Van Liew v. Stansfield
| Decision Date | 30 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | SJC–11905. |
| Citation | 47 N.E.3d 411,474 Mass. 31 |
| Parties | Roland VAN LIEW v. Colleen STANSFIELD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Michael J. Fencer, Boston, for the defendant.
Karen A. Pickett, Boston, for the plaintiff.
Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.
BOTSFORD
, J.
In this case we first consider a procedural issue concerning the appropriate forum to hear appeals from the allowance of a special motion to dismiss under G.L. c. 231, § 59H
), the so-called “anti-SLAPP”1 statute, by a judge in the District Court. This case also requires us to evaluate the relationship between G.L. c. 258E, the statute governing civil harassment prevention orders, and allegedly political speech. On the procedural issue, we conclude that a party seeking to appeal from a District Court order allowing or denying a special motion to dismiss may file the appeal directly in the Appeals Court, rather than in the Appellate Division of the District Court Department (Appellate Division). We further conclude that with one possible exception, the speech at issue here—primarily concerning a local municipal election and more generally issues of local public concern—did not qualify as either “fighting words” or “true threats,” see O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425, 961 N.E.2d 547 (2012), and therefore, no civil harassment prevention order should have issued in this case. In the circumstances presented, Roland Van Liew established that Colleen Stansfield's petition for a civil harassment prevention order was devoid of factual support, that he had sustained injury, and that Stansfield's special motion to dismiss Van Liew's complaint for abuse of process and malicious prosecution should have been denied.
Background.2 Van Liew and Stansfield are both residents of Chelmsford (town). Stansfield has been an elected member of the local planning board since April, 2009. At the time of the events at issue here, in 2012, Van Liew did not hold public office but was an active participant in local civic and political affairs. Over the years, Van Liew has disagreed publicly with many positions taken by Stansfield on the planning board and in her role supporting local political campaigns.
In 2012, Van Liew was a candidate for selectman in the town, and on February 1, 2012, he held a public “meet and greet” event at the town library in connection with his candidacy. Stansfield attended the event and challenged various positions taken by Van Liew during the discussion. At the close of the event, Stansfield approached Van Liew and asked whether he was going to take part in upcoming debates. According to Stansfield, Van Liew responded loudly, “[O]f course ... and I know what you do....
[Y]ou sent an anonymous letter to my wife and I'm coming after you,” to which Stansfield responded, “[Y]ou are looking at a restraining order,” and left.3
Later that day, after speaking with local police, Stansfield sought in the District Court a harassment prevention order against Van Liew pursuant to G.L. c. 258E, § 3
. She alleged four incidents of harassment in her complaint: (1) Van Liew threatened Stansfield at the meet and greet event, where he was “in [her] face” and told her he was “coming after” her and she left shaking in fear; (2) Van Liew sent several mailings in the past year calling Stansfield corrupt and a liar; (3) during a recall election in July, 2011, Van Liew again called her a liar and corrupt; and (4) during their first interaction in a two-hour telephone call initiated by Stansfield (that took place at some point prior to 2009) Van Liew screamed at her and called her “terrible names.” A District Court judge held an initial, ex parte hearing at which Stansfield testified; the judge issued a temporary harassment prevention order against Van Liew.4 The judge scheduled a full hearing on Stansfield's request for a permanent order to take place two weeks later, on February 15, 2012. Five days after the temporary order issued, it was modified at Stansfield's request to prevent Van Liew from mentioning Stansfield's name in any “email, blog, [T]witter or any document through [I]nternet, television show, ad or otherwise.” On February 15, 2012, the scheduled hearing on Stansfield's request for an order took place before a different District Court judge. It was attended by Stansfield, who represented herself, and Van Liew, represented by counsel. Stansfield testified about the verbal exchange at Van Liew's meet and greet event, and further testified that, in the past, Van Liew had called Stansfield “corrupt and a liar” with regard to her work on the planning board, specifically pointing to two electronic mail (e-mail) messages written by Van Liew, one of which Stansfield read to the judge. The e-mail message appears to mention Stansfield twice by name but goes on at great length to provide highly critical commentary about certain development projects that were being proposed for
the town pursuant to G.L. c. 40B and other programs.5 The judge concluded that she could not find the requisite three acts of harassment for a harassment prevention order under G.L. c. 258E and that some of the acts alleged by Stansfield were political speech, not threatening in any way; the judge vacated the temporary harassment prevention order.
Van Liew then filed the present action against Stansfield in the District Court, asserting claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The complaint alleges that Stansfield sought the harassment prevention order against him “for the purpose of disrupting [Van Liew's] campaign” and that she sought the order even though she knew she lacked probable cause for its issuance. Stansfield answered and also filed a special motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to § 59H
along with a supporting affidavit. Van Liew filed an opposition to Stansfield's special motion to dismiss and a supporting affidavit. A third District Court judge allowed the special motion after a hearing, and ruled that Van Liew “failed to show that the application for a harassment prevention order ‘was devoid of any reasonable factual support,’ ” quoting G.L. c. 231, § 59H. Van Liew then appealed the ruling to the Appellate Division, which concluded after a hearing that Van Liew had presented sufficient evidence to show that Stansfield lacked any reasonable factual support for her petitioning activity; the Appellate Division vacated the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the District Court for trial. Stansfield filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the decision and order of the Appellate Division; we transferred her appeal to this court on our own motion.
Discussion. 1. Stansfield's right to appeal. We first consider whether Stansfield may proceed with her appeal, given that the Appellate Division's order vacating the allowance of the special motion to dismiss and remanding the case for trial is interlocutory, and generally may not be the subject of an appeal. Van Liew argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because by statute, G.L. c. 231, § 109
, only final decisions of the Appellate Division are appealable to the Appeals Court. We disagree.
This court previously has held that regardless of where—i.e., in which department of the trial court—a suit may be commenced, a trial judge's denial of a special motion to dismiss brought pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, § 59H
,6 may be appealed directly to the Appeals Court. See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521–522, 781 N.E.2d 780 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9, 802 N.E.2d 1030 (2004). The reasons for our holding, set out in Fabre,7 apply with equal force to an Appellate Division decision denying a special motion to dismiss, and therefore to Stansfield's appeal. But more generally, and based on the same concerns that we expressed in Fabre about certainty, uniform treatment of similarly situated litigants, and consistent development of the law relating to the anti-SLAPP statute, see id. at 522, 781 N.E.2d 780
, we conclude that any party in a case
pending in the District Court who seeks to appeal from the denial or the allowance of a § 59H
special motion to dismiss should file the appeal directly in the Appeals Court rather than in the Appellate Division of the District Court or the Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court. See Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass. 679, 681, 672 N.E.2d 502 (1996) (). In sum, Stansfield's appeal was filed properly in the Appeals Court, and like the Appeals Court, this court has jurisdiction to decide it.
2. Stansfield's special motion to dismiss. We turn to the merits. Stansfield, as the party filing a special motion to dismiss under § 59H
, bore the initial burden to demonstrate through her pleadings and affidavits that Van Liew's claims she sought to dismiss were based on her “petitioning activities alone and ha[d] no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167–168, 691 N.E.2d 935 (1998). See G.L. c. 231, § 59H. There is no dispute that Stansfield met that burden; Van Liew's complaint focused solely on Stansfield's application for a harassment prevention order, which originally was granted ex parte as a temporary order. Van Liew makes no claim here, nor could he, that Stansfield's application for this order did not qualify as petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. Cf. McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 347, 727 N.E.2d 813 (2000) (). As a consequence, Van Liew was required by the statute to show by a preponderance of the evidence—again based on pleadings and affidavits—that Stansfield's petitioning activities were “devoid of any reasonable factual...
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