Vaccarella v. Fusari

• Decision Date: 13 September 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 15343.
• Citation: 365 F. Supp. 1164
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Anthony F. VACCARELLA and Jayne Marie Vaccarella, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Jack A. FUSARI, Connecticut Labor Commissioner, et al., Defendants.

365 F. Supp. 1164

Anthony F. VACCARELLA and Jayne Marie Vaccarella, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Jack A. FUSARI, Connecticut Labor Commissioner, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 15343.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 13, 1973.

Albert W. Hilburger, Garon Camassar, New London, Conn., for plaintiffs; Elliot Taubman, Norwich, Conn., of counsel.

Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., Donald E. Wasik, Asst. Atty. Gen., Employment

Security Division, Labor Dept., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

Before SMITH, Circuit Judge, and BLUMENFELD and CLARIE, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BLUMENFELD, District Judge:

This case requires us to consider a constitutional challenge to that portion of Connecticut's unemployment compensation laws which provides for payments to eligible claimants of an additional allowance of $5.00 per week for each of certain dependents of a worker when he is unemployed through no fault of his own.

The plaintiff, Anthony F. Vaccarella, has been denied a dependency allowance for his 10-year-old sister who is a member of his household and supported solely by him. The state's denial was based solely on the ground that her relationship to the plaintiff is not one of those for which the statute permits such allowances. He requests a declaration that the statute is invalid in that it is violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it does not include minor dependent wards among those for whom an allowance shall be paid, and an injunction against the defendants from refusing to pay the allowance to the plaintiff and all persons similarly situated.¹

The plaintiff relies upon the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for a cause of action, and upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) for this court's jurisdiction. A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 to hear this constitutional challenge to the state statute.

I. The Statute

The pertinent part of the statute on which the defendants rely for rejecting the plaintiff's claim reads as follows:

"Each individual who is eligible to receive benefits for unemployment with respect to any week shall be paid with respect to such week a dependency allowance of five dollars for such individual's nonworking spouse, . . . living in the same household with such individual and for each of such individual's children or stepchildren who at the beginning of the individual's current benefit year were being wholly or mainly supported by such individual and were under eighteen years of age . . . ." Conn.Gen. Stats. § 31-234.

II. Facts

The relevant factual background is undisputed and is largely the subject of a stipulation. The plaintiff, Anthony F. Vaccarella, was laid off from work at Electric Boat Division, General Dynamics Corporation, on or about April 28, 1972, and applied for unemployment compensation benefits shortly thereafter. At the time he was laid off, he was the sole support of his sister, Jayne Marie Vaccarella.²

When the plaintiff's mother died, she was the guardian of Jayne Marie. Since that time Jayne Marie has been living in the plaintiff's home and has been solely supported by him. She has no estate of her own. Her father had disappeared years before and has not been heard from since. Initially the plaintiff, who is 25 years of age, sought to assume full legal responsibility for his 10-year-old sister by adopting her, but the probate court felt that was most irregular and the proceedings were modified. On August 4, 1972 the New London Probate Court appointed the plaintiff and his wife as guardians of both the person and estate of Jayne Marie.

On or about August 11, 1972, the plaintiff applied at the New London unemployment compensation office for the dependency allowance for his ward, Jayne Marie Vaccarella. He was orally denied those benefits by a responsible official of the unemployment compensation office because she was neither the child nor stepchild of the plaintiff, and he was told it would not serve any purpose to apply for such benefits in writing.³ It is admitted that the plaintiff was entitled to unemployment benefits with allowances for his spouse and his children.

III.

Whenever legislation operates to grant benefits to some people, but not to others similarly situated, there is a basis for a claim under the equal protection clause. The question to be decided is whether the legislature's failure to provide for an allowance on account of children in the status of Jayne Marie while granting allowances on behalf of other children or stepchildren who are similarly situated within a family and with respect to support is so arbitrary and capricious as to be violative of the equal protection clause.

Unemployment compensation is designed to assist those who, although generally employed, are unable through no fault of their own to secure employment.⁴ The provision for an additional allowance for certain children clearly relates to social and economic matters. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed. 231 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1108 (2d Cir. 1973). Accordingly, the non-inclusion of an allowance for children in the status of Jayne Marie must be sustained if "it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 33 (1973). See also, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed.2d 583, 589 (1973); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). Unemployment compensation payments are made only while the worker is involuntarily unemployed. The obvious purpose of the statute is to help tide a family over the period when its bread winner is unable to earn the wages needed to support it. And the allowance of an additional $5.00 per week for each child in the family is clearly rational, for the larger the family, the more it takes to support it. When attention is paid to the context of the statute, the key words are "dependency allowance . . . for such individual's nonworking spouse . . . living in the same household . . . and for each of such individual's children (under eighteen years of age) . . . being wholly or mainly supported by such individual . . . ."

If the purpose of the statute is to provide a dependency allowance of an additional $5.00 per week for each child living in the same household with an unemployed beneficiary and being wholly or mainly supported by him, then it is difficult to conceive of any rational basis for denial of an allowance for a child living in his household in the situation of Jayne Marie and at the same time the grant of one for any stepchild similarly situated.

The content of the term "children" in this statute is to be determined by state law. "This is especially true where a statute deals with a familial relationship . . . ." DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580, 76 S.Ct. 974, 980, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956). In that context it is particularly noteworthy that in Connecticut's law there is no jural distinction between the obligation of the plaintiff to support Jayne Marie and that of a stepfather to support his stepchildren living in his household. See Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F.Supp. 409, 414 (D.Conn.1969), aff'd, 396 U.S. 5, 90 S. Ct. 25, 24 L.Ed.2d 5 (1969), where it was noted:

"Connecticut does not have a state law of general applicability imposing an obligation on a stepfather to support his minor stepchildren. Ladd v. Welfare Comm'r, 3 Conn.Cir. 504, 507 n. 5, 217 A.2d 490 n. 5 (1965). See Conn.Gen.Stats. § 17-320."

That holding is elaborated in Ladd, supra:

"At common law, a stepparent is under no obligation to support his stepchildren. If, however, he has assumed the parental relation, acting in loco parentis, and holds them out to the world as members of his own family, he may incur the same liability for their support as if they were his own children; and statutes may impose a duty upon a stepparent to support his stepchildren. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 80. There is no such statute in Connecticut."

It has also been held that although "a guardian is not bound to support his ward out of his own estate and is not liable to an action in his personal capacity . . . a guardian duly appointed is in loco parentis⁵ and is entitled to the custody of his ward." Macready v. Wilcox, 33 Conn. 321, 328 (1866). Thus it is clear that Jayne Marie's dependency upon the plaintiff for support has no less of a legal basis than that of a stepchild for support from his stepfather. Indeed, unlike a guardian, a stepfather does not have any right to custody of his stepchild. The consequences of this comparison show that the exclusion of any child living in the family and dependent on its bread winner for support is not based on any substantive standard established pursuant to a general policy.

From the standpoint of practical administration of the statute, it would seem no more difficult to determine whether a child lives "in the same household with such individual" and is "being wholly or mainly supported by such individual and is under eighteen years of age" as the statute requires, whether the child is adopted, a ward, a stepchild, or the natural child of the eligible unemployed worker. Although there is no clue to their thinking, it may be conceivable that the legislators had in mind the advisability of encouraging stepfathers to support their stepchildren despite the absence of any legal obligation upon them to do so. However, it would be no less...