TE v. State (In re AAAE)

• Decision Date: 10 September 2020
• Docket Number: S-20-0006
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the PATERNITY OF: AAAE, a minor child, TE, Appellant (Petitioner), v. State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, Appellee (Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

471 P.3d 990

In the MATTER OF the PATERNITY OF: AAAE, a minor child,

TE, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, Appellee (Respondent).

S-20-0006

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 10, 2020

Representing Appellant: Deborah L. Roden and Mary Katherine "Katye" Brown, Woodhouse Roden Nethercott, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Brown.

Representing Appellee: Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Misha Westby, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Kucera.

Guardians ad Litem: Dan S. Wilde, Deputy State Public Defender; Joseph R. Belcher, Chief Trial and Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Guardian ad Litem Program, a division of the Office of the State Public Defender. Appearance by Mr. Belcher.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] TE filed a Petition to Establish Paternity of AAAE (AE). The district court granted TE's request for genetic testing, and the results confirmed that he is the child's biological father. The district court issued an order adjudicating paternity, and the Department of Family Services (the Department) objected. The district court vacated the order and set the case for trial. After trial, the district court concluded TE had not timely filed his Petition to Establish Paternity and denied the petition. TE appealed. We reverse.

ISSUES

[¶2] We address the following issues:

1. Could the Department of Family Services challenge the district court's order adjudicating TE's paternity?

2. Does Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-817 afford the district court discretion to deny a petition to establish paternity after ordering genetic testing, the results of which rebuttably establish paternity?

FACTS

[¶3] While married to JCM, FCM was involved in a romantic relationship with TE. She was still married to JCM when she gave birth to AE in November 2013, making JCM AE's presumed father. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-705. TE was present at AE's birth, but he was not listed as the father on the birth certificate, and he did not sign any paternity paperwork at the hospital. After AE was born, TE purchased an at-home paternity test from Walgreens. The results disclosed a 99.99% probability that TE was the child's biological father. At that time, TE did not act to establish paternity. TE and FCM started living together before AE's birth and continued to do so until July 2014 when AE was eight months old. In July 2014, TE was incarcerated. He remained incarcerated until February 2015 and then lived in a halfway house from February to September 2015.

[¶4] In December 2015, the Department took protective custody of AE and her brother. Ultimately, the Department sought to terminate the rights of the parents of both children. The Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, as it pertained to AE, named FCM as the natural mother, JCM as the presumed father, and TE as the alleged father. In May 2017, both FCM and JCM voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to AE.

[¶5] TE responded to the Department's petition and denied its allegations. In August 2017, TE filed a Motion for Judgment on Pleadings Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(c) and 12(b)(6) or in the Alternative Motion to Stay Proceeding Pending Establishment of Paternity. TE argued that the termination proceeding should be dismissed as it pertained to his rights. In support of his argument, he asserted that the Department could not terminate his parental rights because he did not have any legally established rights. TE alternatively requested a stay to allow time for him to establish parentage and assert parental rights. The Department did not object to TE's dismissal from the termination action but argued that he should be precluded from asserting any rights to AE. TE was not dismissed from the termination action.

[¶6] In September 2017, TE filed a Petition to Establish Paternity in the termination case. The Department moved to strike the petition, arguing that it should not have been filed in the termination action asserting, inter alia , that the Department was not an appropriate party to the paternity action.¹ While this motion was pending, TE filed a Petition to Establish Paternity in a new docket, naming FCM as the sole respondent. In an "abundance of caution," he served FCM, JCM and the Department. Only the Department filed an answer. In March 2018, the district court joined the paternity and termination actions, adding the paternity case to the termination docket.²

[¶7] TE filed a Motion for Order for Genetic Testing and an accompanying affidavit. The Department objected, arguing it would be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between AE and JCM; TE did not bring the paternity action within a reasonable time; and JCM should be estopped from denying parentage.³ In response, TE argued that JCM had executed an irrevocable relinquishment of parental rights and was supportive of TE's efforts to establish paternity. He also claimed JCM's conduct did not estop JCM from denying presumptive parentage. TE argued that it was not inequitable for him to move forward with his paternity action because AE had no legal parents, he had a relationship with her, and establishing his paternity would provide her with a legal and biological parent. Finally, he argued he brought his paternity action within a reasonable time and within the five-year statutory timeline.

[¶8] After a hearing, the district court generally agreed with TE. The court concluded that it would "not be inequitable to allow genetic testing ... both presumed parents executed relinquishments of parental rights and as such there can be no inequity to either presumed parent in [proving] a paternal relationship between the alleged father and child." The court also found that the presumed father's relinquishment "render[ed] many of [the statutory] factors [regarding the child's best interests] inapplicable to this case." See infra ¶ 18. It recognized that TE had "not all together foregone the chance at a relationship with [AE]" and that he alleges he "maintains consistent visitation with [AE] ... [and has] made some belated attempts, though unsuccessful, to establish a legal relationship with [AE] ... [and AE] is still relatively young, knows [TE], and the potential for establishing a father-child relationship still exists." The court then concluded, "the time frame in which [TE] asserted his parentage is reasonable under the circumstances." The court granted TE's motion and required the Department to cover the cost of testing.

[¶9] Genetic testing was conducted and disclosed a 99.99% probability of paternity and a combined paternity index of 1,211,096,210 to 1. TE filed a Motion for Order Adjudicating Parentage. The district court granted the motion and entered an Order Adjudicating Parentage. After the order was entered, the Department filed a response raising the same arguments it had previously made against TE's motion for genetic testing. See supra ¶ 7.

[¶10] The district court vacated its Order Adjudicating Parentage, stating "Despite the various assertions in the pleadings to date, no evidence has been presented on the issue of parentage. ... The question of parentage is, and should remain, a question for the trier of fact." The district court held a trial, and at its conclusion, found the petition was not filed in a reasonable time under statutes for establishment of paternity or for disestablishment of paternity . The court denied TE's Petition to Establish Paternity. TE timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Could the Department of Family Services challenge the district court's order adjudicating TE's paternity?

[¶11] TE asserts that the Department lacks standing to contest his Petition to Establish Paternity. The Department argues that it has standing because the Wyoming Parentage Act does not exclude it as a party, and it is a real party in interest.

[¶12] We do not address the Department's argument because it has a more fundamental standing problem—it was not a party to the paternity action: the Department was not named as a party in TE's Petition to Establish Paternity and it did not seek to intervene in the action. In fact, when TE initially sought to add his paternity claim to the termination proceedings, the Department argued it was not a proper party and TE must bring his claims in a separate suit.⁴ He did so.

[¶13] The Department had no right to participate in the paternity action. A nonparty does not have standing as a litigant in a lawsuit. See Matter of Adoption of JLP , 774 P.2d 624, 627 (Wyo. 1989) ("If appellant's parental rights were properly terminated, and we herein determine they were, then appellant was a stranger to the subsequent adoption proceeding and had no right to object to or participate in that proceeding."); YHT & Assocs., Inc. v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC , 177 So. 3d 641, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("[A]lthough YHT had the opportunity to challenge the trial court's denial of its motion to intervene, YHT failed to do so, leaving it as a nonparty to the proceedings below and thus without standing to appeal to this court."); Edmunds v. Edmunds , 194 N.C.App. 425, 669 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2008), aff'd , 363 N.C. 740, 686 S.E.2d 150 (2009) ("In general, only a party or his legal representative has standing to request that an order be set aside under Rule 60(b); a stranger to the action may not request such relief." (citation omitted)).

[¶14] The Department maintains it has standing by virtue of the joinder of the paternity and termination actions under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-810.⁵ The Department argues TE "cannot join his action to an action where the Department is the petitioner and then claim the Department cannot be a party to the joined action." There is a distinction between the joinder of actions under W.R.C.P. 18 and the joinder of parties under W.R.C.P. 19.

[The] joinder of causes of action in federal practice has its source in Rule 18(a) ... which permits and encourages

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