Vaughan v. Shalala

• Decision Date: 17 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-50564,94-50564
• Citation: 58 F.3d 129
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14785B Freda R. VAUGHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 129

58 F.3d 129

48 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 265, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14785B

Freda R. VAUGHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 94-50564

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

May 17, 1995.

Bob Richardson, for appellant.

Joseph B. Liken, Office of Gen. Counsel, Dallas, TX, Ellen A. Lockwood, James H. DeAtley, Acting U.S. Atty., San Antonio, TX, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

On September 24, 1991, Freda R. Vaughan applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability since December 31, 1986. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Vaughan then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ determined that Vaughan was unable to perform her past work but had the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of sedentary work. Thus, the ALJ held that Vaughan was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time through December 31, 1988, the date she was last insured for disability benefits. The decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Secretary when the Appeals Council denied Vaughan's request for review.

Vaughan filed suit in the district court seeking review of the Secretary's decision. Both the magistrate judge and district court authored opinions rejecting appellant's challenges to the ALJ's decision. On appeal, Vaughan raises many of the same objections, and we find them no more persuasive than the other judges did.

BACKGROUND

The following salient facts were presented for the Secretary's determination. Vaughan, a high school graduate, was born on June 1, 1937. Her work experience includes co-owning a liquor store and a furniture store, and working as a supervisor in the mail rooms of an oil company and a savings and loan. She last met the earnings requirements for disability benefits on December 31, 1988.

Between 1985 and 1990, Vaughan was treated conservatively for a variety of ailments by a family practitioner, Dr. Norman Moore. She saw him for hip, leg, and chest pain in 1986, and for back pain, dizzy spells, and pain in her right arm in 1988. On May 6, 1988, her blood pressure was measured at 140/80. On April 3, 1990, it had risen to 170/90. Dr. Moore's records contain no specific diagnosis of Vaughan's problems.

In July 1990, after her eligibility expired, Dr. Jorge Duchicela, also a family practitioner, began treating Vaughan for headaches and pain in her legs and tailbone, hypertension, and pain in her back, arms, and legs.

At the July 22, 1992, hearing before the ALJ, Vaughan testified that she suffered from progressively worsening pain and "tingling" in her arms and legs, a condition present to some degree for 20 years. She had recently begun taking "Propox," which relieved some of the pain. Vaughan also testified that she had suffered from high blood pressure for 20 to 25 years. Although The vocational expert, Robert Marion, testified that Vaughan's past relevant work was classified as skilled and that these skills were transferable to sedentary jobs. Such jobs included receptionist, interview clerk, and cashier, which existed in the hundreds of thousands in the national economy. Vaughan's counsel challenged Marion's figures regarding the number of these jobs that were available in the national economy. Marion responded that his figures were accurate.

she had experienced severe headaches in the past, these were currently controlled with medication. She also testified that she had suffered a "mini-stroke" around 1988, resulting in some memory loss. According to Vaughan, the blood pressure medication that she had taken that morning caused her to have difficulty thinking. She also testified that her family performed most of the household chores.

In this case, the ALJ determined that although Mrs. Vaughan cannot perform her past relevant work, she could perform a wide range of sedentary work ¹ from December 31, 1986, the alleged onset date of disability, through December 31, 1988, the date she was last insured for benefits. Thus, the ALJ concluded that Vaughan was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security.

DISCUSSION

Vaughan first argues that the ALJ's determination that she was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. She states that the ALJ's finding that she could perform the full range of sedentary work conflicts with Dr. Duchicela's evaluation of her exertional abilities, the objective medical evidence of high blood pressure and cholesterol, and her testimony at the hearing regarding her limitations.

Contrary to Vaughan's allegation, the ALJ did not find that Vaughan could perform the full range of sedentary work. Rather, the ALJ found that Vaughan could perform a wide range of sedentary work. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. First, the record reflects that Vaughan was able to, and did, work for several years while suffering from ailments she now asserts are disabling. See Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1305 & n. 11 (5th Cir.1987) (ability to work despite pre-existing condition supports ALJ's finding of not disabled). Second, no physician who examined Vaughan pronounced her disabled. See Harper v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1989) (substantial evidence supported ALJ's finding that claimant's subjective symptomology not credible when no physician on record stated that claimant was physically disabled). In her "Disability Report," submitted nearly three years after the date she last met insured status, Vaughan acknowledged that no physician had advised her to limit her activities in any way. Accordingly, Dr. Duchicela's November 1991 assessment that Vaughan could lift only five pounds does not alter the validity of the ALJ's decision.

Third, although Vaughan alleged a very limited activity level at the hearing, she stated in the "Disability Report" that her social contacts and driving were not restricted and that she could perform household chores like cooking, making the bed, and washing. The ALJ concluded that several of the symptoms allegedly plaguing Vaughan were not consistent with the objective medical evidence. See Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 296 (5th Cir.1992). Thus, the ALJ's finding that Vaughan's complaints were not debilitating is supported by substantial evidence.

Vaughan next asserts that the ALJ failed to use proper legal standards in denying benefits. First, she argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the "grids" contained in...