Van Der Veer v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 25 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96API02-189,96API02-189
• Citation: 680 N.E.2d 230,113 Ohio App.3d 60
• Parties: VAN DER VEER, Admr., Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 60

113 Ohio App.3d 60

680 N.E.2d 230

VAN DER VEER, Admr., Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Appellees.

No. 96API02-189.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided July 25, 1996.

Norman C. Hartsel Co., L.P.A., and Norman C. Hartsel, Perrysburg, Newcomer & McCarter and N. Stevens Newcomer, Toledo, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Susan M. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Ohio Department of Transportation.

JOHN C. YOUNG, Judge.

This matter is before this court upon the appeal of Dorothy Van Der Veer, administrator ("Dorothy"), from the January 18, 1996 judgment entry of the Court of Claims of Ohio.

The history of this case is as follows: A complaint in wrongful death was filed by Dorothy Van Der Veer, as the administrator of the estate of Steven J. Van Der Veer, on behalf of herself and the next of kin. Dorothy was the mother of the decedent. The complaint was filed in the Court of Claims of Ohio against appellees, the Ohio Department of Transportation, and the Department of Administrative Services. The parties stipulated that the state of Ohio was liable in damages. Thereafter, the parties stipulated that the aggregate amount of all damages was $300,000, including an unstated amount for the total loss of the motor vehicle and funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $8,753.97.

At the time of his death, decedent was survived by his parents (Dorothy and Robert Van Der Veer) and three adult brothers and an adult sister. Decedent had several life insurance policies which named Dorothy as the beneficiary. Two of these policies were with Harvest Life Insurance, and Dorothy was named as the sole beneficiary under both of these policies. One of the Harvest Life Insurance policies also provided for an accidental death benefit. Pursuant to these two policies, Dorothy received a death benefit of $290,069. Dorothy also received half of the death benefit of a $100,000 policy with Western and Southern Life Insurance ($50,000). Decedent's father, Robert Van Der Veer, received the other half of the benefit under the Western and Southern Life Insurance policy ($50,000). The remaining policy was a group term life insurance policy through Royal Macabees Insurance Company, which also provided for accidental death and dismemberment ("AD & D") benefits. Pursuant to this policy, Dorothy and Robert Van Der Veer each received $9,750. The remainder of the benefit ($19,500) went to decedent's estate.

Of the $429,069 received under the policies of insurance, $328,121 represented the ordinary death benefits, and $100,948 represented insurance proceeds which became payable solely because the decedent's death was the result of an accident ("AD & D Proceeds").

Pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(D), the Court of Claims reduced the agreed amount of damages, $300,000, by the amount of death benefits that were received pursuant to the life insurance policies ($300,000 minus $429,069). This resulted in a net judgment of $0.00. Dorothy, in her capacity as administrator, appealed and asserts the following assignments of error:

"I. The Court of Claims erred when it concluded that life insurance proceeds received by reasons of the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent were 'collateral sources' within the meaning of R.C. § 2743.02(D).

"II. The court of common please [sic ] erred when it did not distinguish between proceeds of life insurance received from whole life participating policies purchased by the decedent and group term life insurance benefits received by reason of the death of the plaintiff's decedent.

"III. The Court of Claims should have found R.C. § 2743.02(D) to be unconstitutional. Inherent in statutory construction of statute and implicit from discussions because of Taylor [sic ]."

We will first address appellant's third assignment of error, insofar as appellant argues that R.C. 2743.02(D) violates the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Appellant cites Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504, in support of the proposition that a statute which reduces an award of damages by the amount of collateral benefits is unconstitutional. In Sorrell, the court found that R.C. 2317.45 infringed upon the jury's ability to award damages and, therefore, affected one's fundamental right to a trial by jury. Because a fundamental right was involved, the Sorrell court applied a strict scrutiny test to the statute. The court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it required trial courts to deduct collateral benefits from a jury award regardless of whether the collateral benefits were actually duplicated in the jury's verdict. Id. at 422, 633 N.E.2d at 510.

In the instant action, appellant challenges the constitutionality of R.C. 2743.02(D), which provides:

"Recoveries against the state shall be reduced by the aggregate of insurance proceeds, disability award, or other collateral recovery received by the claimant. * * * "

This court initially notes that legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus; Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 97. Moreover, courts must, to the extent reasonably possible, construe a statute so as to uphold a challenged statute if at all possible. Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 260, 269, 652 N.E.2d 952, 960; Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289, 595 N.E.2d 862, 867.

Generally speaking, the analyses for due process and equal protection are identical, and the only substantial difference between substantive due process and equal protection is that legislation reviewed under equal protection involves a classification. See Morris v. Savoy (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 706-707, 576 N.E.2d 765, 781-782 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

A statutory classification which involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181, 183. Likewise, a statute challenged on due process grounds will be deemed valid if it (1) bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, and (2) if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Mominee v. Scherbarth (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 28 OBR 346, 503 N.E.2d 717; Morris, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 689, 576 N.E.2d at 770.

We will first address appellant's equal protection argument. In the instant action, appellant does not argue that a suspect class is involved. Nor is a fundamental right involved, insofar as the right to sue the state does not constitute a fundamental right. See Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 355, 639 N.E.2d 31, 35 (holding that because the General Assembly has the power to define the contours of the state's liability, within the constraints of equal protection and due process, the right to sue the state is not fundamental).

Nor is the fundamental right to a jury involved since this action was brought in the Court of Claims. See Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner (1929), 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301; Sorrell, supra. In cases involving a claim against the state of Ohio, the right to a jury does not exist. See Belding; Sorrell, supra. Such a right did not exist at common law simply because the state had immunity and suits could not be brought against the state. As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Fabrey, 70 Ohio St.3d at 355, 639 N.E.2d at 35:

" * * * Thus, in Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504, we held that Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution does not provide for a jury trial in all cases, but only in those for which the right existed at common law. * * *

" * * * The immunity of the defendants in this case is not such an infringement of a preexisting right. It is, rather, in accord with a traditional common-law principle. We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) does not violate Section 16, Article I of the Constitution of Ohio." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 355, 639 N.E.2d at 35.

Given that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is involved in this case, this court must apply a rational basis test. State ex rel. Abde v. Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund (June 25, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APD02-126, unreported, 1996 WL 362083. Under a rational basis analysis, a statutory classification does not violate equal protection if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Roseman v. Firemen & Policemen's Death Benefit Fund (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 443, 613 N.E.2d 574.

In applying a rational basis test, the Ohio Supreme Court has utilized the following analysis:

"Our analysis in Menefee reflected a two-step process, whereby the court is first required to identify a valid state interest and then required to determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational." Buchman, 73 Ohio St.3d at 267, 652 N.E.2d at 959.

In the instant action, R.C. 2743.02(D) provides that a judgment against the state is to be reduced by the aggregate amount of insurance proceeds, or other collateral recovery received by the claimant. Both conserving fiscal resources and providing recovery for injured persons who have no source of reimbursement for their damages constitute a valid governmental interest. Cf. Menefee, 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 550 N.E.2d 181.

The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that the preservation of fiscal integrity is a valid state interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330, 22...