Vafaiyan v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2-06-144-CR.,2-06-144-CR.
• Citation: 279 S.W.3d 374
• Parties: Reza VAFAIYAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

279 S.W.3d 374

Reza VAFAIYAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.

No. 2-06-144-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

December 18, 2008.

Erika Copeland, Abilene, TX, for Appellant.

Barry L. Macha, Criminal District Attorney, John Brasher, Dobie Kosub, Assistant District Attorney for Wichita County, Wichita Falls, TX, for Appellee.

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and McCOY, JJ.

OPINION

ANNE GARDNER, Justice.

I. Introduction

Reza Vafaiyan appeals his conviction and life sentence for money laundering. In his five points, Vafaiyan argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress, that the nonaccomplice testimony insufficiently corroborated the accomplice witness testimony, and that the trial court erred by omitting three witnesses from the accomplice witness jury instruction. Vafaiyan also argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

II. Background and Procedural Facts

From 2002 to 2004, police investigated Vafaiyan extensively for his multiple purchases of pseudoephedrine products from various grocery and drug stores. Vafaiyan was suspected of "smurfing," that is, frequently purchasing small quantities of pseudoephedrine-containing products from a large number of stores to amass an illegal amount of the product. Police suspected that Vafaiyan would then sell the pseudoephedrine products and other methamphetamine precursors to customers via clandestine transactions through his store, Krystal Mart.

During a surveillance of potential smurfing in the area, several police officers detained Vafaiyan during a traffic stop on March 22, 2004, and an officer discovered a paper bag in plain view with pseudoephedrine-containing products inside. The officers arrested Vafaiyan during this stop. On April 23, 2004, police obtained but did not execute a warrant for Vafaiyan's arrest based on an earlier incident regarding his possession of methamphetamine. From April 25 to April 27, police tailed Vafaiyan from Wichita Falls to Shreveport and then back and observed him make several stops at retail stores. On April 27, police arrested Vafaiyan as he returned home from the trip. A search of Vafaiyan's vehicle resulted in discovery of six cases of starter fluid, twelve cases of pseudoephedrine products, five eight-packs of lithium batteries, and $2,100. Police executed more search warrants for his house, store, bank accounts, computers, and deposit account in Atlanta. The grand jury initially indicted Vafaiyan for possession of certain chemicals with intent to manufacture methamphetamine but later re-indicted him for money laundering.

During the trial, police officers, undercover officers, employees, customers, and convicted methamphetamine cooks testified against Vafaiyan. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and a sentence of life imprisonment, and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. Vafaiyan appeals this judgment.

III. The Motion to Suppress

In his first point, Vafaiyan claims the trial court erred by denying to grant his motion to suppress. He argues that the evidence in question was illegally obtained as a result of warrantless searches and searches pursuant to warrants issued without probable cause. We will first consider the two arrests in question, and then we will examine the seven warrants.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex.Crim. App.2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim. App.2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53. Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court's ruling, or when there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818; see Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.

We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974, 124 S.Ct. 1883, 158 L.Ed.2d 469 (2004).

Traffic Stop on March 22, 2004

Officer Spragins testified that he and his colleagues spent the morning of March 22 conducting surveillance on persons obtaining methamphetamine precursor chemicals, such as pseudoephedrine products. The officers were notified by a Walgreens manager about a suspicious precursor purchase by Vafaiyan, and they proceeded to follow him to an Albertsons and to another Walgreens. Officer Spragins testified that he and the other officers observed Vafaiyan driving erratically, signaling one direction and then turning the vehicle the other direction. Officer Spragins stated that Vafaiyan had already pulled over to the side of the road before they could signal for him to stop for the traffic violation. He confirmed that he and the other officers had detained Vafaiyan upon stepping out of their vehicles, despite the fact that Vafaiyan had pulled his vehicle over without official prompting. Officer Dilbeck, another officer at the scene, testified that upon approaching the vehicle, he saw two sacks with two boxes of a pseudoephedrine product in each sack. Officer Dilbeck stated that he asked for consent to search the vehicle and that Vafaiyan verbally gave consent. Officer Spragins testified that they arrested Vafaiyan for possession of certain chemicals with intent to manufacture a controlled substance.

Under Texas law, a law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a motorist who commits a traffic violation when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Vafaiyan's failure to signal a turn constituted a traffic offense. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104 (Vernon 1999); Krug v. State, 86 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, pet. ref'd). Moreover, a peace officer may arrest, without a warrant, a driver who commits a traffic violation because a violation of the Texas traffic laws constitutes probable cause to arrest the violator. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999); Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd). Deferring to the trial court's findings, we conclude that the officers' observations of the traffic violation were sufficient to constitute probable cause for the stop.

The plain view doctrine supported the police officers' subsequent search of the vehicle. For this warrant exception to attach, two requirements must be met: (1) the officer must be in a proper position to view the crime; and (2) the fact that the officer has discovered evidence must be immediately apparent. Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim.App.1991). There must be probable cause to believe the property is associated with some criminal activity. Id. An officer may rely on his own training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

During this stop, Officer Dilbeck saw the packages of Sudafed through the car window. Officer Dilbeck stated that he knew this type of medication was sought by methamphetamine cooks. The officers involved recalled that they saw Vafaiyan enter three separate retail stores shortly before the traffic stop on March 22, 2004. Officers Spragins and Dilbeck testified that they knew individuals acquired an unlawful amount of pseudoephedrine by smurfing. Officer Spragins stated that he had knowledge of the requirements to arrest someone for possession of certain chemicals with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. From this knowledge, he could formulate a reasonable suspicion that, despite the seemingly innocent act of purchasing small amounts of cold medicine from a few places, Vafaiyan was engaging in or about to engage in criminal activity. See Woods v....