Vaughn v. State
| Citation | 176 So.3d 354 |
| Decision Date | 11 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D14–2241.,1D14–2241. |
| Parties | Joshiwah Denard VAUGHN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Rod Smith and Jesse Smithof Avera & Smith, LLP, Gainesville, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthew Pavese, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Under review is a dispositive order by the lower court denying Appellant Joshiwah Denard Vaughn's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Having determined the court below properly denied the motion, we affirm.
Based on the testimony provided at the suppression hearing, the facts of the traffic stop were as follows. In the early morning hours of August 14, 2013, Appellant's vehicle was stopped by Gainesville Police Department Officer Candace Futrell for a window tint violation. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Futrell saw a television illegally mounted to the dashboard. Officer Futrell asked for Appellant's license and registration and questioned him regarding his home address. The addresses on the license and the registration, as well as the one orally provided by Appellant, were all different. Officer Futrell then asked Appellant a series of questions regarding whether he had any weapons or contraband on his person or in the vehicle, and Appellant replied that he had a knife on him. By this time, other officers, including a police K–9, had arrived onto the scene and Officer Futrell requested Appellant step out of the vehicle. At the hearing, Officer Futrell testified that she asked Appellant to exit the vehicle for officer safety purposes because Appellant had admitted to having a knife on him and she did not know if any other weapons were in the vehicle.
Once Appellant was out of the vehicle, Officer Futrell again questioned him regarding the different addresses to determine whether Appellant had failed to update his registration as required by law. In response to the questioning, Appellant replied that he had different addresses for where he lives and where he receives his mail. Officer Futrell then informed Appellant that the officers needed to remove the knife from him for safety reasons. Another officer patted down the pocket indicated by Appellant, removed what was described at the hearing as a box cutter or utility knife, and handed it to Officer Futrell. Without opening the knife, Officer Futrell was able to see a white powdery residue she suspected to be cocaine. A field test conducted on site confirmed her suspicion. Appellant was then searched and narcotics were found on his person.
In denying the motion, the court below determined that Officer Futrell had a valid reason to stop Appellant and further investigate the addresses issue. The court also found that the time Appellant was detained before the frisk, (about ten to fifteen minutes), was not unreasonable. Finally, the court concluded that Officer Futrell had a valid safety concern to retrieve the knife. Once the cocaine was discovered on the knife, probable cause existed to arrest Appellant and a valid search incident to arrest led to narcotics being discovered on his person.
The review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law. Higerd v. State,54 So.3d 513, 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The standard of review for the trial judge's factual findings is whether competent, substantial evidence supports the judge's ruling. Butler v. State,706 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The standard of review for the trial judge's application of the law to the factual findings is de novo.Id.A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes “clothed with a presumption of correctness” and the reviewing court “must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling.” Murray v. State,692 So.2d 157, 159 (Fla.1997).
On appeal, Appellant argues that the lower court erred because the traffic stop progressed into an investigative detention without reasonable suspicion. We disagree. Appellant was validly stopped because his car's window tint appeared, and was in fact, too dark. See§ 316.2953, Fla. Stat. (2014)(making it a noncriminal traffic infraction for operating a motor vehicle with side windows tinted beyond a certain percentage); State v. Moore,791 So.2d 1246, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)( that an officer was justified in stopping a vehicle because the officer's observation of dark tinted windows gave him probable cause to believe they were illegally tinted). Officer Futrell also saw a television illegally mounted on the dashboard. See§ 316.303, Fla. Stat. (2014)(making it a noncriminal traffic infraction to operate a motor vehicle with television-type receiving equipment located so that the viewer or screen is visible from the driver's seat). Upon asking for Appellant's license and...
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