VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Com'n of Utah
Decision Date | 10 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 940586-CA,940586-CA |
Citation | 901 P.2d 281 |
Parties | Steven J. VanLEEUWEN, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, Custom Landscape Services, and CNA Insurance Company, Respondents. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
David S. Kunz, Brad C. Smith, Ogden, for petitioner.
Theodore E. Kanell, Hanson, Epperson & Smith, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Before BENCH, JACKSON, and WILKINS, JJ.
Steven J. VanLeeuwen petitions for review of the Industrial Commission's denial of his claim for workers' compensation benefits. We affirm.
Custom Landscape Services provides mowing, landscaping, and yard care services to individuals and businesses. Custom employed VanLeeuwen as a "Project Supervisor," responsible for supervising other employees and for transporting them to and from various work sites. Custom provided VanLeeuwen with a company truck, which he used to commute to and from Custom's business office.
On the morning of May 6, 1993, VanLeeuwen was driving the truck from his home to Custom's business office when he was involved in an automobile accident. VanLeeuwen suffered serious injuries.
VanLeeuwen filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with the Industrial Commission. A formal adjudicative hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied VanLeeuwen's claim, ruling that VanLeeuwen "was not in the course and scope of his employment with [Custom] as he was driving to work." The ALJ further ruled that "this accident is governed by the going-and-coming rule which precludes benefits being awarded and does not fit into any exception to the rule and, therefore, the claims of [VanLeeuwen] should be dismissed." The ALJ ordered "that the claim of [VanLeeuwen] for payment of unpaid medical expenses, recommended medical care, and temporary total compensation be ... denied."
VanLeeuwen filed with the Commission a Motion for Review. The Commission ruled that The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision and this petition for writ of review followed.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1993), we may grant relief from an agency action if the agency "has erroneously interpreted ... the law." " 'We review statutory interpretations by agencies for correctness, giving no deference to the agency's interpretation, unless the statute grants to the agency the discretion to interpret the statute.' " Employers' Reinsurance v. Industrial Comm'n, 856 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Ferro v. Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App.1992)). 1 The Utah Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) provides, in pertinent part:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, ... shall be paid compensation....
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994). In Cross v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App.1992), this court held that the Act does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the Commission to interpret the specific statutory language. We therefore review the Commission's interpretation of the Act for correctness.
Under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), we may also grant relief from an agency action if the agency "has erroneously ... applied the law." "Every agency decision we review under [the Utah Administrative Procedures Act] necessarily involves an express statutory grant of discretion to the agency to apply the law at issue." Employers' Reinsurance, 856 P.2d at 650 n. 3. When an agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not disturb the agency's application " 'unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.' " Cross, 824 P.2d at 1204; (quoting Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App.1989)).
When a petitioner challenges an agency's findings of fact, we are required to uphold the findings if they are supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1994); accord Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 P.2d 819, 825 (Utah 1995). Substantial evidence has been defined as " 'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.' " Utah Ass'n of Counties, 895 P.2d at 825 (quoting U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1994)). Id. (citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App.1989)). As a preliminary matter, before we will subject an agency's findings to the substantial evidence test, the party challenging the findings "must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence." First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); accord Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988); Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
VanLeeuwen argues that the Commission erred by denying his claim because his injury occurred while he was en route to work in a truck provided by Custom and he was, therefore, in the course of his employment at the time of the accident. VanLeeuwen urges this court to reverse the Commission's decision and award him benefits merely because he was driving an employer-owned vehicle and was injured while traveling to work.
The Act provides coverage to employees injured in accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994). As a general rule, injuries sustained by an employee while traveling to and from the place of employment do not arise out of and in the course of employment and are, therefore, not covered by workers' compensation. See State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984) ( ); Barney v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271 (1973) (same); Cross, 814 P.2d at 1204 (same). This rule has some exceptions, such as
where transportation was furnished by the employer to the benefit of the employer; where the employer requires the employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the business; where the employee is injured while upon a "special errand" or "special mission" for the employer; where ingress and egress at the place of employment are inherently dangerous; and where the employee combined pleasure and business on a trip, and the business part predominated.
State Tax Comm'n, 685 P.2d at 1053 (citations omitted).
In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989), the supreme court discussed the relevant factors to consider when applying an exception to the going and coming rule.
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct.
Id. at 937; accord Kinne v. Industrial Comm'n, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) ( ). Ultimately, whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. State Tax Comm'n, 685 P.2d at 1053.
In the present case, the ALJ's findings indicate that VanLeeuwen received the majority of the benefit from his use of the company-owned truck. VanLeeuwen has not challenged the ALJ's finding, but instead argues that Custom received a substantial benefit from his use of the truck as a matter of law. See First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165.
A review of the record indicates that the primary benefit to Custom in providing VanLeeuwen with a company-owned truck was his arrival at work. However, mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the employer. See Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 24 Utah 2d 16, 18-19, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (1970) ( ); Cross, 824 P.2d at 1205 ( ); Santa Rosa Junior College v. W.C.A.B., 40 Cal.3d 345, 220 Cal.Rptr. 94, 97, 708 P.2d 673, 676 (1985) (...
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