Van Campen v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.

• Citation: 216 S.W.2d 443,358 Mo. 655
• Decision Date: 13 December 1948
• Docket Number: 40760
• Parties: Georgea Belle Van Campen, Respondent, v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

216 S.W.2d 443

358 Mo. 655

Georgea Belle Van Campen, Respondent, v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 40760

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 13, 1948

Rehearing Denied January 7, 1949.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Harry F Russell, Judge.

Affirmed (subject to remittitur).

M. G Roberts, C. H. Skinker, Jr., Roscoe Anderson and Cullen Coil for appellant.

(1) The court erred in permitting counsel for the respondent, in his argument to the jury, over the objection of counsel for plaintiff, to read from the pleadings in the case and to base an argument on the contents of said pleadings. Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 51 S.W.2d 36; Brunk v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 334 Mo. 517, 66 S.W.2d 903; Harlan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 414, 73 S.W.2d 749; Johnston v. St. Louis, 138 S.W.2d 666; Walsh v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 353 Mo. 458, 182 S.W.2d 607; Better Roofing Materials Co. v. Sztukouski, 183 S.W.2d 400; Amsinger v. Wajim, 335 Mo. 528, 73 S.W.2d 214. (2) Instruction 4 by numbered paragraph 1, fails to limit the recovery for future loss of earnings to such loss of earnings which are directly attributable to the injuries suffered by respondent. Kelly v. Kiel, 117 S.W.2d 1086. (3) The instruction by numbered paragraph 5, permits the jury to assess double damages for future pain and suffering, and the instruction is not justified by any evidence -- there being no evidence of compensable permanent injuries which could manifest themselves by objective symptoms. Wild v. Pitcairn, 347 Mo. 915, 149 S.W.2d 800; Meierotto v. Thompson, 201 S.W.2d 161. (4) The instruction by numbered paragraph 5, fails to limit the jury to an award for permanent injuries suffered as distinguished from permanent injuries which respondent might suffer in the future, thereby permitting the jury to speculate on possible permanent injuries which could develop in the future. (5) The verdict is excessive and so excessive as to indicate bias and prejudice on the part of the jury. Holtz v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 209 S.W.2d 883; Eisenbarth v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, Inc., 161 S.W.2d 263; Heitz v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc., 175 S.W.2d 583; Reed v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 62 S.W.2d 747; Burneson v. Zumwalt Co., 349 Mo. 94, 159 S.W.2d 605; O'Brien v. Rindskopf, 334 Mo. 1233, 70 S.W.2d 1085; Williamson v. Wabash R. Co., 196 S.W.2d 129; Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603; Johnson v. Terminal R. Assn., 354 Mo. 800, 191 S.W.2d 676; Rhineberger v. Thompson, 202 S.W.2d 64; Derschow v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 339 Mo. 63, 95 S.W.2d 1173; Arno v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 202 S.W.2d 787.

Everett Hullverson for respondent; Forrest Boecker of counsel.

(1) The court did not commit any error in permitting counsel for respondent in his argument to the jury to read from the defendant's abandoned pleadings in the case as the same were competent in that they contained admissions against interest and were properly used as argument under the circumstances as shown by the record. Wahl v. Cunningham, 332 Mo. 21, 56 S.W.2d 1052; Johnston v. St. Louis, 138 S.W.2d 666; Brunk v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 334 Mo. 517, 66 S.W.2d 903; Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 51 S.W.2d 36; Morgan v. Kroger Gro. & Bkg. Co., 348 Mo. 542, 154 S.W.2d 44; Rockenstein v. Rogers, 326 Mo. 468, 31 S.W.2d 792; Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 175 S.W.2d 889; Campbell v. Webb, 202 S.W.2d 35; City of St. Louis v. Sheahan, 327 Mo. 305, 36 S.W.2d 951. (2) Plaintiff's Instruction 4 on the measure of damages was correct as to form and was supported by the evidence in the record. Meierotto v. Thompson, 201 S.W.2d 161; Keehn v. Real Estate Co., 328 Mo. 1031, 43 S.W. 416; Brunk v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., supra; Wild v. Pitcairn, 347 Mo. 915, 149 S.W.2d 800; Baker v. C., B. & Q.R. Co., 327 Mo. 986, 39 S.W.2d 535; Cunningham v. Doe Run Lead Co., 26 S.W.2d 957; Homan v. Mo. Pac., 335 Mo. 30, 70 S.W.2d 869; Tash v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 1148, 76 S.W.2d 690; Kemper v. Gluck, 327 Mo. 733, 39 S.W.2d 330, certiorari denied 284 U.S. 649, 76 L.Ed. 551; Westervelt v. St. Louis Transit Co., 222 Mo. 325, 121 S.W. 114. (3) If defendant was convinced that the instruction in question required clarification, he should have submitted a clarifying instruction. Keyes v. C.B. & Q.R. Co., 326 Mo. 236, 31 S.W.2d 50; Brunk v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., supra; Dodson v. Gate City Oil Co., 338 Mo. 183, 88 S.W.2d 866; Hancock v. K.C. Terminal Ry. Co., 339 Mo. 1237, 100 S.W.2d 570; Gorman v. Franklin, 117 S.W.2d 289; Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851; Bishop v. Musick, 3 S.W.2d 256; Westervelt v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra. (4) The verdict was justified by the evidence in the case and was not excessive. Potashnick v. Pearline, 43 S.W.2d 790; Benson v. C., R.I. & P.R. Co., 267 Ill.App. 11, affirmed 352 Ill. 195, 185 N.E. 244, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 636, 78 L.Ed. 553; Capstick v. T.M. Sayman Prod. Co., 327 Mo. 1, 34 S.W.2d 480; Wack v. F.E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 197, 53 S.W.2d 28; Yerger v. Smith, 338 Mo. 140, 89 S.W.2d 66; Manley v. Wells, 292 S.W. 67; Rouchene v. Gamble Constr. Co., 338 Mo. 123, 89 S.W.2d 58; Summa v. Morgan Real Estate Co., 350 Mo. 205, 165 S.W.2d 390; Hepner v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 Cal.App. 747, 300 P. 830; Ramey v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 323 Mo. 662, 21 S.W.2d 873; Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 21 P.2d 432; Lamar v. Collins, 252 Ill.App. 238; Hein v. Peabody Coal Co., 85 S.W.2d 604; Wilson v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 295 Penn. 168, 145 A. 81; Rannard v. Harris, 113 Cal.App. 15, 297 P. 623; Kepner v. C.C.C. & St. L.R. Co., 322 Mo. 299, 15 S.W.2d 825, certiorari denied 280 U.S. 564, 74 L.Ed. 618; Texas R. Co. v. Bell, 28 S.W.2d 853; Bucktrot v. Partridge, 130 Okla. 122, 265 P. 768; Margulis v. Natl. Enameling & Stamping Co., 324 Mo. 420, 23 S.W.2d 1049; Thomas v. Southern Pac. Co., 116 Cal.App. 126, 2 P.2d 544, certiorari denied 284 U.S. 689, 76 L.Ed. 582; Hollander v. Wilson Estate Co., 135 Cal.App. 646, 27 P.2d 785; Adskim v. Oregon-Wash. R. & Nav. Co., 134 Ore. 574, 294 P. 605; Terry Shipbldg. Corp. v. O'Dell, 26 Ga.App. 102, 105 S.E. 864; Cooksey v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 178 P.2d 69; Raimonidi v. Ziffrin Truck Lines, 329 Ill.App. 650, 70 N.E.2d 221; Montgomery v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 330 Ill.App. 334, 71 N.E.2d 105; Warf v. P.R.R. Co., 65 F.Supp. 631; Kircher v. A., T. & S.F. Ry. Co., CCH Ins. Law Reports, 16 Negl. Cases 156, Sept. 8, 1948. (5) In determining on appeal whether or not damages are excessive, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and there is a presumption in favor of right action on the part of the jury in the trial court. Gieseking v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 344 Mo. 672, 127 S.W.2d 700, certiorari denied 308 U.S. 583, 84 L.Ed. 488; Clader v. City of Neosho, 198 S.W.2d 523; Whittington v. Westport Hotel Operating Co., 326 Mo. 1117, 33 S.W.2d 963; Joice v. M., K. & T.R. Co., 189 S.W.2d 568; Goslin v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 395, 173 S.W.2d 79. (6) In computing the amount of damages, the jury could, and properly did, take into account the decline in the purchasing power of money at the present time. Young v. Term. Railroad Assn., 192 S.W.2d 402; Petty v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 191 S.W.2d 653; Williamson v. Wabash R. Co., 196 S.W.2d 129; Marshall v. St. L. Union Tr. Co., 196 S.W.2d 435; Clader v. City of Neosho, supra; Central Truckaway System v. Moore, 304 Ky. 533, 201 S.W.2d 725; Bowers v. Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co., 42 S.E.2d 705; Pauly v. McCarthy, 184 P.2d 123; Estrada v. Orwitz, 170 P.2d 43; Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Coogler, 209 S.W.2d 778; Waller v. Skelton, 212 S.W.2d 690, certiorari denied 211 S.W.2d 445; Margaret Ann Super Mkt., Inc., v. Scholl, 34 So.2d 238; Kircher v. A., T. & S.F. Ry. Co., supra.

Dalton, C. Bradley and Van Osdol, CC., concur.

OPINION

DALTON

Action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff for $ 25,000 and defendant has appealed.

Plaintiff, a passenger on one of defendant's trains, was injured February 7, 1947, when the car in which she was riding left the track near Republic, Missouri, and turned over on its side.

Error is assigned on the argument to the jury; the giving of instruction No. 4; and an alleged excessive verdict. Appellant first contends the court erred in permitting plaintiff's counsel in his argument to the jury to read from the pleadings in the case and to base an argument thereon and in failing to strike the argument and instruct the jury to disregard it.

The action was based upon a charge of general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Defendant admitted that plaintiff was a passenger on its train when the train left the track, but denied the allegations concerning defendant's negligence, plaintiff's injuries and that the injuries were caused by defendant's negligence. The cause was submitted under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and, at defendant's request, the court instructed the jury that the burden of proof rested upon plaintiff to prove that defendant was negligent and that such negligence, if any, caused injury to plaintiff.

Defendant's counsel, in his argument to the jury, stated: "Now, I want to tell you that the Frisco Railroad didn't try to claim that they weren't liable for the injuries to this woman . . . And, ladies and gentlemen, we want to pay her a reasonable amount . . . We are not contesting the question, we didn't put on any evidence to show, that it wasn't our fault that this train went off the track. . . . We didn't do it . . . because we want to pay our passengers when we are so unfortunate as to hurt them."

In reply, plaintiff's counsel stated: "And coun...