Van Sickle v. Holloway

• Decision Date: 28 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1612,85-1612
• Parties: Alan Bruce VAN SICKLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Judges William J. HOLLOWAY, James K. Logan, Stephanie K. Seymour, Delmas Hill, Monroe G. McKay, James Barrett, Oliver Seth, Jean Breitenstein, Robert McWilliams, William Doyle, of the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit; Judge Sherman G. Finesilver, Judge Richard P. Matsch, Judge John Kane, Judge James Carrigan, Judge Zita Weinshienk, Judge John Moore, Judge Alfred Arraj, Judge Hatfield Chilson, of the United States District Court, Colorado; Judge John-David Sullivan, Judge Louis Babcock, Judge Alan Sternberg and Judge Dale Tursi, Defendants-Appellees. *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1431

791 F.2d 1431

Alan Bruce VAN SICKLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Judges William J. HOLLOWAY, James K. Logan, Stephanie K Seymour, Delmas Hill, Monroe G. McKay, James Barrett, Oliver Seth, Jean Breitenstein, Robert McWilliams, William Doyle of the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit; Judge Sherman G. Finesilver, Judge Richard P. Matsch, Judge John Kane, Judge James Carrigan, Judge Zita Weinshienk, Judge John Moore, Judge Alfred Arraj, Judge Hatfield Chilson, of the United States District Court, Colorado; Judge John-David Sullivan, Judge Louis Babcock, Judge Alan Sternberg and Judge Dale Tursi, Defendants-Appellees.^*

No. 85-1612.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

May 28, 1986.

Before GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, WRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, DEVITT, Senior District Judge. ¹

GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

This three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Circuit Rule 10(e). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Van Sickle filed this action pro se apparently based on 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985 against several state and federal judges, alleging that they violated and conspired to violate his civil rights. The district court dismissed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) as frivolous and malicious. ² Van Sickle appealed pro se and submitted a brief, in which he sets forth several questions to be resolved on appeal, and a "Motion for an Order in the Nature of Mandamus," together with a supporting affidavit. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's decision.

I. FACTS

The circumstances underlying this case date back to 1981 when Van Sickle commenced a pro se action in the Colorado state district court against his former employer and two former co-workers, alleging wrongful discharge and outrageous conduct. Defendant State Judge Sullivan granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals (defendant Judges Babcock, Sternberg, and Tursi) affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. Dissatisfied with the results in state court, Van Sickle filed an action pro se in federal district court seeking damages against the state trial judge and the three court of appeals judges, alleging that they had violated and conspired to violate his civil rights by failing to rule on his slander claim. ³ Specifically Van Sickle alleged that the state court judges "acted in a complete absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter by stonewalling or intentionally ignoring the subject matter remaining in dispute under the cause of action in the nature of slander, and did so intentionally to deprive [him] of [his] civil rights." Chief District Judge Finesilver ruled that the defendants were judicially immune and dismissed the action with prejudice. In addition to filing a notice of appeal, Van Sickle also filed suit against Chief District Judge Finesilver in federal district court alleging that he failed to "hear and determine the real issues." District Judge Moore dismissed the action against the chief judge on the basis of judicial immunity, and Van Sickle appealed. The Tenth Circuit consolidated the appeals and affirmed the dismissals in both cases.

Van Sickle responded by commencing the case at bar. Van Sickle filed this action pro se in the federal district court against not only all the judges who have ruled against him, but also all the United States district judges for the District of Colorado as well as all the United States circuit judges for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The complaint alleges that the defendant "judges acted in complete absence of jurisdiction over the alleged subject matter when they blocked and struck a slanderous subject matter from the record before hearing and determining that matter to have been included in summary judgment." Van Sickle was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, and because the defendants include all the federal district judges for the District of Colorado, the case was assigned to the Honorable Frank G. Theis, United States Senior District Judge for the District of Kansas. In a well-reasoned opinion, Judge Theis concluded that all the defendants were judicially immune from liability, and because Van Sickle could make no rational argument on the law or facts, dismissed the case as frivolous and malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Van Sickle appealed, and filed a brief in which he merely sets forth several issues, and a "Motion for an Order in the Nature of Mandamus" in which he requests that this court compel the district court and/or the state court to "hear and determine the issue of slander."

II. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1915(d)

The district court may dismiss an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) only if it is "frivolous or malicious." Under the liberal rules applicable to pro se complaints, an action is frivolous if the plaintiff cannot make a rational argument on the law and facts in support of his claim. Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir.1981) (citing Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir.1976)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840, 103 S.Ct. 90, 74 L.Ed.2d 83 (1982); Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir.1981). We review the district court's decision to determine whether it has abused its discretion in dismissing the appellant's complaint. See Green v. Black, 755 F.2d 687, 688 (8th Cir.1985). After a close reading of the appellant's complaint, we are convinced that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case as frivolous and malicious.

B. The state defendants

Van Sickle's complaint alleges that several judges have violated and conspired to violate his constitutional rights by intentionally failing to rule on his slander claim. The district court, however, correctly ruled that these defendants are absolutely immune from liability in this case. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the defense of absolute immunity for "officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Judges are clearly among those officials who are entitled to such immunity. The purpose of the doctrine is to benefit the public, "whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The Supreme Court has recognized that "the loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218). Therefore, absolute immunity is necessary so that judges can perform their functions without harassment or intimidation. Further, it is well settled that the doctrine of judicial immunity is applicable in actions, such as the case at bar, that are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

The appropriate inquiry in determining whether a particular judge is immune is whether the challenged action was "judicial," and whether at the time the challenged action was taken, the judge had subject matter jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. at 1104-05. Stated differently, judges are liable only when they act in "clear absence of all jurisdiction"; they are absolutely immune even when their action is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority. Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1104-05.

We cannot agree with Van Sickle that Judges Sullivan, Babcock, Sternberg, and Tursi acted in clear absence of jurisdiction. A judgment granting a motion for summary judgment and the affirmance of such judgment are judicial acts within the jurisdiction of the courts on which these judges sit. The judges' alleged failure to rule on Van Sickle's general allegations of slander can at best be characterized as erroneous, which will not subject them to civil liability. Even if the judges maliciously declined to rule on these allegations, they are still absolutely immune from liability. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. at 1104-05. Indeed, Van Sickle's lawsuit is precisely the type of action that the Supreme Court in Pierson, supra, recognized as necessitating the doctrine of judicial immunity. Van Sickle, an unsuccessful and dissatisfied state-court litigant, has sought another forum, the federal court, harassing the state court judges with allegations of "malice and corruption." Consequently, the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes recovery by Van Sickle against these judges.

C. The federal defendants

The doctrine of judicial immunity also precludes recovery from the federal judges in these circumstances. Whether the allegations with respect to these defendants are considered under a Bivens type of constitutional tort theory, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), or the allegations of a conspiracy are considered a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985, the federal judges in this case are absolutely immune from liability. ⁴ In Economou, 438 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. at 2909, the Supreme Court stated that it is "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under Sec. 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Judges of courts of limited jurisdiction are immune from civil liability when they act within their jurisdiction. Randall v....