Valle v. Moore
Decision Date | 29 August 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-2865.,SC01-2865. |
Citation | 837 So.2d 905 |
Parties | Manuel VALLE, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
Manuel Valle, a prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition.
Valle was convicted and sentenced to death for the April 2, 1978, murder of police officer Louis Pena. See Valle v. State, 394 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.1981). The facts of this crime are provided in detail in the case on direct appeal of Valle's retrial. See Valle v. State, 474 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla.1985).1 On appeal, this Court reversed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in forcing Valle to go to trial on short notice. See Valle, 394 So.2d at 1005. On retrial, Valle again was found guilty as charged on all counts, and the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of nine to three. The trial court imposed the death penalty and this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Valle, 474 So.2d at 798.
Valle then sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court, contending that the exclusion of rehabilitative character evidence that Valle would be a model prisoner if incarcerated for life and not executed violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court accepted review, vacated this Court's decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). See Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986). On remand, this Court vacated Valle's death sentence because of the exclusion of model prisoner evidence. See Valle v. State, 502 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 1987).
In Valle's third sentencing in 1988, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four. The trial court imposed the death penalty, finding five aggravating circumstances,2 and no mitigating circumstances. This Court affirmed Valle's death sentence. See Valle v. State, 581 So.2d 40, 49 (Fla.1991).
On December 2, 1993, Valle filed an amended motion for postconviction relief. After a Huff3 hearing, the postconviction court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Valle appealed to this Court the summary denial of his postconviction motion. This Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the claim that counsel was ineffective for presenting model prisoner evidence and for failing to move for a mistrial and disqualification of the resentencing judge after the judge allegedly kissed the victim's widow in front of the jury. See Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Fla. 1997).
At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing on remand, Valle withdrew his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial or disqualification. Consequently, the evidentiary hearing addressed only the claim that defense counsel was ineffective for presenting model prisoner evidence. The trial court ultimately rejected Valle's claim, concluding that he failed to prove either deficiency or prejudice. Valle appealed the denial of postconviction relief, and this Court affirmed. See Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 967 (Fla.2001). Valle now files this petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising four issues.4
Habeas petitions are the proper vehicle to raise claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla.2000). The standard of review applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel raised in a habeas petition mirrors the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), standard for claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. See Jones v. Moore, 794 So.2d 579, 586 (Fla.2001). However, appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective under this standard for failing to raise issues that were not properly raised during the trial court proceedings and do not present a question of fundamental error. See Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 643. The same is true for claims without merit because appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on appeal. See id. In fact, appellate counsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some possibility of success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable nonfrivolous issue. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) ( ); Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 549 (Fla.1990) ( ). Finally, a claim that has been resolved in a previous review of the case is barred as "the law of the case." See Mills v. State, 603 So.2d 482, 486 (Fla.1992).
In Valle's first claim in his habeas petition, he asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying his motion to waive the advisory jury in his 1988 resentencing proceeding. Specifically, Valle claims that he could not present good prisoner evidence as mitigation without telling the jury that he had been on death row for ten years, and this would have unduly prejudiced the jury against Valle. Therefore, Valle maintains that the trial court should have granted his motion to waive the advisory jury, and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this claim in his direct appeal.
This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding the waiver of an advisory jury for an abuse of discretion. See Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 361 (Fla.2001). As we have explained, "even when a capital defendant makes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the advisory jury's recommendation, the trial judge `may in his or her discretion either require an advisory jury recommendation, or may proceed to sentence the defendant without such advisory jury recommendation.'" Id. (quoting State v. Carr, 336 So.2d 358, 359 (Fla.1976)).
This Court rejected an argument similar to Valle's in Sireci v. State, 587 So.2d 450, 452 (Fla.1991). In Sireci, the defendant asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to waive the jury sentencing recommendation because, given the time lapse between the conviction and the resentencing proceeding, the jury necessarily would know of and be prejudiced by the prior death sentence. Id. The Court rejected the defendant's contention, explaining:
Regardless of the jury's recommendation, the trial judge must conduct an independent review of the evidence and make his or her own findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors. The trial judge here noted that if he found the jury was influenced by improper considerations, he had "the ability and the duty to lessen the reliance upon the jury's verdict." Even if the jury may have surmised that the defendant had been previously sentenced to death, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to waive an advisory jury sentencing recommendation.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Thompson v. State, 389 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla.1980) ( ).
Based on this Court's decision in Sireci, we conclude that the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in denying Valle's motion to waive the advisory jury. Consequently, we hold that appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this claim on appeal. See Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 643 ( ).
In Valle's second claim, he asserts that the jury instruction for the cold, calculated, and premeditated ("CCP") aggravator was inadequate,5 and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. Because this claim was not preserved at trial by objection, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal unless the claim constituted fundamental error. See Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 646.
We conclude that this claim does not rise to the level of fundamental error. This Court previously has upheld substantially similar CCP jury instructions. See Wike v. State, 698 So.2d 817, 821-22 (Fla. 1997) ( ). The CCP instruction in this case provided the statutory definition of the aggravator, provided the definition of premeditated murder, and further explained that for the CCP aggravator to apply "the law requires there be heightened premeditation, that is a deliberate intent to kill that is more contemplative, more methodical and more controlled than the premeditation required for a conviction of first degree murder." Therefore, we conclude that the jury instruction in this case was not unconstitutionally vague.
Moreover, even assuming the instruction was inadequate, Valle is unable to show prejudice under Strickland because this Court concluded on direct appeal that the "facts were sufficient to sustain a finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated." Valle, 581 So.2d at 48. See, e.g., Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 915 (Fla.2000) (...
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