Vason v. State
Decision Date | 15 June 1990 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 349 |
Citation | 574 So.2d 860 |
Parties | Corey VASON v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Scott Johnson, Jr., Montgomery, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverett, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was indicted for theft of property in the first degree and burglary in the third degree. The theft charge was amended from theft of property in the first degree to theft of property in the second degree and the appellant then changed his plea from not guilty to guilty on both charges. The trial court asked appellant if he wished to have a sentencing hearing, whereupon the appellant asked that his sentencing conform to the mandate of Harmon v. State, 543 So.2d 715 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), reversed, 543 So.2d 716 (Ala.1988), on remand, 543 So.2d 717 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years' imprisonment on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.
The appellant argues that he should not have received convictions for both burglary in the third degree and theft of property in the second degree, because, he says, the charges arose from the same transaction and the theft was an element of the burglary in that it was the felony intended to be committed upon breaking and entering. Therefore, he argues that the offenses represent a single criminal act and that convictions for both violated the doctrine of double jeopardy.
The following transpired prior to sentencing the appellant:
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent sentences on the two convictions.
Although it is unclear whether the appellant's sentences even had to be concurrent, see Bibb v. State, 352 So.2d 842 (Ala.1977) ( ), as the appellant's sentences were imposed concurrently, his sentencing was proper. See Gray v. State, 338 So.2d 444 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), writ denied, 338 So.2d 445 (Ala.1976) ( .
"Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished only under one of such provisions, and a conviction or acquittal under any one shall bar a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other provision." § 15-3-8, Code of Alabama 1975. This Code section and its forerunners generated old case law holding that one could not be convicted of both burglary and larceny arising from the same transaction.
In Wildman v. State, 42 Ala.App. 357, 165 So.2d 396 (1963), writ denied, 276 Ala. 708, 165 So.2d 403 (1964), the original opinion holding that grand larceny and burglary are "of the same kindred of crimes" and "a verdict of guilt of one excludes a like finding of the other," was modified on rehearing to hold that while a single act could give rise to convictions for both burglary and larceny, double punishment was improper. In holding that it was the double punishment which was proscribed and that concurrent sentences could never constitute double punishment, the court quoted from People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962) as follows:
" ' * * * It was there pointed out, upon an analysis of several earlier decisions, that the prohibition of the statute against double punishment applies not only where "one 'act' in the ordinary sense" is involved but also where there is a "course of conduct" which violates more than one statute and comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute ...; that the divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the defendant; and that if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.' "
Id. at 401. The court also quoted from People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205, 140 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1957), as follows:
" 'It is clear that if separate and distinct acts were committed, and that they violated more than one section of the Penal Law, punishment for each of them would be proper although they arose out of a single transaction.* * * It is also not open to dispute that if there were merely a single inseparable act violative of more than one statute, or if there were an act which itself violated one statute and was a material element of the violation of another, there would have to be single punishment."
Id. at 399-400. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, in Wade v. State, 42 Ala.App. 400, 166 So.2d 739 (1964), the defendant was indicted for second degree burglary "with a companion count of grand larceny" and the court held that "on conviction there can be but one punishment." Id. 42 Ala.App. at 401, 166 So.2d at 740. In Rutherford v. State, 49 Ala.App. 246, 270 So.2d 678 (Ala.Cr.App.1972), writ denied, 289 Ala. 751, 270 So.2d 679 (1972), the court noted that in order to prohibit double punishment for the same act or omission in cases involving burglary and grand larceny, there must be "uncontradicted evidence of the completed act of larceny stand[ing] alone to support the allegation of the appellant's intent when he entered the premises into which he had broken." Id., 49 Ala.App. at 247, 270 So.2d at 679. Thus, the court again verified the propriety of the two convictions arising out of the same act or omission in the case of burglary and larceny.
In Yelton v. State, 56 Ala.App. 272, 321 So.2d 234 (Ala.Cr.App.1975), writ denied, 294 Ala. 745, 321 So.2d 237 (1975), this court held that where a defendant had previously been convicted of murder and was later prosecuted for burglary arising from a breaking and entering with intent to commit the murder which was the subject of the prior conviction, the later burglary prosecution was barred. The court based this decision on the fact that both of these convictions would require "jury-fixed sentences" and therefore double punishment. The court stated:
Id. at 236. (Emphasis in original.) In the present case the appellant's two convictions resulted from but one trial; therefore, the rule in Yelton does not apply.
The propriety of double convictions where the same transaction supports the convictions for both grand larceny and burglary was again upheld in Parker v. State, 516 So.2d 859, 865-66 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), wherein this court held that an indictment charging the defendant with burglary and grand larceny could form the basis of two convictions for the purpose of the Habitual Felony Offender Act, despite the preclusion of double punishment for two offenses arising out of the same transaction. The court noted, "This code section forbids double punishment, but it does not forbid double convictions." Id. at 865.
While the rule against single crimes being divided into two or more offenses has been cited to bar convictions, see e.g. Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786 (Ala.1987) (...
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