Vance Lumber Co. v. King County

• Decision Date: 13 November 1935
• Docket Number: 25926.
• Citation: 184 Wash. 402,51 P.2d 623
• Parties: VANCE LUMBER CO. v. KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

51 P.2d 623

184 Wash. 402

VANCE LUMBER CO. v. KING COUNTY et al.

No. 25926.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

November 13, 1935

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Chester A. Batchelor Judge.

Action by the Vance Lumber Company against King County and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Warren G. Magnuson, Wm. Hickman Moore, and Edwin C. Ewing, all of Seattle, for appellants.

G. W Hamilton and Geo. G. Hannan, both of Olympia, and J. W Robinson, of Seattle, amici curiae.

W. H Abel, of Montesano, for respondent.

TOLMAN Justice.

Respondent, as plaintiff, instituted this action to recover a sum certain which had been paid by it to the county treasurer of King county, under protest, in satisfaction and discharge of taxes on real estate in that county for the years 1931 and 1932. It appears from the complaint that the respondent first tendered to the county treasurer the sum due, less 5 per cent. thereof, pursuant to the provisons of chapter 166, Laws 1935 (page 553), and the tender being refused by the county treasurer, the whole of the tax was paid under protest, and this action was thereupon instituted to recover back from the county the sum of $1,001.69 overpaid by reason of the refusal of the treasurer to allow the discount provided for in the act of 1935, supra.

To the complaint a demurrer was interposed. In addition to the allegations of the complaint, certain facts were stipulated and agreed upon with the understanding that in the event of an adverse ruling the defendants would stand upon their demurrer. The cause was thus submitted upon the complaint and upon the stipulated facts, and after arguments and consideration the demurrer was overruled. The defendants declined to plead further, and a judgment against the county for the amount demanded was entered in due course. From that judgment, the defendants have appealed.

Section 1 of chapter 166, Laws 1935 (page 553), provides for the remission of interest on delinquent taxes for the year 1932 and prior years, and, in addition, for an allowance or rebate of 5 per cent. of the principal of any such tax 'to all persons paying all of any year or years of said delinquent taxes on or Before November 30, 1935.'

The facts pleaded and admitted bring the respondent within the terms of the statute. The defense below and here is that the statute is unconstitutional.

The appellant first cites section 12 of article 1 of our State Constitution, which forbids special privileges and immunities, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which is to the same effect. Under these constitutional provisions, it is argued that those taxpayers who have paid their taxes in full are prejudiced and damaged by the acquittance to others of 5 per cent. and that a premium is thus placed upon delinquency; that those who have paid in full must in the future pay an additional amount in order to make up the loss occasioned by the allowance of the discount.

This argument, we think, assumes facts not shown by the record Before us, and, perhaps, not susceptible of proof. That is to say, that by this argument it is assumed that had the act in question never become law all taxes would have been paid in full. Perhaps no one knows or can know what would have happened if the Legislature had not provided for the discount. It is a matter of general knowledge that Before the enactment of the several recent statutes affecting the collection of taxes, tax foreclosures were exceedingly numerous throughout the state, and that through foreclosure many pieces of real estate were passing into the ownership of the counties and were thus removed from the tax rolls, so to remain until resold by the several counties. That resales, generally, did not bring satisfactory financial returns seems to be the common understanding, and that many resales were made for a mere nominal consideration, so as to get the property back on the tax rolls, is generally believed. Thus, without the present law, no doubt, the delinquent taxes on many pieces of property would have been largely, if not wholly, lost, and, in addition, every parcel of real estate which passed to a county on tax foreclosure would for a time at least be freed from assessment and taxation. Who then shall say that the taxpayer who paid in full has not been benefited by the enactment of the statute here questioned? In a realm of such unknown possibilities we cannot say, as a matter of law, that special privileges or immunities have been granted by the act which we are discussing.

Notwithstanding what has just been said, it seems self-evident that the county or the county treasurer cannot raise the question which we are now discussing. In matters of taxation, every taxpayer has a right to appeal to the courts on questions of lack of uniformity, discrimination, and the like, in order to protect and enforce his own constitutional rights. We know of no statute making counties guardians of their taxpayers in this respect. Whether or not this statute discriminates between individual taxpayers does not concern any county in the state. The statute acts uniformly upon each of the several counties of the state, it confers no special privilege nor immunity, and there is no lack of uniformity as to the counties.

Of all the authorities cited pro and con upon this question, the only ones which seem to have any bearing are State v. Luecke (Minn.) 260 N.W. 206, 208, and State v. Fischl, 94 Mont. 92, 20 P.2d 1057. Each of these cases was instituted by a taxpayer claiming that the statute discriminated against him and each was waged against a county officer who was attempting to carry into effect the discriminating statute.

In the Minnesota case there was involved chapter 414 of the Minnesota Laws of 1933 which directed that in certain instances delinquent taxes for 1926 and prior years might be satisfied by the payment of three-fourths of the original tax and that in certain instances taxes for the years 1929 and 1930 might be satisfied by the payment of four-fifths of the original tax. The terms and provisions of the Minnesota statute, as disclosed by the opinion of the court, seem to be far more lacking in uniformity than is our own. In holding that this statute violated the uniformity provisions of the Minnesota Constitution (article 9, § 1), the Minnesota court strongly condemned what it deemed to be the probable effect of the statute, saying, among other things, 'It is clear to us that the statute being considered (and the similar provision of Laws 1931, c. 129, § 2) is violative of this provision of our Constitution. The classification of subjects here attempted is unreasonable and fanciful. Realty owners are divided into two classes; those who pay taxes promptly and those who do not. The latter pay a smaller amount than the former. No reasonable basis founded on essential differences of nature or circumstances suggests itself for this classification. * * * Yet, in determining the reasonableness of a classification, a legitimate object for the court's consideration is the practical effect the classification is bound to have on business and organized society generally. In this connection it readily can be seen that the statute here concerned encourages and fosters tax delinquencies in the state. Taxpayers are prompted to allow taxes to become delinquent in order thereafter to be able to satisfy them in full by the payment of a fraction of the amount originally assessed. Such result is not desirable, and demonstrates the unreasonableness of the classification.'

If this were an action by or against a taxpayer who had paid his taxes in full, the Minnesota case would be a strong authority in his favor and yet even in such a case some fallacies in the argument of the Minnesota court might be observed. Our act and the Minnesota act alike legislate with respect to a condition already fixed, and neither could be an invitation to any one to bring himself within the terms of the act. No taxpayer could, after the passage of the act, elect to do the thing which would bring him under the act, although it is possible that a settled policy of enacting such statutes might in the end build up the belief that the Legislature would eventually come to the relief of all distressed taxpayers. Such a belief would, indeed, be unfortunate, and such a settled policy could not be less than disastrous.

The Montana case, which we have cited, is much less in point. It construes a constitutional provision very different from our own and the facts are likewise dissimilar.

Since no taxpayer who has paid in full is a party to this action, we have no reason or excuse for now determining what the rights of such a taxpayer may be. We cite and discuss these authorities mainly for the purpose of showing that they are not applicable to the present question, and incidentally, as indicating how serious the question may be when properly presented.

The appellant next argues that the effect of the statute in question is to release lease or discharge taxes levied for state purposes in contravention of section 9, art. 11 of our Constitution. That provision reads: 'No county, nor the inhabitants thereof, nor the property therein, shall be released or discharged from its or their proportionate share of taxes to be levied for state purposes, nor shall commutation for such taxes be authorized in any form whatever.'

For many years our statute law has provided for a 3 per cent rebate on real property taxes paid on or Before March 15, next prior to the date of delinquency, and has specified that the amount of such rebates shall be charged to the county current expense fund. No one has questioned that law, probably because it expressly provides that...