Van Jenkins v. Livonia Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 26 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NUMBER: 13-14489 |
| Parties | VAN JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. LIVONIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF LIVONIA, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS
Plaintiff Van Jenkins ("Jenkins") filed a pro se complaint seeking to recover damages and other relief for injuries arising out of an alleged assault that occurred during a traffic stop on May 13, 2013. The Wayne County Sheriff's Department, the State of Michigan, and Wayne County have already been dismissed.
Before the Court is a multi-faceted Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #90) filed by the remaining defendants: the City of Livonia, the Livonia Police Department, and Officers Kristin Crawford and Katy Perkins. The Motion is fully briefed.
Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and judgment will enter in favor of Defendants. Jenkins' claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, all claims against the "John Doe" Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Jenkins says that the events surrounding an alleged illegal traffic stop on May 13, 2013 constitute actionable claims, resulting in a variety of injuries. Jenkins alleges that Officer Crawford handcuffed him too tightly causing a flare-up of his Spina Bifida and hypertension disabilities. Jenkins also claims he was denied hospitalization. Further, Jenkins asserts that during or shortly after the arrest several of his possessions were confiscated, and that at some point during his detention officers took money from him. Jenkins states that as a result of these events he suffered a variety of harms: (1) personal injury; (2) eviction from his home; (3) repossession of his automobile; (4) inability to pay a loan on time; and (5) deprivation of his right to travel with a Michigan driver's license.
Jenkins says his damages arise from violations of the United States Constitution and several statutes. The Amended Complaint does not list allegations by count, leaving the Court and Defendants to speculate about Jenkins' particular legal claims. The Court perceives claims as being made pursuant to five statutes: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 241; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 242; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (5) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Defendants seek dismissal of the suit, judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, which the Court evaluates under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(c) and 56 respectively.
These rules will be qualified to the extent necessary in light of Jenkins' status as a pro se litigant; when reviewing pro se complaints, the Court must employ a lessstringent standard than if the complaint had been drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But "leniency granted to pro se petitioners . . . is not boundless." Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). Further, courts are not required to conjure unstated allegations or guess the plaintiff's claims. Wells v. Brown et al., 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); even pro se litigants must meet minimal standards. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that, "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). In general, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d, 291, 295-96 (6th Cir. 2008).
The standards differ, however, in one key respect: a motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be made until after the pleadings (complaint, answer, and reply if ordered) are closed, while a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must be made before the answer is filed. No reply was filed and the Court did not order one, so the pleadings were "closed" when Defendants filed their Answer on November 24, 2014. Defendants filed this Motion on May 8, 2015. Since the Motion was filed after the Answer, the Court evaluates this Motion under Rule 12(c) only and not Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 728 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012) ( )
Judgment may be granted under Rule 12(c) where the movants clearly establish that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 61 S. Ct. 418, 85 L. Ed. 577 (1941); Drew v. Kemp-Brooks, 802 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (E.D. Mich. 2011); 5C C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, p. 518. "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1970, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
"[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court's assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder." Twombly, 550 U.S. at563 n.8. The function of the Court in ruling on such a motion is not to weigh the evidence, nor to appraise the credibility of witnesses. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Court simply determines "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2507, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The essential inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S. Ct. at 2512.
The movant has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. at 2514 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). "The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Sagan, 342 F.3d at 497 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).
Both parties must support their assertions "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, either party may carry its burden by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Id. 56(c)(1)(B).
It is not enough for the nonmovant to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Rather, the nonmovant must sufficiently allege a fact that, if proven, "would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio, 503 F.3d 456, 469 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the nonmoving party does not respond with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir. 1989).
Police departments are not separate entities and cannot be sued in tort actions. Thiel v. Sterling Heights, No. 09-12399, 2010 WL 3170510, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2010); McPherson v. Fitzpatrick, 63 Mich. App. 461, 463-464, 234 N.W.2d 566 (Mich.Ct. App.1975). Nor may police departments be sued...
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