Van Dinter v. City of Kennewick
| Decision Date | 04 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 59275-6,59275-6 |
| Citation | 121 Wn.2d 38,846 P.2d 522 |
| Parties | Duane VAN DINTER, Petitioner, v. CITY OF KENNEWICK, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
David R. Hevel, Kennewick, for petitioner.
William L. Cameron, Kennewick City Atty., Kennewick, for respondent.
Bryan P. Harnetiaux, Gary N. Bloom, Spokane, for amicus curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
Andrew G. Cooley, Seattle, for amicus curiae Washington Defense Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
Duane Van Dinter was injured when he struck his eye on a rod protruding from a piece of playground equipment at a Kennewick city park. The trial court dismissed Van Dinter's negligence action against Kennewick on the ground that the city is immune under Washington's recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.210. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
On August 4, 1989, Van Dinter attended a birthday party at a park in Kennewick. Located in this park is a caterpillar-shaped piece of playground equipment designed for children to climb on. The "caterpillar" sits inside an area covered with gravel and bordered by wooden beams. The surrounding area is grass-covered. Metal rods intended to represent antennae protrude from the caterpillar's head.
During the party, Van Dinter and one of the children present became engaged in a water-fight game near the caterpillar. Van Dinter turned suddenly while chasing the child, and in doing so struck his right eye on one of the caterpillar's antennae. His dark glasses shattered, and he suffered a serious injury leaving him disfigured and almost blind in his right eye. The accident occurred when Van Dinter was on the grassy area next to the caterpillar. He states that he did not realize someone on the grass could collide with any part of the caterpillar.
Van Dinter sued the city of Kennewick alleging the city had negligently caused his injury by installing the caterpillar without a sufficiently wide buffer separating it from the surrounding grassy area. To show the city's negligence, Van Dinter submitted a copy of installation specifications from the caterpillar's manufacturer. Those specifications indicate that the installed caterpillar's height should be 7 feet 3 inches, and that an area of "well-maintained loose surfacing" should extend at least 6 feet in all directions surrounding the caterpillar. Clerk's Papers, at 21-22. Van Dinter also submitted guidelines published by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which recommend an 8-foot border around playground equipment. The caterpillar here was only about 5 feet high, and its border extended only 3 to 4 inches beyond the end of the antennae.
In its answer, the city denied liability and moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune under RCW 4.24.210, which generally immunizes property owners from liability for all injuries occurring on their property to recreational users except those injuries resulting from a "known dangerous artificial latent condition". The city also requested sanctions against Van Dinter for filing a frivolous claim. The trial court granted Kennewick's summary judgment motion but refused to impose sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment and also declined to impose attorney fees. Van Dinter v. Kennewick, 64 Wash.App. 930, 827 P.2d 329 (1992). We granted Van Dinter's petition for review.
Under the common law, the duty of care landowners owe to persons entering upon their land is governed by whether the person is a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §§ 58-61 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton on Torts ). A landowner generally owes trespassers and licensees the duty to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring them, whereas to invitees the landowner owes an affirmative duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash.2d 644, 648, 414 P.2d 773 (1966); see generally Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's Recreational Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 Wash.L.Rev. 1 (1977). The category of invitees was traditionally restricted to only those whose presence was of potential economic benefit to the landowner. Because of the harsh results this narrow classification could cause, many jurisdictions, including Washington, adopted a more inclusive definition of invitee. See McKinnon, at 650-51, 414 P.2d 773 (); see generally Barrett, 53 Wash.L.Rev. at 1-2; Prosser & Keeton on Torts, at § 61. Under this more inclusive definition, an invitee was any person who entered upon the land after having been led by the landowner to believe "that the premises were intended to be used by visitors, as members of the public, for the purpose which the entrant was pursuing, and that reasonable care was taken to make the place safe for those who enter for that purpose." McKinnon at 649, 414 P.2d 773. This redefinition expanded the category of invitees, thereby increasing the potential liability of landowners.
Many state legislatures responded to this expansion by enacting recreational use laws, which were intended to inspire landowners to make their lands available to the public by reducing their potential liability. Barrett, 53 Wash.L.Rev. at 2. Thus Washington's recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.210, was enacted in order "to encourage owners or others in lawful possession and control of land and water areas or channels to make them available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon". RCW 4.24.200. The Legislature sought to achieve this recreational goal by eliminating landowner liability except in three situations: (1) when the entrant is charged a "fee of any kind", (2) when the entrant is injured by an intentional act, or (3) when the entrant sustains injuries "by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted." RCW 4.24.210. 1
The dispute in the present case is whether Van Dinter's injuries were caused by a "known dangerous artificial latent condition", as provided by RCW 4.24.210. We begin by inquiring as to what "condition" of the Kennewick city park caused Van Dinter's injuries. On the one hand, the city, joined by amicus curiae the Washington Defense Trial Lawyers Association, contends that the condition was the caterpillar. The Court of Appeals also assumed this is the correct view. Van Dinter, 64 Wash.App. at 933, 827 P.2d 329. On the other hand, Van Dinter identifies the proximity of the caterpillar to the grassy area as the cause of his injury. In support of this view, amicus curiae the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association (WSTLA) asserts that the "condition" for purposes of RCW 4.24.210 should be defined as "the injury-causing instrumentality itself and its relatedness to the external circumstances in which the instrumentality is situated, or operates." Brief of Amicus Curiae WSTLA, at 4.
We agree with Van Dinter and WSTLA that the cause of Van Dinter's injury cannot properly be regarded as the caterpillar in isolation from its surroundings. Van Dinter was injured while playing on the grassy area next to the caterpillar. He contends, and the facts reasonably support this contention, that if the border around the graveled area surrounding the caterpillar had been larger, his injury never would have occurred. The caterpillar was thus not in itself causally sufficient to have caused the accident. Rather, as Van Dinter contends, the condition of the park that caused his injury was the caterpillar's placement, that is, its proximity to the grassy area.
Identifying the condition that caused Van Dinter's injury is a factual determination. Because the trial court ruled against Van Dinter on summary judgment, all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom must be construed in the light most favorable to Van Dinter. See Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). To view the caterpillar or some part of it, such as the antennae, as having been the injury-causing condition would be to artificially isolate some particular aspect of the total condition that caused Van Dinter's injury. We also must give Van Dinter the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the facts. Consequently we hold that the condition that caused Van Dinter's injury was the caterpillar's placement, rather than the caterpillar as viewed in isolation.
We next consider whether the condition by reason of which Van Dinter was injured was "known dangerous artificial [and] latent", as required under RCW 4.24.210 before landowner tort liability can arise. The parties dispute only whether the injury-causing condition was latent.
The meaning of "latent" in RCW 4.24.210 is somewhat unclear, especially in light of the juxtaposition of the terms "known" and "latent". The incongruity of saying that one and the same condition is both known and latent was recognized during the law's passage and explained by reference to what is known to the landowner but latent as regards the recreational user. Senate Journal, 40th Legislature (1967), at 875; see Morgan v. United States, 709 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir.1983). For example, a condition such as a partially-covered well may not be readily apparent to the recreational user. 2 In such a situation landowner liability can arise under RCW 4.24.210 only if the landowner knows about the condition. "Latent" in RCW 4.24.210 therefore means not readily apparent to the recreational user.
Van Dinter relies on Preston v. Pierce Cty., 48 Wash.App. 887, 741 P.2d 71 (1987), in which a young child broke his ankle when his foot slipped into the exposed moving parts of the center section of a...
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