Hay v. Salisbury

• Decision Date: 02 August 1926
• Citation: 92 Fla. 446,109 So. 617
• Parties: HAY v. SALISBURY et ux.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

109 So. 617

92 Fla. 446

HAY v. SALISBURY et ux.

Florida Supreme Court

August 2, 1926

Suit by Lillian Mae Hay against Lyman A. Salisbury and wife for specific performance. Form a decree dismissing the complaint complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

Terrell J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Principle on which doctrine of res judicata rests is that when right or fact has been tried and determined by court of competent jurisdiction, or opportunity for such trial has been given judgment, so long as unreversed, should be conclusive on parties and their privies. 'The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate.' 15 R. C. L. p. 953.

Public policy demands that matters distinctly put in issue and determined by court of competent jurisdiction as to parties and subject-matter shall not be retried between same parties in any subsequent suit in any court. 'Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation, and the peace and order of society demand that matters distinctly put in issue and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as to parties and subject-matter shall not be retried between the same parties in any subsequent suit in any court. The doctrine of res judicata not only puts an end to strife, but produces certainty as to individual rights and gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings which otherwise would be endless.' 15 R. C. L. p. 954.

In order that the plea of res judicata be sustained, there must be identity of the causes of action involved in the prior suit and the pending suits, and there must also be the same parties, or their privies.

Test of identity of causes of action to determine question of res judicata is identity of facts essential to maintenance of suits. 'The test of the identity of causes of action, for the purpose of determining the question of res adjudicata, is the identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the suits.' Jackson v. Bullock, 62 Fla. 507, 57 So 355.

Judgment in first suit is conclusive, not only as to every question decided, but as to every other matter which parties might have litigated within issues or as incident to or essentially connected with subject-matter of litigation. 'When the second suit is between the same parties as the first and on the same cause of action, the judgment in the former is conclusive in the latter, not only as to every question which was decided, but also as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and had determined within the issues as they were made or tendered by the pleadings or as incident to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation, whether the same, as a matter of fact, were or were not considered. As to such matters a new suit on the same cause of action cannot be maintained between the same parties. This rule applies to every question falling within the purview of the original action, both in respect to matters of claim and defense, which could have been presented by the exercise of due diligence.' 15 R. C. L. p. 963.

Judgment on merits is absolute bar to subsequent action on same claim, and concludes parties and their privies, not only as to every matter offered and received, but as to any admissible matter which might have been offered. 'A judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim, and concludes the parties and their privies, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter that might have been offered for either purpose.' Sauls v. Freeman, 24 Fla. 209, 4 So. 525, 12 Am. St. Rep. 190.

Judgment or decree unreversed, estops parties from setting up new suit to annul or set aside any matter of defense of which they could have availed themselves in original proceedings. 'A judgment or decree, unreversed, is conclusive upon parties and estops them from setting up, in a new suit brought to annul or set it aside, any matter of defense of which the parties could have availed themselves in the original proceeding, the evidence of the facts constituting the defense having been known to the parties in due time.' Mattair v. Card, Adm'r, 19 Fla. 455.

That final decree is pro confesso does not prevent it being conclusive between parties as to matters litigated. The fact that a final decree adjudicating the rights of litigants is upon a decree pro confesso does not prevent such decree from being conclusive and binding between the parties as to the matters litigated.

Conclusiveness of judgment does not depend on form of fact that court investigated or decided legal principles involved; judgment by default or on confession is as conclusive on rights of parties as judgment on demurrer or verdict. 'The conclusiveness of a judgment upon the rights of parties does in no wise depend upon its form, or upon the fact that the court investigated or decided the legal principles involved. A judgment by default or upon confession is, in its nature, just as conclusive upon the rights of the parties before the court, as a judgment upon demurrer or verdict.' Gifford v. Thorn, 9 N. J. Eq. 722.

Decree in suit to remove claims under contract as clouds on title held res judicata in subsequent suit to enforce specific performance of contract, as any claims under the contracts could have been litigated in the former action. To a bill filed by H. against S., seeking to enforce the specific performance of an alleged contract entered into for the sale of certain real estate by S. to H., a plea of res adjudicata was filed, alleging a prior suit by S. against H. and another, seeking the removal of any claims of said H. and another under said alleged contract, or otherwise, said real estate as clouds upon the title of S., the service of process in said suit, the entry of decree pro confesso and final decree thereon, quieting the title of S. as against any claims of H. under said contract, and declaring the fee-simple title to said property in S., free of any claims of H. thereto under said contract, or otherwise. Under an agreed statement of facts, the allegation of the plea was sustained. Held, that the final decree in the prior suit adjudicated the rights of H. under the contract, as any rights she may have had under the alleged contract could and should have been put in issue in the prior suit.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pinlas County; M. A. McMullen, judge.

COUNSEL

Hampton, Bull & Pencke and S. S. Sandford, all of Tampa, for appellant.

Harris & Denning, of St. Petersburg, for appellees.

OPINION

CAMPBELL Circuit Judge.

On June 30, 1924, Lillian Mae Hay filed her bill of complaint in the court below, seeking to have Lyman A. Salisbury and Ruth F. Salisbury, his wife, specifically perform an alleged verbal agreement to convey certain lands described in the bill of complaint as follows, to wit:

Lot three (3) of W. S. Smith's replat of block five (5) of Lakeside Subdivision, as per recorded plat thereof.

The bill alleges in substance that on or about June 1, 1923, the complainant, through her agent, James D. Hay, entered into a verbal agreement to purchase from defendant Lyman A. Salisbury the property described for a specified amount; that $100 of the consideration was paid in cash; and that complainant, the purchaser, was let into the possession of the property; that another payment was to be made when the defendant delivered a valid written contract evidencing said sale; and that further installment was to be paid on January 1, 1925, when a warranty deed would be executed by defendants and delivered to complainant, and a mortgage on said property executed by complainant to secure the deferred payments; that a certain contract for the sale of property to complainant was executed and tendered to complainant, but that it excepted a perpetual easement of four feet across the lot which was not mentioned in the oral agreement; that complainant declined to accept the contract unless the exception of the perpetual lease was eliminated from the contract, or the purchase price reduced pro tanto; that after negotiations extending over several months, the complainant, not being able to induce the defendant to eliminate from the contract the provision for a perpetual easement, or to get him to reduce the consideration pro tanto, advised defendant that the complainant would accept the contract as drawn, providing for the reserved easement; and that she was ready to make the payments in cash provided for in the contract, and, upon receiving the warranty deed to the property, was ready to execute a mortgage thereon to secure the deferred payments; that the defendant refused to carry out the provisions of the contract, accept the payments, and execute therefor his warranty deed.

The bill prays that the defendant be required to execute and deliver to the complainant a deed of conveyance for the property, properly joined by his wife, upon payment of such of the cash installments of the purchase price as might be due and the execution of the mortgage for the deferred payments, as provided for in the alleged agreement.

To this bill of complaint the respondents filed a plea, setting up a prior adjudication of the questions raised in complainant's bill of complaint. This plea was filed on April 6, 1925, and alleges in substance...