Puente v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 22 September 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-07-2714
• Parties: Teresa PUENTE, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

738 F.Supp.2d 669

Teresa PUENTE, Plaintiff,

v.Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. H-07-2714.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

Sept. 22, 2008.

Carl M. Weisbrod, Morgan Weisbrod LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Angeline S. Johnson, OGC/SSA, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEITH P. ELLISON, District Judge.

Pending before the court are Plaintiff Teresa Puente ("Puente") and Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), cross-motions for summary judgment. Puente appeals the determination of an Administrative Law Judge ("the ALJ") that she is not entitled to receive Title II disability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. After considering the parties' filings and the applicable law, the Court finds that Puente's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 15) should be granted, the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 16) should be denied, and the Commissioner's decision denying disability income benefits be reversed, and the case be remanded, pursuant to sentence four, to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 13, 2004, Puente filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), claiming that she had been disabled and unable to work since July 1, 2004. (R. 22, 72). Puente alleges that she suffers from neck and back pain, headaches, and depression. (R. 24, 72). After being denied benefits initially and on the reconsideration levels (R. 29-41), on March 7, 2005, Puente requested an administrative hearing before an ALJ to review the decision. (R. 42).

A hearing was held on April 5, 2006, in Houston, Texas, at which time the ALJ heard testimony from Puente and Susan Rapant ("Rapant"), a vocational expert ("VE"). (R. 287-317). Puente was represented by a non-attorney ( i.e., a paralegal) at the hearing. (R. 62, 289). In a decision dated August 24, 2006, the ALJ denied Puente's application for benefits. (R. 22-28). On November 7, 2006, Puente appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council of the SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals. (R. 11). The Appeals Council, on April 13, 2007, denied Puente's request to review the ALJ's determination. (R. 8-10). This rendered the ALJ's opinion the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). With the assistance of an attorney, Puente filed this case on August 21, 2007, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of her claim of benefits. See Docket Entry No. 1.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Bases for Benefits

Social Security disability insurance benefits are authorized by Title II of the Act and are funded by Social Security taxes. See Social Security Administration, Social Security Handbook, § 2100 (14th ed.2001). The disability insurance program provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence. A claimant for disability insurance can collect benefits for up to twelve months of disability prior to the filing of an application. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.131. 404.315; Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1007 n. 1 (5th Cir.1975); see also Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir.1997). For purposes of Title II disability benefits, Puente has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured for benefits through December 31, 2008. (R. 22, 24). Consequently, to be eligible for disability benefits, Puente must prove that she was disabled prior to that date.

Applicants seeking benefits under this statutory provision must prove "disability" within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).Under Title II, disability is defined as "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

B. Standard of Review

1. Summary Judgment

The court may grant summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The burden of proof, however, rests with the movant to show that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then a motion for summary judgment cannot be granted because there exists a genuine issue of fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

An issue of fact is "material" only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the case. See Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1991). When deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court shall draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and deny the motion if there is some evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. See McAllister v. Resolution Trust Corp., 201 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir.2000). If there are no issues of material fact, the court shall review any questions of law de novo. See Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir.1999). Once the movant properly supports the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must present specific and supported material facts, of significant probative value, to preclude summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 199 F.3d 796, 798 (5th Cir.2000).

2. Administrative Determination

Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether the proper legal standards were applied to evaluate the evidence. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir.2002). "Substantial evidence" means that the evidence must be enough to allow a reasonable mind to support the Commissioner's decision; it must be more than a mere scintilla but does not need to be a preponderance. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272; Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir.1999).

When applying the substantial evidence standard on review, the court "scrutinize[s] the record to determine whether such evidence is present." Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and must be affirmed. See Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir.2002). Alternatively, a finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. See Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir.2001). The court may not, however, reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272. In short, "[c]onflictsin the evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve." Id. (internal citations omitted).

C. ALJPs Determination

An ALJ must engage in a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing "substantial gainful activity," or is, in fact, disabled:

1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of the medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

3. An individual who "meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1" of the regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

4. If an individual is capable of performing the work she has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

5. If an individual's impairment precludes performance of her past work, then other factors, including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if any work can be performed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir.2000); accord Boyd, 239 F.3d at 704-05. The claimant has the burden to prove disability under the first four steps. See Myers, 238 F.3d at 619. If the claimant successfully carries this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that other substantial gainful employment is available in the national economy, which the claimant is capable of performing. See Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272; Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 1984, 131 L.Ed.2d 871 (1995). If the Commissioner is able to verify that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform in spite of her existing impairments, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove that she cannot, in fact. perform the alternate work suggested. See Boyd, 239 F.3d at 705. A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. See id.

The mere presence of an impairment does not necessarily establish a disability. See Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.1992). An individual claiming disability benefits under the Act has the burden to prove that he suffers from a disability as defined by the Act. See Newton, 209 F.3d at 452; Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir.19...