Valdes v. State

Decision Date09 September 1993
Docket NumberNo. 76569,76569
Citation626 So.2d 1316
Parties18 Fla. L. Weekly S481 Frank VALDES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Joseph S. Karp, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Celia A. Terenzio, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Frank Valdes appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and numerous lesser offenses and his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.

Around 1:30 p.m. on June 24, 1987, Officers Turner and Griffis transported James O'Brien, a state prison inmate, to a dermatologist's office for an examination. After Griffis pulled the prison van into the parking lot near the doctor's office, William Van Poyck came up to the van and aimed a pistol at Turner's head. Van Poyck ordered Turner to exit the van, and Frank Valdes went to the driver's side of the van to get Griffis. Van Poyck took Turner's gun and ordered him to get under the van. Griffis exited the van and was forced to the back of the vehicle, where he was shot three times, once in the head and twice in the chest. Turner could not tell whether Van Poyck or Valdes actually pulled the trigger. After Griffis was shot, Turner was forced to get up from under the van and look for the keys. When the search proved unsuccessful, Valdes fired several shots at a padlock on the van in an attempt to free O'Brien. One of the shots ricocheted off the van and struck Turner, causing him minor injuries. Van Poyck then pointed his gun at Turner's head, said "you're a dead man," and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire. Turner fled the scene when Van Poyck turned his attention to Valdes, who was smashing one of the van's windows.

Van Poyck and Valdes then ran to their Cadillac, which was parked in an adjacent parking lot. As they headed toward their car, Van Poyck used the butt of his gun to shatter the windshield of another car that had pulled up to the scene. Valdes and Van Poyck then got into the Cadillac, Valdes driving, and sped from the parking lot. The West Palm Beach Police Department responded shortly thereafter to a call from witnesses at the doctor's office. During the subsequent chase Van Poyck leaned out the car window and fired numerous shots at the police cars in pursuit, hitting four of them.

Valdes eventually lost control of the car and crashed into a tree. Van Poyck was tried first, found guilty of numerous offenses and sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Van Poyck v. State, 564 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 1339, 113 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991).

Valdes was found guilty of first-degree murder, armed robbery, seven counts of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and aiding in an attempted escape. The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court followed this recommendation.

Valdes' first argument on appeal relates to his motion to dismiss trial counsel. If a defendant alleges that his counsel is incompetent and requests that counsel be discharged, the trial court must "make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant." Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.) (quoting Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 185, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988). Valdes argues that the trial court here failed to conduct a proper inquiry into the effectiveness of Valdes' counsel and erred in denying Valdes' motion to dismiss his attorneys.

Craig Boudreau and Fredrick Susaneck were appointed to represent Valdes in August 1989. Trouble started in March 1990, when Valdes had an outburst at a hearing, said Boudreau was too busy with another case to pay attention to this one, and stated he did not recognize Boudreau as his attorney. In May, just days before trial was scheduled to begin, Valdes filed a written motion to dismiss counsel, stating that they had a long-standing conflict with him over the appropriate defense and that they were not adequately prepared for trial. He also asserted that they had threatened him and hit him during a meeting at the jail. Valdes noted that he had filed criminal charges against his attorneys and was considering pursuing a civil complaint and a complaint with the American Bar Association. The court reserved ruling on this motion and asked for affidavits from the attorneys in response to the allegations. These affidavits reflect that both attorneys denied the alleged violence or even having a heated discussion on the day of the alleged battery.

A hearing was held on Valdes' motion at the beginning of the trial. The judge began the hearing by telling Valdes he would hear from him first. Valdes asserted that he was constructively without counsel, stated he refused to answer any questions until an attorney was appointed for him, and began complaining about the media coverage of the previous hearing. The judge interrupted Valdes and let the State call their three witnesses, each of whom testified that Valdes did not appear upset when he left the meeting with his attorneys and said nothing to them about any attack.

After each witness's direct examination, the court gave Valdes an opportunity to cross-examine, to which Valdes responded by objecting to the proceeding because he had no attorney to represent him. After the third witness testified, Valdes physically attacked him. A recess was taken, and Valdes was given the opportunity to resume the hearing. Valdes responded by calling the proceeding a "farce" and a "sham" and swearing at the judge. Valdes was removed from the courtroom again and the hearing continued. The judge denied the motion to dismiss counsel, finding that Valdes had made it quite clear he was not capable of representing himself and that his own conduct precluded the court from further inquiry. The judge also found that Valdes had engaged in a purposeful and willful course of conduct to frustrate the trial, and that if the judge allowed withdrawal at this point there was no doubt he would be faced with the same situation down the line with different attorneys.

We find that the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry, gave Valdes the opportunity to state his reasons for wanting new counsel, and properly denied Valdes' motion when he refused to explain his allegations of ineffectiveness. It is obvious that Valdes was given every opportunity to establish his claim that counsel was ineffective and chose not to do so. 1 On the record here, there was no basis for a finding of ineffective representation. Cf. Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 230 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1596, 118 L.Ed.2d 311 (1992).

It is also readily apparent from the record in this case that Valdes was abusing the system in an effort to delay his trial. Boudreau and Susaneck were Valdes' fifth and sixth attorneys. Valdes' second 2 attorney, Nelson Bailey, represented him for about three months before withdrawing due to a conflict with Valdes. At the hearing on Bailey's motion to withdraw, Valdes stated he had a problem with Bailey which he did not want to divulge. The judge gave him the benefit of the doubt and allowed the withdrawal, but warned Valdes that he would not let him keep changing lawyers for no reason.

Attorneys Mark Wilensky and Marc Goldstein were appointed to replace Bailey in late January 1988. After two unsuccessful motions 3 to dismiss these attorneys, Valdes presented a third motion stating that he had filed a civil suit against his attorneys as well as a complaint with The Florida Bar. Valdes refused to discuss the specific problems he was having with counsel. At the hearing on this motion, the attorneys noted that Valdes refused to talk with them at all, and Goldstein stated that Valdes was the most difficult client he had ever had. The court granted the motion to dismiss counsel, appointing Boudreau and Susaneck in their place.

In the motion to dismiss counsel at issue here, Valdes raised the same vague allegations of disagreement with the line of defense that he had raised as to his previous attorneys and again refused to discuss the specific basis for his allegations of ineffectiveness. To ensure the success of his motion, Valdes heightened the allegations to a completely unsubstantiated accusation of battery and filed charges against the attorneys. As we have stated previously in a similar context, we will not allow a difficult defendant "to completely thwart the orderly processes of justice." Waterhouse v. State, 596 So.2d 1008, 1014 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 418, 121 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). The trial court's finding that allowing the withdrawal of Boudreau and Susaneck would only have led to the same problem with any attorneys who replaced them is completely supported by the record and fully justified a denial of Valdes' motion.

We also reject Valdes' claim that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta 4 inquiry and explain to Valdes his right to represent himself. Valdes never unequivocally asked to represent himself, and in fact he made it clear throughout the various problems with his attorneys that he did not want to represent himself. Valdes was told at previous hearings that he would not be allowed to get new court-appointed counsel whenever he wanted, and if he fired counsel for no reason he would have to represent himself. Any further inquiry into this area at the last hearing was thwarted by Valdes' conduct in attacking a witness. Further, as the trial court held, this action made it perfectly clear that Valdes was not capable of representing himself.

In a related claim, Valdes argues that the trial court...

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