Valenta v. Regents of University of California

Decision Date28 June 1991
Docket NumberNo. G009790,G009790
Citation231 Cal.App.3d 1465,282 Cal.Rptr. 812
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesLubomir J. VALENTA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant, H. Richard Bixby, Claimant and Respondent.
OPINION

MOORE, Associate Justice.

Lubomir Valenta appeals an order denying his motion to terminate a claim of lien by his former attorney, H. Richard Bixby. The trial court ruled Bixby was entitled to a lien for the reasonable value of his services against the judgment in an underlying case. Valenta contends the court lacked jurisdiction because the validity of the lien must be decided in an independent action. We agree and reverse. 1

FACTS

In 1981, Valenta filed an action for wrongful termination against the Regents of the University of California and various members of the faculty and administration of the University of California at Irvine medical school. In April 1986, he retained Bixby, who represented him through a successful eight-day trial and obtained a judgment of $866,000 in November 1986.

Following entry of judgment, the defendants appealed and Valenta cross-appealed seeking reinstatement. Bixby associated another attorney to handle the appeal. In a letter to the new attorney, dated November 25, 1986, Valenta confirmed the association of attorney agreement as follows: "... we have agreed, together with Mr. Bixby, that ... you ... alone, [will] handle the appeal and cross-appeal procedures for the flat percentage of recovery, the difference between Mr. Bixby's 30% of the total recovery and 50% of the total recovery, i.e. 20% of the total recovery plus interest accrued from the date of the original judgement. [p] ... We understand that if the retrial is granted, you and Mr. Bixby would retry it, as he perfectly well knows the subject matter and he has done an excellent job on the trial and his absence at the retrial would be a handicap to our case. [p] We further specifically understand that you and your firm alone would handle the cross-appeal procedures and that the total amount of recovery would be divided as follows: [p] 1. cost advanced to us as we are presently totally ruined [p] 2. 30% to Mr. Bixby of the total and final verdict plus accrued interest [p] 3. 20% to you and your firm for re-tiral [sic] and re-appeal procedures, from the final amount of verdict plus accrued interest [p] 4. Any cost would be paid by us, from the final amount of the verdict...." On August 13, 1987, Valenta substituted Bixby out of the case.

After his termination as attorney of record, Bixby notified Valenta's new attorney that he had a lien on the proceeds of the judgment in the amount of $287,430, plus interest and costs of $1,000. Valenta objected to the claim of lien and notified Bixby both personally and through counsel that he would not recognize a lien.

Valenta declared "each and every fee agreement ... null and void, rescinded and invalid," based on numerous "acts and failures committed during the trial," failure to take the matter to appeal, an alleged unlawful attachment of Valenta's IBM computer, printer, word processor and software, and Bixby's "[f]ailure to execute written retainer/contingent fee/lien agreement ... at the time you agreed to represent me...." Valenta's attorney also noted the objection to the lien, stating "I am sure you know that under Business and Professions Code, section 6147(b) [which requires a contingency fee agreement to be in writing], Dr. Valenta is within his rights in regarding your fee agreement as void and that you are, therefore, entitled to collect only a reasonable fee for the services you rendered to him."

On appeal of the underlying judgment, this court reduced the award pursuant to Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373, but otherwise affirmed it in its entirety. Thereafter, Bixby filed a notice of reaffirmation of claim of lien for reasonable attorney's services rendered and costs advanced.

On April 5, 1990, Valenta filed a motion to terminate the lien for reasonable attorney's fees and the possessory lien on his property. Bixby opposed the motion, contending he agreed to represent Valenta for a 1/3 contingent fee, with no agreement to pursue any appeal, after learning from Valenta that he had had four different attorneys since the filing of the complaint on May 21, 1981, and that, as of February 1986, no at issue memorandum had been filed and a trial date had not been obtained. He stated it was his custom and practice over 34 years to have a contingent fee in writing, but that he had given the complete file to Valenta at his request, without making a copy of the file for his records. Bixby concluded that "[u]nless Valenta's conscience starts bothering him, I will probably never see the fee contract, however, I am perfectly willing to accept the reasonable value of the services I rendered."

The trial court denied the motion to terminate the liens on May 11, 1990. On June 7, Valenta brought a motion to disqualify the trial judge for prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. That same day, he brought a motion to reconsider the denial of his motions to terminate the liens. Both motions were denied.

By order filed July 3, the court ruled as follows: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that two motions of Plaintiff Dr. Valenta to terminate the charging and posessory [sic] liens and to dissolve/strike the claim of lien for reasonable value of attorney's services are denied, and that ... Bixby is entitled to lien for 'reasonable Value of Attorney's Services' against the judgment in this case. [p] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ... Bixby has to enforce his lien for reasonable value of attorney's services in a separate action...." Valenta timely filed this appeal from the denial of his motions to terminate the liens and from the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

In his reply brief, Valenta relies upon Hansen v. Jacobsen (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 350, 357, 230 Cal.Rptr. 580, and contends the only matter which could have been decided by the lower court was whether Bixby could file a...

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  • Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 28, 2002
    ...a lack of precision in the use of these terms all too often creates confusion. (See Valenta v. Regents of University of California, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1469-1470, 282 Cal.Rptr. 812; Hansen v. Jacobsen, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 354, 357, 230 Cal. Rptr. 580.) B. Determining the E......
  • In re Marriage of Goddard
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    ...to fix an attorney's lien in the same action commenced on behalf of the client. (Valenta v. Regents of University of California (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1465, 1469-1470, 282 Cal.Rptr. 812.) The failure of a complaint to contain facts sufficient to state a cause of action is a jurisdictional de......
  • Law Offices of Stanley J. Bell v. Shine, Browne & Diamond
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    ...Cal.Rptr. 580; Hendricks v. Superior Court (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 586, 17 Cal.Rptr. 364.) In Valenta v. Regents of University of California, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1470, 282 Cal.Rptr. 812, the court expanded on this: "Clearly, the practice of filing a notice of lien in a pending action ......
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    ...J. Bell v. Shine, Browne & Diamond (1995) 36 Cal. App.4th 1011, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 717 (Bell)); Valenta v. Regents of University of California (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1465, 1470, 282 Cal.Rptr. 812; Hansen v. Jacobsen (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 350, 356, 230 Cal. Rptr. 580; Bandy v. Mt. Diablo Unified ......
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