Van Carr v. State
| Decision Date | 11 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2063,2063 |
| Parties | EVERETT VAN CARR, JR. v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case Nos. C-02-CR-16-002351, C-02-CR-17-000654
UNREPORTED
Reed, Freidman, Alpert, Paul E. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Alpert, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Everett Van Carr, Jr., appellant, contends that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County imposed an illegal sentence after he entered an Alford1 plea to second-degree assault, influencing a witness, and suborning perjury. The circuit court rejected that claim and, for reasons we shall explain, so shall we.
In November 2016, Carr was charged, in Case Number C-02-CR-16-002351, with first- and second-degree assault, as well as reckless endangerment, of Shelly Ann Spriggs. While charges in that case were pending, Carr attempted to coerce Ms. Spriggs into recanting her allegations against him, leading to an ensuing twenty-count indictment, in Case Number C-02-CR-17-000654, alleging, among other things, influencing a witness, obstruction of justice, subornation of perjury, and, on multiple occasions, violation of a protective order.
Ultimately, in May 2017, the State and Carr reached a plea agreement, whereby Carr would enter Alford pleas to Count 2 of the indictment in Case Number 2351 (second-degree assault), and Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment in Case Number 654 (influencing a witness and subornation of perjury). In exchange, the State would enternolle prosequi to all other counts of the indictments and recommend a sentence of no more than 25 years of active incarceration, with the defense free to argue for less.
During the ensuing plea colloquy, defense counsel explained to Carr the terms of the plea agreement, and the following occurred:
(Emphasis added.)
Defense counsel briefly conferred with Carr off the record, and then the examination resumed:
(Emphasis added.)
After defense counsel concluded the examination, and the prosecutor gave a factual basis for the plea, the court accepted the plea and deferred sentencing pending the completion of a presentence investigation. As the proceedings concluded, the court issued Carr a stern warning:
(Emphasis added.)
Sentencing took place in July 2017. During the time period between the plea hearing and sentencing, Carr repeatedly violated the No Contact Order. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, Carr, anticipating an unfavorable outcome, moved to withdraw his plea, averring that he had entered his plea under duress and because the victim had "begged him" to do so. The prosecutor countered that there had been a "valid qualification" of Carr's plea and informed the court of his violation of the No Contact Order, and she expressed her "vehement[]" opposition to the motion to withdraw. Thecourt, voicing its concerns that Carr was "attempt[ing] to manipulate the process," denied the motion.
The victim then gave a victim impact statement, the parties presented argument, and Carr allocuted. Finally, the court, noting Carr's criminal record (which included convictions for armed robbery and domestic assault) and his repeated violations of the No Contact Order, sentenced him to the maximum sentence on each count and ran those sentences consecutively, for a total of 40 years' imprisonment. Carr responded with an obscene outburst, which punctuated the recitation of post-trial rights,2 and then the hearing concluded.
After sentence was rendered, Carr did not move to withdraw his plea, nor did he make a motion to do so at any time thereafter. He did, however, file a pro se application for leave to appeal, but his application was dismissed as untimely because it was filed 32 days after sentencing, in violation of Maryland Rule 8-204(b)(2)(A). Carr v. State, Application No. 1184, Sept. Term, 2017 (filed Oct. 31, 2017) (per curiam).3 His ensuing motions for modification and for sentence review by a three-judge panel were denied.
In June 2019, Carr filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, which subsequently was supplemented by a motion filed with the assistance of appointedcounsel. In December 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on that motion. It concluded that the record unambiguously indicated that there had not been a binding plea agreement. As a fallback position, the court ruled that any possible ambiguity was resolved by defense counsel's unequivocal statement to Carr, on the record in open court, prior to the acceptance of the plea, that "none of this stuff [was] binding" on the court and that it could "decide whichever sentence" it "deems as fair and appropriate." Accordingly, the circuit court denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence, and this timely appeal followed.
Carr contends that his sentence was illegal because it violated the terms of a binding plea agreement. Invoking the trilogy of Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (2010), Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 (2010), and Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503 (2012), he asserts that the circuit court bound itself to a cap of 25 years of active incarceration unless it became aware, during the time period between the plea hearing and sentencing, of information unfavorable to him; but that, if the court then elected to impose a sentence above the conditional cap of 25 years, it would provide him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. Because the circuit court ultimately imposed a sentence greater than 25 years, but, according to Carr, did not "explicitly give him notice and an opportunity to withdraw [his guilty plea] before" doing so, the court thereby allegedly breached a binding plea agreement. For reasons we shall explain, we hold that there was no binding plea agreement in this case, and, therefore, the Cuffley-Baines-Matthews trilogy is inapplicable.
A sentencing court "may correct an illegal sentence at any time." Md. Rule 4-345(a). An "illegal sentence," within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a), is, however, narrowly construed: it encompasses only those sentences that are "intrinsically," Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466 (2007), or "inherently" illegal. Matthews, 424 Md. at 519.
There are three types of "intrinsically" or "inherently" illegal sentences within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a): a sentence that exceeds that maximum provided by statute, Carlini v. State, 215 Md. App. 415, 427 (2013); a sentence imposed "where no sentence or sanction should have been imposed," Johnson v. State, 427 Md. 356, 368 (2012) (quoting Alston v. State, 425 Md. 326, 339 (2012)); and "a sentence imposed in violation of the maximum sentence identified in a binding plea agreement and thereby 'fixed' by that agreement as 'the maximum sentence allowable by law[.]'" Matthews, 424 Md. at 519 (quoting Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 524 (1991)). The instant appeal concerns the third variety of illegal sentence, which presupposes the existence of a binding plea agreement.
In Ray v. State, 454 Md. 563 (2017), the Court of Appeals clarified the analysis a reviewing court should apply in interpreting the terms of a binding plea agreement. First, we must look to the written agreement, if any, Hughes v. State, 243 Md. App. 187, 200 (2019), and determine whether its language "is clear and unambiguous as a matter of law." Ray, 454 Md. at 577. If so, the unambiguous written language controls. Id. Otherwise, we turn to the record adduced at the plea hearing and "determine what a reasonable lay person in the defendant's position would understand the agreed-uponsentence to be," id., based "solely" upon that record. Cuffley, 416 Md. at 582. If, having performed the first two stages of the analysis, "we still find ambiguity regarding what the defendant reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement," then we proceed to the third and final stage and resolve any residual ambiguity "in favor of the defendant." Ray, 454 Md. at 577-78.4
Thus far, everything we have discussed applies to binding plea agreements. A circuit court's decision whether to approve a plea agreement (as opposed to merely...
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