Vargas v. State
| Decision Date | 23 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | A15-0386 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Francisco Vincent Vargas, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Redwood County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Katie Conners, Special Assistant Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Steven S. Collins, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal from the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, appellant challenges the district court's conclusion that the state had no obligation to prove that appellant possessed a controlled substance in order to convict him of conspiracy and that his claims therefore fail as a matter of law. We affirm.
Appellant was arrested in July 2008 and charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The state later amended the complaint, adding a charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The state dismissed the first-degree possession charge on the first day of appellant's March 2010 jury trial. The jury convicted appellant of the first-degree conspiracy charge.
This appeal is from the denial of appellant's second petition for postconviction relief. In April 2011, appellant filed his first postconviction petition, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied appellant's petition. On October 1, 2012, we affirmed the denial of that petition for postconviction relief. State v. Vargas, No. A10-1233, 2012 WL 4475682, at *5 (Minn. App. Oct. 1, 2012). The facts of this case are set forth in our earlier opinion, and we do not recite them again here.
As relevant to this appeal, a criminalist from the St. Paul Police Department Crime Lab (SPPDCL) testified at trial that a substance seized from a vehicle that appellant wasdriving was cocaine, and that it weighed 52.6 grams. Appellant's trial counsel cross-examined the criminalist's testimony concerning, among other things, the SPPDCL's testing procedures, but appellant did not dispute at trial that the substance found in the vehicle was cocaine. Independent testing of the substance was neither requested nor performed. After the state rested, appellant moved to dismiss, arguing that he had been "framed" and that there was no evidence of a conspiracy. The district court denied the motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury, and the jury found appellant guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree possession.
Appellant now argues that evidence of "massive reliability failures" at the SPPDCL requires a new trial. The postconviction court denied appellant's petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing because it determined that the state was not required to prove that the substance received in evidence at trial was actually cocaine and that appellant's legal claims therefore failed as a matter of law.
We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). "In doing so, we review the postconviction court's legal conclusions de novo, see Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2010), and its findings of fact for clear error, see Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 2009)." Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013).
Central to this appeal is whether appellant's conviction required proof that the substance seized by police was actually cocaine. The postconviction court held that the state was not required to so prove, and that the laboratory deficiencies to which appellant points as entitling him to relief are therefore not materially important to his conviction.
To prove the crime of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance, the state must prove that (1) there was an agreement to commit a controlled-substance crime and (2) one of the parties to that agreement committed an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.096, subd. 1 (2008) (), 609.175, subd. 2 (2008) (); State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 2001). "[A] conspiracy to commit a crime is a separate, substantive offense from the crime which is the object of the conspiracy . . . ." State v. Burns, 215 Minn. 182, 186, 9 N.W.2d 518, 520 (1943). Because conspiracy is an anticipatory crime, the crime that is the object of the conspiracy need not be completed. See Minn. Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2.
Appellant cites Kuhnau for the proposition that the state is required to prove all of the elements of the underlying drug offense in addition to the elements of conspiracy, including possession of a controlled substance. See 622 N.W.2d at 556 (). In Kuhnau, the Minnesota Supreme Court heldthat the district court erred by failing to include the language "whether Kuhnau knew or believed that the substance sold was methamphetamine under the facts presented" in the otherwise appropriate jury instructions. Id. at 557. Nothing in Kuhnau required the actual sale of a controlled substance. Rather, the state must prove that the accused conspired to commit the crime and intended to sell a controlled substance. Id.
Here, the first-degree possession charged was dismissed before trial, and appellant was tried only on the conspiracy charge. Appellant did not challenge at trial that the substance at issue was cocaine. Rather, he maintained that he was not part of any conspiracy concerning it and that he had been "framed." As required by Kuhnau, the district court instructed the jury that it was required to find that the state had proven appellant's agreement to commit a controlled-substance crime in order to convict.
In State v. Deshay, we noted that "[t]he conspiracy statute does not require that the state prove DeShay personally sold ten or more grams of cocaine within a 90-day period; only that he participated in an agreement to sell ten or more grams of cocaine within a 90-day period." 645 N.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Minn. App. 2002), aff'd, 669 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2003). Similarly, the state was not required to prove here that appellant actually possessed more than 25 grams of cocaine. Rather, the state needed to prove that appellant participated in an agreement to possess more than 25 grams of cocaine. We determined in an earlier appeal that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Vargas, 2012 WL 4475682, at *9. Consequently, the postconviction court did not err in determining that the state was not required to prove that appellant possessed cocaine under Minn. Stat. § 152.096, subd. 1.
Appellant, as the petitioner for postconviction relief, has the burden to prove his entitlement to postconviction relief by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2014). "To meet that burden, a petitioner's allegations must be supported by more than mere argumentative assertions that lack factual support." Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005). A postconviction court may summarily deny a petition for relief without an evidentiary hearing if the files and records conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014). We review such a denial for abuse of discretion. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Minn. 2013).
Appellant's first two arguments rely on the premise that his claims concerning problems at the SPPDCL qualify as newly discovered evidence. To qualify as newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial, the information must (1) not have been known to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) not have been discoverable through due diligence before trial; (3) not be cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) be likely to have produced a more favorable result at trial. Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997).
Here, even if all of appellant's allegations concerning SPPDCL problems are true, the outcome of his trial would not have been any different. There was no argument at trial concerning whether the substance found in the vehicle was cocaine. Rather, appellant argued that there was no evidence of his involvement in a conspiracy. Asdiscussed above, the state was required to prove that appellant participated in an agreement to possess more than 25 grams of a controlled substance, but was not obligated to prove that he possessed cocaine. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(1) (2008).
Further, appellant asserts that evidence of SPPDCL problems shows that the criminalist gave false testimony. Appellant cites State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (1982), to support his claim that he need only show that evidence of SPPDCL problems might have caused the jury to reach a different conclusion. But Caldwell involves a situation where false testimony was relied on concerning the issue of identity. Id. at 585-86. There, the false or misleading testimony was critical to the...
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