A v. X, Y, and Z
Decision Date | 08 March 1982 |
Docket Number | No. C-4,C-4 |
Citation | 641 P.2d 1222 |
Parties | A, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. X, Y, AND Z, Appellees (Defendants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
John M. Daly, of Daly, Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, Gillette, for appellant.
Francis E. Stevens, of Sheehan, Stevens & Sansonetti, Gillette, for appellees.
Dan R. Price, II, of Morgan & Brorby, Guardian Ad Litem, Gillette, for appellee, Minor Child X.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
Appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as A) brought this action to establish his paternity to appellee-defendant X (hereinafter referred to as child). In early November 1979, A and appellee-defendant Y (hereinafter referred to as mother) engaged in sexual intercourse. On February 8, 1980, mother and appellee-defendant Z (hereinafter referred to as Z) were married. On August 3, 1980, mother gave birth to child. The trial court held that A lacked standing to bring this action. A appeals from the order dismissing his amended complaint with prejudice. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the child.
We affirm.
A alleged in his amended complaint that he is the biological father of child; that Z is the presumptive father of child; that child will have needs; that A has financial means to provide for child's needs; and that he desires to do so. Such allegations are taken to be true for the purposes of this action. In his prayer, A requests that he be declared the father of child; that child's birth records be changed to strike Z's name therefrom and to reflect A as child's father; and that A be given visitation rights and an obligation to support child.
At common law, a biological father could not bring an action for paternity. Blanton v. Warn, Wyo., 444 P.2d 325 (1968). He has only those rights conferred by statute. In recognition of such, A recited that this action was brought pursuant to §§ 14-2-101 through 14-2-120, W.S.1977. Section 14-2-104, W.S.1977, designates those entitled to bring a paternity action. It authorizes such action only in three instances:
A cannot qualify to bring the action under any of the three instances. He is not a presumed father under § 14-2-102(a)(i)(ii) or (iii), W.S.1977, inasmuch as he was not married to the mother when the child was born; there was no attempted marriage between A and mother before the child's birth which "is or could be declared invalid"; and there was no attempted marriage between A and mother after the child's birth which "is or could be declared invalid." There is not here a presumed relationship under § 14-2-102(a)(iv) inasmuch as such refers to a presumption arising if A receives the minor child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child. And, finally, subsection (c), § 14-2-104, is inapplicable since there is a presumed father and child relationship under § 14-2-102, between Z and child by virtue of the fact that Z was married to mother at the time of child's birth. Section 14-2-102 provides in pertinent part:
It would seem, then, that the issue is settled and that A lacked standing to maintain this action. However, A contends that such construction unconstitutionally deprives him of due process of law and denies to him equal protection of the law 1 by virtue of an impermissible gender-based classification which results from failure to give the biological father the same procedure to establish paternity or nonpaternity as is given to the mother.
He does not suggest that such should make the entire enactment (§ 14-2-101, W.S.1977 et seq.) unconstitutional, and, thus, leave the matter as it would be under common law. Rather, he argues that legislative intent was to enact a constitutional law and that we should give recognition to such intent by construing the act in a manner whereby A would have standing to
maintain the action. See Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61 (1981). 2
A is not denied equal protection of the law. Gender-based classifications are not ipso facto invalid.
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1236, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975)." Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1204, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981).
Furthermore, to word the enactment without gender classification would result as a purpose for the enactment to be a determination of the existence or nonexistence of a presumed mother in addition to that of a presumed father. Such result would be an absurdity. Nature identifies the mother at the time of birth. There is no need to engage in presumptions.
As reflected in its opinion letter, the trial court properly found that:
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...from confusion, torn affection, and the stigma of illegitimacy. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-500, 97 S.Ct. at 1935-36. See A. v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.1982); Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075 In failing to recognize the significant countervailing constitutional interests......
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