Van Poyck v. Singletary

• Decision Date: 14 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 89870,89870
• Citation: 715 So.2d 930
• Parties: 23 Fla. L. Weekly S275 William VAN POYCK, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 930

715 So.2d 930

23 Fla. L. Weekly S275

William VAN POYCK, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., etc., Respondent.

No. 89870.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 14, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1998.

Gerald S. Bettman, Jacksonville, and Jeffrey O. Davis and Mitchell S. Moser of Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, WI, for Petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

William Van Poyck, a prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(9), Florida Constitution, and find that Van Poyck is not entitled to relief.

On June 24, 1987, Van Poyck was arrested following an attempt to free prison inmate James O'Brien from the custody of two corrections officers. Officer Fred Griffis was shot and killed during the commission of the crime. Van Poyck was found guilty of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, six counts of attempted manslaughter, armed robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and aiding in an attempted escape. The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one and the trial judge sentenced Van Poyck to death. The facts of the case are set forth in greater detail in Van Poyck v. State, 564 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 1339, 113 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991), in which this Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence. Van Poyck subsequently filed a motion for As to his first issue, Van Poyck claims the trial judge wrongfully forced him to exhaust his peremptory challenges on seven venirepersons who should have been dismissed for cause, then erroneously denied his request for an additional peremptory challenge. ² Van Poyck asserts that as a result of the trial judge's error, two challenged jurors served on the jury. ³ Van Poyck contends that his appellate counsel on direct appeal compounded the error by failing to properly present the issue because he identified the wrong jurors seated on the jury, and then failed to argue the issue in any depth or cite relevant legal authority. Van Poyck states that this Court appropriately rejected the argument because the jurors identified by his appellate counsel, although unsuccessfully challenged for cause, were subsequently dismissed for personal reasons, and thus it was unnecessary for Van Poyck to exercise peremptory challenges. Van Poyck claims that his appellate counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because this Court would have granted a new trial had the issue been properly presented. We do not agree that the trial court wrongfully forced Van Poyck to exhaust his peremptory challenges or that Van Poyck's appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied relief after a substantial evidentiary hearing. This Court recently affirmed the trial court's ruling on the rule 3.850 motion in Van Poyck v. State, 694 So.2d 686 (Fla.1997). Van Poyck now files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that: (1) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly raise the issue of the trial court's wrongfully forcing him to exhaust his peremptory challenges; (2) his death sentence is unconstitutional because the judge and jury weighed the invalid aggravators that the murder was premeditated or that Van Poyck was the shooter; and (3) he was charged with and convicted of criminal offenses that did not exist as a matter of law. Issues one and three warrant discussion. Issue two is procedurally barred. ¹

If a reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror can possess an impartial state of mind in the discharge of his or her duties, that juror is incompetent to serve and must be excused for cause. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985). A trial judge has great discretion in ruling on challenges for cause based on juror incompetency, Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1332-33 (Fla.1997), and we will not overturn the trial judge's determination in the absence of "manifest error." Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 636 (Fla.1997). The denial of a challenge for cause will be upheld if there is competent record support for the decision. Gore, 706 So.2d at 1332-33; Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla.1995). On the other hand, it is reversible error when a challenge for cause is improperly denied, and the defendant then exhausts his peremptory challenges on venirepersons who should have been dismissed for cause and a request for additional peremptory challenges is denied. Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1990); Moore v. State, 525 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla.1988); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985).

Based on our examination of the record, we find that the trial judge was clearly Van Poyck notes that this Court decided in his direct appeal that the two jurors incorrectly named by his appellate counsel had a pro-death bias and should have been struck for cause. Van Poyck, 564 So.2d at 1071. He claims that because the voir dire testimonies of these jurors are indistinguishable in content from the voir dire of various venirepersons whom his appellate counsel should have named, this Court would have found reversible error in the denial of the for-cause challenges and in the denial of his request for an additional peremptory challenge had he received effective assistance of counsel on appeal. We have reexamined the voir dire of the jurors who were challenged for cause and were the subject of a claim in the initial appeal. In their voir dire, they each unequivocally indicated that they would abide by the trial court's instructions and would recommend a life sentence if the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. ⁵ Since they were excused for personal reasons and Van Poyck did not have to exercise a peremptory challenge, the grounds for their excusal for cause was a non-issue in the initial appeal. On a reexamination of the record, we also find that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in denying the challenge for cause to each of these jurors.

                within his discretionary authority in denying the challenges for cause to the seven venirepersons now claimed by Van Poyck to have been biased or prejudiced.  During individual voir dire, each of the seven persons repeatedly and unequivocally stated that he or she could render a verdict based solely on the evidence and the instructions given by the trial judge. 4  We find nothing in this record  
                that mandates that any of these venirepersons should have been excused for cause
                

In conclusion, we find that Van Poyck's appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to pursue and argue Van Poyck's claim that the other seven venirepersons were biased or prejudiced. See Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.1994); Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1994).

In his third issue, Van Poyck claims that he was charged with and convicted of crimes that do not exist as a matter of law.

Specifically, Van Poyck contends that his convictions for attempted first-degree murder and attempted manslaughter were based on a felony murder theory, and that attempted felony murder was determined in State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995), to be a legal impossibility. This claim is also without merit. In State v. Woodley, 695 So.2d 297 (Fla.1997), this Court clarified that the Gray decision should not be applied retroactively to overturn a conviction of attempted felony murder that has become final on appeal. Because the crime of attempted felony murder was a valid offense when Van Poyck's convictions became final, he is not entitled to the relief requested.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J. and SHAW, J., concur.

ANSTEAD, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The majority's holding on the juror challenge issue is not only contrary to this Court's prior unanimous opinion in this case, but is also erroneously based solely on the faulty premise that "each of the seven persons [challenged for cause] repeatedly and unequivocally stated that he or she could render a verdict based solely on the evidence and the instruction given by the trial judge." Majority op. at 932. This simplistic analysis and conclusion that a juror becomes immune to challenge as long as a juror will answer the right leading question is directly contrary to our established law. See Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla.1995); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.1985); Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959). These cases make clear that there is no particular question that can be asked nor answer received that will serve as a magic wand to qualify an otherwise objectionable juror.

The majority cites Hill but fails to apply its essential holding that where "any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render an impartial recommendation as to punishment, the juror must be excused for cause." Hill, 477 So.2d at 556. A recent opinion by Judge Pariente for the Fourth District Court of Appeal relying on our established law demonstrates the flaw in the majority's analysis and conclusion. Writing in Williams v. State, 638 So.2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), Judge Pariente correctly analyzed this same issue:

A juror's subsequent statement that he or she could be fair should not necessarily control the decision to excuse a juror for cause, when the juror has expressed genuine reservations about his or her preconceived opinions or attitudes. Reasonable doubt has been found where a juror admitted she "probably" would be prejudiced, even though she then asserted she "probably" could follow the...