.

On March 18, 1931, one Dopp, president of the board of directors of the school district, and purchasing agent of the district ordered from the plaintiff a bill of goods to be shipped to the district. The goods ordered were twenty-five cases of single towels at $4.40 per case, two cases toilet tissue at $9.20 each, twenty-five cases single towels at $4.40 each and two cases of toilet tissue at $9.20 each. The goods were to be shipped in separate lots. By ordering in this quantity instead of a single shipment there was an allowance of $17.50 made to the district; in other words, a discount. The arrangement was that the goods were to be shipped one half in March, 1931, and the other half to be shipped in August 1932. The goods were shipped as agreed, and the district paid for the first shipment as agreed, but the last half was not paid. The defendant entered a general denial to the petition of plaintiff, then denied it had purchased the goods for delivery in August, 1932, and denied that Dopp had any authority to contract in its behalf. A jury was waived, and the case was brought to the court, and the court rendered its decision October 25, 1933, finding for the plaintiff and against the defendant for $130.53, the amount of the bill on November 22, 1932, with interest at 6 per cent. from that date. The defendant excepted to the judgment and appealed to this court.

The defendant, appellant, cites in its argument, and largely relies on Burkhead v. Independent School Dist. of Independence, 107 Iowa, 29, 77 N.W. 491, and Consolidated School Dist. of Glidden v. Griffin, 201 Iowa, 63, 206 N.W. 86.In the Burkhead Case, the plaintiff therein was employed April 5, 1893, by the board of directors to the Independent School District for a period of five years, at an annual salary of $1,500, payable in monthly installments, the contract saying, " to perform all the duties of superintendent and teacher required of him by law and the rules and regulations of the board, established for the government of said schools." He rendered the services for three years, and in his petition alleged he was ready and willing to perform the duty of superintendent and teach in pursuance of the contract, but the defendant, though no charges had been made against him, refused to allow him so to do. That no salary had been paid him for any part of the year beginning with September, 1896, and ending with June, 1897. The defendant demurred; the only ground of which is necessary to notice here is " the board of directors was without authority to employ a teacher for a period of five years." The district court sustained the demurrer. Plaintiff elected to stand on the ruling, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. In an opinion written by Judge Ladd, the court said, " The important question, however, is whether the board of directors had the authority to employ a teacher or superintendent for a period of five years. Our statutes are silent as to the duration of such contracts, and a limitation of the length of time a teacher may be engaged to teach in the public schools." It further said, " the board of directors represents the district,-from a legal standpoint, is the district. It is a continuous body. The officers change, but the corporation continues unchanged. The contracts are of the corporation, and not of the members of the board individually," citing a line of authorities. It then says, " section 2773 of the Code authorizes the board of directors to ‘ designate the period each school shall be held beyond the time required by law.’ That time is 24 weeks of 5 school days each in each school year commencing the third Monday in March, unless the county superintendent shall authorize shortening this period." It then goes on to say that as the time school is to be taught cannot be known in advance, it would be impossible for the teacher or board to fairly contract. It then points out that the electors are empowered to determine what additional branches shall be taught during the following year, and the board is authorized to prescribe a full course of study for the school. It then points out, How shall it be ascertained, several years in advance, whether the teacher employed will be competent to instruct in branches which may be prescribed by the electors or the board? It then calls attention that not exceeding $15 per year for each pupil may be raised for teacher's fund. How shall it be known whether the fund to be raised will be sufficient to compensate the teacher according to his contract for a longer period than one year? If it were...