Van Deelen v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-17-00432-CV,14-17-00432-CV |
| Parties | MICHAEL D. VAN DEELEN, Appellant v. SPRING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, PAMELA FARINAS, AND COREY LEDAY, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 55th District Court Harris County, Texas
Michael D. Van Deelen, formerly a teacher at Dekaney High School, appeals from the trial court's take-nothing final judgment in favor Spring Independent School District, the school's principal, Pamela Farinas, and the school's assistant principal, Corey LeDay. Concluding that Van Deelen failed to complain about all grounds supporting Farinas's and LeDay's plea to the jurisdiction, failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a takings claim under the Texas Constitution,1 and failed to make a good faith report to the appropriate law enforcement agencies as required by the Texas Whistleblower Act ("TWA")2 regarding Farina's alleged failure to report certain activities, we affirm the trial court's rulings on those claims. Concluding that Van Deelen raised an issue of material fact as to the TWA claims involving his reports as to a teacher, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment as to those TWA claims. We affirm, in part, and reverse and remand, in part.
Van Deelen was hired as a teacher at DeKaney High School in January 2016. Beginning on January 29, 2016, Van Deelen made multiple reports about what he believed were numerous instances of unlawful drug use and dealing on the school's campus by students and a teacher, Bobby Scott. Van Deelen reported to the school's principal, Pamela Farinas, a number of District officials, the District's police department, and several governmental entities. Van Deelen also reported to the District's police department and many of the same officials and governmental entities that Farinas failed to refer his reports of the alleged drug-related offenses to the District's police department and the relevant municipal police department as required by the Texas Education Code. See Tex. Educ. Code § 37.015.
Farinas investigated Van Deelen's allegations of drug use and dealing by students and Scott and determined that the allegations had no merit. Van Deelen claimed that after he reported the drug offenses, several other employees at the school, individually and in concert with one another, began taking adverse personnel actions against him, including reprimands and warnings that he would be terminatedif he continued to make false allegations concerning drug use and dealing on the school's campus. Farinas recommended to the District's human resources department and director, Deeone McKeithan, that Van Deelen be removed from her campus.
On February 16, 2016, Van Deelen filed a grievance about "employees' retaliation against me for whistleblowing." Two days later, McKeithan informed Van Deelen that he was suspended and prohibited from returning to the school's campus. Van Deelen filed a second whistleblower grievance on February 19, 2016. Van Deelen terminated his grievance proceedings after 60 days, as permitted by the TWA, and filed his original petition on April 22, 2016, against the District and Farinas for violations of the TWA as reflected in his February 16 and 19, 2016 grievances. See Tex. Gov't Code § 554.006(d).3
Van Deelen amended his petition three times, ultimately suing the District for violating the TWA and the Texas Constitution. Van Deelen alleged District employees took a refrigerator and chair from him for public use the day he was suspended. Van Deelen also sued Farinas and another school employee, Corey LeDay, for defamation.
Farinas and LeDay filed a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act and the immunity provision of the Texas Education Code. The trial court granted Farinas's and LeDay's motion and dismissed Farinas and LeDay from the lawsuit with prejudice. The District moved for summary judgment on the TWA claim and the constitutional takings claim,which the trial court granted.4 The trial court signed its final judgment on May 30, 2017.
Van Deelen brings this appeal from the final judgment. In four issues, he claims that the trial court erred by granting the District's motion for summary judgment and Farinas's and LeDay's plea to the jurisdiction.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea used to defeat a claim without regard to whether the claim has merit. Bland I.S.D. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).5 Such a plea challenges a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. We therefore review de novo a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). When a trial court does not state the basis for granting a plea to the jurisdiction, as here, the appealing party must negate on appeal all possible grounds that could form the basis of that ruling. Estate of King, No. 04-15-00271-CV, 2016 WL 3625663, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem.op.).
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo as well. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc., v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In a traditional motion for summary judgment, such as was granted here, the movant has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to thenonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). A movant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment. Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010)
Evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the summary judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). When, as in this case, the order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which the trial court relied, we must affirm if any of the independent summary judgment grounds is meritorious. Lightning Oil Co. v Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017).
In his fourth issue, Van Deelen claims the trial judge erred in granting Farina's and LeDay's plea to the jurisdiction. The trial judge granted the plea to the jurisdiction based on, among other grounds, Farina's and LeDay's immunity under the Education Code.
Section 22.0511 of the Education Code provides in relevant part:
(a) A professional employee of a school district is not personally liable for any act that is incident to or within the scope of the duties of the employee's position of employment and that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee, except in circumstances in which a professional employee uses excessive force in the discipline of students or negligence resulting in bodily injury to students.
Tex. Educ. Code § 22.0511(a). See also Robinson v. Brannon, 313 S.W.3d 860, 865-66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Van Deelen failed to challenge this ground on appeal.
If the appealing party fails to negate each ground on which the trial court may have granted the plea to the jurisdiction, an appellate court must affirm. Estate of King, 2016 WL 3625663, at *1. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's granting the District's plea to the jurisdiction as to Farina and LeDay.6
Sovereign immunity is waived when a public employee alleges a violation of the TWA. Univ. of Houston v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). A violation of the TWA "occurs when a governmental entity retaliates against a public employee for making a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority." State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 878 (Tex. 2009).7 In his first issue, Van Deleen argues the trial court erred in granting the District's motion for summary judgment as to his TWA claims.
As an initial matter, the District claims, without citing any authority, that Van Deelen's whistleblower claim that the District retaliated by suspending him was rendered moot by his subsequent termination. Van Deelen's live pleading specifically states that none of his TWA claims include events occurring after February 2016.
"Mootness occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant therelief requested or otherwise affect the parties' rights or interests." State ex rel Best v. Harper, No. 16-0647, 2018 WL 3207125, at *2 (Tex. June 29, 2018) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). It is unclear how Van Deelen's subsequent termination by the District would make it impossible for the court to evaluate his claim for damages from events that occurred before that time. Van Deelen is not seeking future lost wages. We hold that the TWA claim for Van Deelen's suspension is not moot.
The District also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Van Deelen's whistleblower claims because his vague grievances related to retaliation based on Van Deelen's reports of Scott's alleged drug dealing in the school's parking lot or Farinas's alleged failure to report it did not properly invoke the TWA. As a prerequisite to filing suit under the TWA, a claimant must first initiate an action under the grievance or appeal procedures of the governmental employer. Tex. Gov't Code § 554.006(a). This is a jurisdictional requirement, such that...
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