Vandergriff v. Parkridge E. Hosp.

• Decision Date: 21 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. E2014-02253-COA-R3-CV,E2014-02253-COA-R3-CV
• Citation: 482 S.W.3d 545
• Parties: James R. Vandergriff et al. v. ParkRidge East Hospital et al.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

482 S.W.3d 545

James R. Vandergriff et al.

v.ParkRidge East Hospital et al.

No. E2014-02253-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, AT KNOXVILLE.

June 30, 2015 Session

FILED AUGUST 21, 2015

James R. Vandergriff and Samantha J. Vandergriff, Pro se.

H. Dean Clements and Brie Allaman Stewart, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, ParkRidge East Hospital.

F. Laurens Brock, Rocklan W. King III, and Donna L. Boyce, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Richard J. Bowers, M.D., Elizabeth M. Bowers, M.D., and Chattanooga Women's Specialist, P.C.

Arthur P. Brock and Drew H. Reynolds, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, Shawn P. Stallings, M.D. and Regional Obstetrical Consultants, P.C.

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY and JOHN W. McCLARTY, JJ., joined.

OPINION

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J.

The parents of a minor child filed a pro se complaint asserting claims on behalf of their daughter and individual claims by each parent. The complaint alleges that the daughter was born with brain injuries and remains severely disabled due to the failure of health care providers to treat her mother for a severe womb infection during two hospitalizations preceding birth. Plaintiffs also allege that the complaint was filed timely, although it was filed ten years after their daughter's birth, because the defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that the mother was not treated for the infection. The complaint states that the parents learned of the infection in 2012 when they obtained medical records that included a previously-undisclosed placenta pathology report. The defendants responded to the complaint by filing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the parents' individual claims pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations, Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–116(a)(1)–(2), and the daughter's claims based upon the three-year statute of repose, Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–116(a)(3). The trial court dismissed the parents' individual claims because the complaint established that the parents learned of the infection no later than December 31, 2012, yet another eighteen months passed before the complaint was filed. As for the daughter's claims, the trial court concluded that her claims were barred by the statute of repose. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that it was error to dismiss their individual claims based upon the statute of limitations and the daughter's claims on the statute of repose. We affirm the dismissal of the parents' claims as barred by the statute of limitations because the complaint indicates that in 2012 the plaintiffs had sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on notice that they had been injured by the defendants' negligence, and they failed to file their claims in a timely manner thereafter. As for the minor child's separate claims, they were asserted in a pro se complaint filed by her parents, and neither of her parents is a licensed attorney. Although a parent "may sue or defend" on behalf of their minor child, see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 17, a parent who is not "duly licensed" may not engage in the "practice of law" on behalf of their minor child. See Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 7, § 1.01 ; Tenn.Code Ann. § 23–3–103(a). A claim asserted in a pleading by a person who is not entitled to practice law is a nullity. Bivins v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 910 S.W.2d 441, 447 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) ; see Investors Grp., I Ltd. v. Knoxville's Cmty. Dev. Corp ., No. E1999–00395–COA–R3–CV, 2001 WL 839837, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 25, 2001). Because the parents' attempt to assert claims on behalf of their daughter was a nullity, see Gentry v. Gentry, 924 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn.1996), the trial court's judgment on the merits of the minor's purported claims is vacated.

James R. Vandergriff ("Father") and Samantha J. Vandergriff ("Mother") are the parents of a daughter, Catherine, who was born with severe disabilities allegedly as the result of the negligence of ParkRidge East Hospital and several healthcare providers (collectively "Defendants").¹

On March 10, 2004, while Mother was pregnant with Catherine, Mother was admitted to ParkRidge East Hospital ("ParkRidge") after problems developed with her pregnancy. Mother remained at ParkRidge from March 10–17, 2004. The tests conducted on Mother during that time revealed that she was suffering from an infection. Although the discharge summary from this hospital stay indicates that Mother was treated for this infection, Plaintiffs contend that the discharge summary was intentionally falsified and that Mother did not actually receive the proper treatment.

On March 21, 2004, Mother was readmitted to ParkRidge. Catherine was born very prematurely later that day. Catherine remained in the NICU ward for more than two months until she was discharged on June 10, 2004. It is undisputed that Catherine was born with brain damage and will be severely disabled for the rest of her life.

Ten years later, on August 25, 2014, a pro se complaint was filed by "James R. Vandergriff, individually, as (father and legal guardian) of Catherine E. Vandergriff and Samantha J. Vandergriff, individually, as (mother and legal guardian) of Catherine E. Vandergriff...." The complaint, which asserted separate claims on behalf of the parents and Catherine, alleged that Catherine's injuries were the result of Defendants' failure to treat Mother's infection during her March 10–17 hospital stay.² Mother and Father signed the complaint, but the complaint was not signed by an attorney.

As stated in the complaint, Plaintiffs attributed the delay in filing the lawsuit to fraudulent concealment of the medical treatment Mother did and did not receive during her March 10–17 hospital stay. In relevant part, the complaint states:

34. We never knew about the severe infection that was present at our daughter's birth because the truth was hidden from us. At the time, were [sic] not aware of the severe womb infection because the information was never documented into the medical records we received.

35. In 2012, we learned about the severe womb infection. We obtained medical records for the second time, which the second set of medical records had a placenta pathology report not previously disclosed to either Samantha J. Vandergriff nor [sic] myself, James Vandergriff.

36. The placenta pathology report states (Acute Chorioamnioitis Funitis and villous necrosis). This is a very severe womb infection which was longstanding because Samantha J. Vandergriff was left untreated during her March 10, 2004 to March 17, 2004 [stay] at ParkRidge East Hospital.

Defendants responded to the complaint by filing motions to dismiss. They contended that the parents' individual claims were barred by the statute of limitations because they had been brought more than one year after Plaintiffs discovered the alleged injury. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–116(a)(1)–(2) (2014). Defendants also contended that Catherine's separate claims were barred by the three-year statute of repose applicable to health care liability actions. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–116(a)(3) (2014). Plaintiffs did not file any responses to the motions to dismiss, but Father and Mother did attend the hearing on the motions.

On October 14, 2014, the trial court entered an order dismissing all claims. The court concluded that the parents' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court noted that Paragraph 35 of the complaint established that the parents learned of the infection that caused Catherine's injury on or before December 31, 2012; therefore, the one year limitation period would have begun on that date at the latest. Assuming Mother and Father filed the required pretrial notices on the last possible date, December 31, 2013, the statute of limitations would have been extended to April 30, 2014.³ See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–121(c) (2014). The complaint was not filed until August 2014; therefore, the parents' individual claims were time barred.

With regard to Catherine's claims, the trial court concluded that they were time-barred by the statute of repose. The trial court reasoned that, although fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of repose, any fraudulent concealment was uncovered on or before December 31, 2012 when her parents learned of the infection that caused Catherine's injuries.⁴ Accordingly, Catherine's claims had to be filed no later than April 30, 2014, the deadline for filing her parents' claims. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–26–116(a)(3). Because the complaint was filed more than one year after the fraudulent concealment of the claims was discovered, Catherine's claims were barred by the statute of repose.

Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that it was error to dismiss the parents' claims as barred by the statute of limitations and to dismiss Catherine's claims as barred by the statute of repose.

ANALYSIS

I. PRO SE LITIGANTS

We are mindful of the fact that Father and Mother are representing themselves in this litigation although they have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. Parties who represent themselves (pro se litigants) are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts; nevertheless, "the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's adversary." Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003). Therefore, courts may "not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe." Id. As we have explained:

The courts give pro se litigants who are untrained in the law a certain amount of leeway in drafting their pleadings and briefs. Accordingly, we measure the papers prepared by pro se litigants using standards that are less stringent than those applied to papers prepared by lawyers.

Pro se litigants should not be permitted to shift the burden of the litigation to the courts or to their

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