Vaughn v. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 05-91-00237-CR,05-91-00237-CR
• Citation: 833 S.W.2d 180
• Parties: John Edward VAUGHN, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 180

833 S.W.2d 180

John Edward VAUGHN, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 05-91-00237-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

May 5, 1992.

Rehearing Denied June 10, 1992.

R.D. Tucker, Dallas, for appellant.

Karen R. Wise, Dallas, for appellee.

Before LAGARDE, KINKEADE and CHAPMAN, JJ.

OPINION

KINKEADE, Justice.

John Edward Vaughn, Jr. appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, the jury assessed punishment at twenty-seven years' confinement in the Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In three points of error, Vaughn argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting his confession, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and (3) the trial court erred in forcing him to go to trial with a biased juror. Because the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Vaughn to go to trial with an objectionable juror, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause for a new trial.

FACTUAL HISTORY

Vaughn, Marvin Wade, and Kevin Wherry met to talk about robbing a motel. Afterwards, the three men drove to the motel and entered the office wearing masks. They told everyone in the motel office to lie down on the floor. Assistant manager Deda Bonura, Bonura's daughter, her daughter's friend, the motel owner, and a patron lay down on the floor as the men instructed them. While Wade held the gun and pulled the phone cord from the wall, Wherry put the money from the cash register in a bag that Vaughn had retrieved from the car. Before leaving, Wade told everyone to continue to stay down or they would be killed. After the three men left, they divided the money three ways. Later, the police arrested the three men in connection with another robbery.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his second point of error, Vaughn contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Vaughn argues that, because his confession was inadmissible and the State's witnesses failed to connect him to the crime, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the critical inquiry remains whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Garrett v. State, 682 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1876, 85 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all of the evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted. Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 695 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). This standard supports the jury's responsibility, as the trier of fact, to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See McCarty v. State, 788 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1990, pet. ref'd) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The jury, as the trier of fact, remains the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The jury may accept or reject any or all of the evidence for either side. Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); see TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. arts. 36.13 & 38.04 (Vernon 1979).

The corpus delicti of a crime is the establishment of substantial facts that a crime has been committed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (5th ed. 1979). When the State establishes the corpus delicti of the crime by other evidence, the defendant's confession of the offense, unaided by other evidence, is sufficient to prove guilt. Hester v. State, 544 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). The State established the corpus delicti of the aggravated robbery through the testimony of assistant motel manager Bonura and the motel owner. Both testified that (1) two masked men came to the motel (Vaughn had stepped outside to get the bag for the cash), (2) exhibited a handgun, and (3) in the course of committing the theft of money from the cash drawer, threatened or placed them both in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. In his confession, Vaughn stated that he and two friends robbed two men and a woman in a motel at gunpoint. Vaughn testified that Wade held the gun, that Wherry collected the money from the cash drawer, and that he obtained the bag to put the money in. All three men split the money from the robbery. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could find Vaughn guilty as a party to the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State established the corpus delicti and Vaughn confessed to the crime, the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. We overrule his second point of error.

VAUGHN'S CONFESSION

In his first point of error, Vaughn contends that the trial court erred in admitting his confession. Vaughn argues that his confession was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made because police officers failed to properly inform him of his rights. Specifically, Vaughn complains that the police did not ask him if he wanted an attorney present during questioning.

To determine whether a defendant has constitutionally waived his rights under the Fifth Amendment, the State must show that (1) the relinquishment of the right was voluntary and (2) the waiver was made with a full awareness of both the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Sanchez v. State, 760 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.). The trial court determines whether the defendant waived his right to remain silent and to have counsel present during questioning based upon the totality of the circumstances. Harville v. State, 591 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Because the waiver can be determined from the circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession, the defendant does not have to expressly waive his right to counsel. Thus, the fact that a defendant does not specifically say that he waives counsel does not prevent the trial court from concluding that the accused knowingly waived his right to counsel. Id. at 866. The trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 47 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

No written statement is admissible unless it shows on its face that the accused received Miranda warnings. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a) (Vernon 1979); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Whenever the defendant alleges acts of coercion and the acts are disputed, the issue is one to be determined by the trier of fact. Harville, 591 S.W.2d at 867. The trial court at the hearing is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses. It may believe or disbelieve any part of any witness's testimony. Id. Once the accused "knowingly and intelligently" elects to proceed with an interrogation without the benefit of counsel, the uncounseled statements he then makes need not be excluded at trial. Lucas, 791 S.W.2d at 47.

Dallas Police Officer Garen Cornett testified that he read Vaughn his rights before he started questioning Vaughn about the robbery. Officer Cornett stated that Vaughn said he understood his rights. Vaughn then discussed the crime with the officer. While Vaughn sat next to him, the officer wrote down Vaughn's statement. The officer then brought in a civilian witness, Debra Mathis. Mathis testified that the officer read the top of the statement, which listed the Miranda rights. She then asked Vaughn to read the statement out loud to her. Vaughn signed the statement in her presence. The officer also testified that Vaughn was not coerced, threatened, or promised leniency for making the statement.

Vaughn testified that he did not voluntarily give the statements. Although he graduated from high school, Vaughn stated that he had difficulty reading and writing. He testified that he did not ask the police to write down his statement and that he did not know what the statement said. Vaughn objected to the admission of the confession at trial. After a hearing, the trial court found that Vaughn gave a statement after he had been read his rights and after he had stated that he understood his rights. Further, the trial court found that the confession was made voluntarily and that Vaughn was not coerced, threatened, or promised leniency in exchange for a confession.

The record shows that:

(1) the officer read Vaughn his rights and that he understood his rights,

(2) Vaughn did not request an attorney at any point during questioning,

(3) the officer wrote down the statement as Vaughn told him the facts,

(4) in the presence of a civilian witness, the officer read the top part of the statement containing the Miranda warning to Vaughn and Vaughn read the bottom part of the statement out loud,

(5) Vaughn signed the statement in the presence of the officer and the civilian witness, and

(6) Vaughn testified that he had a learning disability and that he did not understand the statement he had signed.

When the evidence is disputed, the trial court may choose to disbelieve any witness's testimony. Harville, 591 S.W.2d at 867. Although Vaughn claimed that he did not voluntarily give the statement, the trial court chose not to believe his testimony. Id. Absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion, the findings of the trial court supported by the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Lucas, 791 S.W.2d at 47. We conclude that, under the totality of circumstances, Vaughn knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have his counsel present during questioning and that the officer did not act improperly in taking Vaughn's confession. See Harville, 591 S.W.2d at 867; Sanchez, 760 S.W.2d at 732-33....