State ex rel. Hansen v. Salter

• Decision Date: 21 July 1937
• Docket Number: 26701.
• Citation: 70 P.2d 1056,190 Wash. 703
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HANSEN et al., County Com'rs, v. SALTER, County Assessor.

70 P.2d 1056

190 Wash. 703

STATE ex rel. HANSEN et al., County Com'rs, v. SALTER, County Assessor.

No. 26701.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

July 21, 1937

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of S. F. Hansen and others, as Commissioners of Thurston County, for a writ of mandamus to R. W. Salter, as Assessor of such County. From a judgment of dismissal, relators appeal.

Affirmed.

Smith Troy, E. A. Philbrick, and John S. Lynch Jr., all of Olympia, for appellants.

G. W Hamilton and R. G. Sharpe, both of Olympia, for respondent.

BLAKE Justice.

This action challenges the constitutionality of chapter 228, Laws of 1937, an act levying an excise tax on 'Private Motor Vehicles.' The salient features of the act, in so far as we are here concerned, are as follows: After defining the term 'private motor vehicle' in section 1, it is provided in section 2 that an excise tax shall be imposed 'for the privilege of using' any private motor vehicle in the amount of 'one and one-half (1.5) per centum of the fair market value' of such vehicle. Section 6 provides that the tax imposed shall be in addition to all other licenses and taxes otherwise imposed, but declares 'Such vehicles are hereby exampted from all ad valorem taxes for state, county or municipal purposes.' The act further provides (section 5) that the county auditor shall collect the tax and remit (section 9) it to the state treasurer. The latter section further provides: 'All revenue derived from the tax imposed by this act shall upon receipt thereof be credited * * * to the state school equalization fund.' Section 10 provides that dealers' stocks of such motor vehicles shall be listed by county assessors and assessed for ad valorem taxes as other personal property. Section 11 provides that the first tax to be exacted by the act shall be for the calendar year 1938, and that, except as provided in section 10, no private motor vehicles shall be listed or assessed for ad valorem taxes 'for the year 1937 or any succeeding year so long as this act remains in effect.' Section 12 then provides for allocation of the revenues derived from the tax to counties entitled thereto for common school support, at the same time and upon the same basis as the state school equalization fund is required to be apportioned to counties under Rem.Rev.Stat. § 4936 (Laws 1933, c. 28, p. 171, § 12). Section 12 further provides that the levy required to be made under Rem.Rev.Stat. § 4936, shall not exceed one and one-fourth mills on each dollar of assessed valuation.

The relators, the county commissioners of Thurston county, brought this action in mandamus to compel the county assessor to list and assess private motor vehicles, as defined in the act, for ad valorem taxes for the year 1937. From judgment dismissing the action, relators appeal.

Appellants attack the validity of the act on five grounds:

First. It is urged that the exaction is a property tax--not an excise--and therefore denies 'equal protection of the laws' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the demands of equality and uniformity in taxation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the State Constitution. That a tax upon the use of personal property is an excise is no longer open to question in this state. Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 57 S.Ct. 524, 81 L.Ed. 814. Being an excise, the tax is not objectionable upon the grounds suggested. Unless the exaction is inherently oppressive, or the classification of the persons or objects affected is unreasonable, such a tax is valid. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed. 1248, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536. It is not contended that the tax is inherently oppressive.

Second. But it is contended that the classification with respect to 'dealers' stocks' is discriminatory and unreasonable. If it be--which we do not decide--it is a defect of which relators may not be heard to complain, for to the extent that the act exempts 'dealers' stocks' from its operation, the county, as a taxing unit, suffers no injury, as such stocks are left subject to assessment for ad valorem taxes by the county. Only one who is injuriously affected by an act may challenge its constitutionality. Vance Lumber Co. v. King County, 184 Wash. 402, 51 P.2d 623.

Third. We understand the relators to contend, however, that the county, as a taxing district, is injured by the exemption of private motor vehicles (except dealers' stocks) from ad valorem taxation. Conceding that county revenues may be diminished by the withdrawal of private motor vehicles from ad valorem taxation, the consequence to the county may be said to be damnum absque injuria, for the county has no inherent powers of taxation. Its power to tax derives wholly and solely from legislative enactment. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash. 238, 183 P. 65; State ex rel. School District v. Clark County, 177 Wash. 314, 31 P.2d 897; Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175.

Fourth. It is suggested that exemption of 'private motor vehicles' from ad valorem taxes of itself constitutes discrimination. But this is in no sense an exemption statute. It is simply designed to change the character of the tax, the method of levying and collecting it, and the disposition of the revenues flowing from it. This the Legislature has plenary power to do, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the State Constitution.

Fifth. It is further urged that, in violation of article 2, section 37, of the State Constitution, section 12 of the act attempts to amend Rem.Rev.Stat. § 4936, by reference merely. The latter section is section 5, subchapter 9, of the School Code (chapter 97, page 322, Laws 1909), which relates to school revenues. In substance, section 5 (Rem.Rev.Stat. § 4936) requires the county commissioners of each county to levy a tax on all taxable property in the county sufficient to produce the sum of $10 for each child of school age, 'provided, that such tax * * * shall in no case exceed five mills on each...