Veeder v. Veeder
| Decision Date | 13 March 1923 |
| Docket Number | 35065 |
| Citation | 192 N.W. 409,195 Iowa 587 |
| Parties | DORA B. VEEDER, Appellee, v. JOSEPH VEEDER et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wright District Court.--H. E. FRY, Judge.
THREE actions are consolidated for trial in this proceeding. One is an action in partition, another is an application for a widow's allowance, and the third is the application of an executor for an order to sell the real estate of a decedent to pay debts. The trial court granted a decree of partition of the real estate, as prayed, awarded the widow an allowance of $ 360, and authorized and directed the executor to sell the real estate of the decedent to pay the debts. The facts more fully appear in the opinion.--Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Ladd & Rogers and Healy, Thomas & Healy, for appellants.
W. E Bullard and Sylvester Flynn, for appellee.
We first consider the action in partition. This suit was brought by the surviving widow of one Fred C. Veeder, who died January 26, 1921. Said decedent left surviving him his said widow and five sons, all children of a former marriage. Decedent and the appellee were married on January 27, 1916. Each had been previously married, and the appellee had one child by the former marriage. Prior to the marriage of said parties, the appellee had been employed as housekeeper for the defendant, and had lived in his home on a farm owned and occupied by him and his five sons, four of whom were adults at the time of his death. Prior to the marriage, the appellee and decedent entered into an antenuptial contract, as follows:
"This contract made and entered into by and between F. C. Veeder of Belmond, Iowa, as party of the first part, and Dora B. Lang of Belmond, Iowa, as party of the second part, witnesseth: That whereas, a marriage is intended to be solemnized between the said parties of the first and second part, the said F. C. Veeder, party of the first part, does hereby agree to and with the said Dora B. Lang, party of the second part, as follows: That upon the death of the said F. C. Veeder the said Dora B. Lang shall have of his estate as her full share and interest therein, the one sixth of all of the property and estate of the said F. C. Veeder at the time of his decease; and also it is further agreed and made a part of this agreement, that all life insurance on the life of the said F. C. Veeder shall be added to the value of all properties and interests of his said estate in making up the full amount of the estate of the said F. C. Veeder, and it is further agreed by and between the said parties hereto, that the said F. C. Veeder shall purchase a residence property in the town of Belmond, Iowa, and which property so purchased shall be by the said F. C. Veeder given to R. J. Lee and Nana C. Lee, the father and mother of the said Dora B. Lang, party of the second part, to be used by them for a home during their natural lives, or until the decease of the said F. C. Veeder, with the condition and agreement that in case the said R. J. Lee and Nana C. Lee shall accept of this offer, they, the said R. J. Lee and Nana C. Lee, shall keep up the ordinary repairs required to be made on the said dwelling house, shall keep the same insured in some responsible insurance company for at least one half of the actual value thereof, and shall pay all the taxes and assessments levied upon and against the said property before the same shall become delinquent; and this agreement and use of said property shall continue so long as the said Dora B. Lang shall live as the wife of the said F. C. Veeder, or until the death of the said F. C. Veeder; and it is further agreed that upon the death of the said F. C. Veeder, the said property shall be appraised and shall be accepted and received by the said Dora Lang at its valuation to apply on the one-sixth interest she is hereby made entitled to receive as her full share in the estate of the said F. C. Veeder; and the said Dora B. Lang, party of the second part, does hereby signify her assent and agreement to the provisions of this agreement and does hereby covenant to and with the said F. C. Veeder, party of the first part, and the said Dora B. Lang, party of the second part, in consideration of the premises and in consideration of the sum of one dollar to her in hand paid, does for herself, her heirs, executors and administrators, covenant and agree with the said F. C. Veeder, party of the first part, that the interest so as above agreed to be set apart from the estate of the said party of the first part shall be in full satisfaction of all her rights in the said estate of the said F. C. Veeder, including all her distributive share or dower rights therein as his widow, and shall bar her from claiming the same if she shall survive the said F. C. Veeder after said marriage between them; and further that if the said marriage shall be had and she shall survive him that she will not claim any other or different share or interest in the estate of the said F. C. Veeder than the one sixth thereof, as hereinabove provided, unless some part thereof shall be given to her by his will, or some act done by him subsequent to execution of these presents."
This contract was duly executed and acknowledged by the parties the day preceding their marriage.
After the marriage, the appellee took up her home with the decedent and assumed the duties of a wife in said home. She had charge and care of the home and did the usual work of keeping a house, furnishing the meals, and doing the washing for the family, as farmers' wives ordinarily do.
About sixty days after the marriage, the appellee left the home of her husband and went to the home of her father, who resided in the town of Belmond, near where the farm was located. The decedent visited her there frequently, and finally persuaded her to return to the home on the farm and resume the marital relations, which she did on or about July 1st. She remained on the farm and continued to perform her duties as wife thereafter until the following August, when she again left the home of the decedent and never returned thereafter. In February, 1917, she instituted an action for divorce against the decedent, predicating the same on alleged grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The decedent appeared as defendant in said action, and resisted appellee's claim for divorce, and filed a cross-petition seeking a divorce from appellee on the charge that her marriage to him was the result of conspiracy on her part to obtain his property, and that she had been guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment as to impair his health and endanger his life.
The trial court denied the appellee a divorce, and granted a divorce to the decedent upon his cross-petition. The cause was appealed to this court, where the action of the lower court in denying the appellee herein a decree of divorce was affirmed, and the action of the lower court in granting a decree of divorce to the decedent was reversed. Veeder v. Veeder, 189 Iowa 912, 179 N.W. 136.
After the death of the decedent, the appellee instituted this action in partition, and as the issues were finally settled, appellee's contention is that she is entitled to an undivided one sixth of the property left by the said decedent, under the terms and provisions of the said antenuptial contract. The appellants' defense to this action is based upon the claim that the appellee breached the said antenuptial contract on her part by failing and refusing, without just cause, to perform the duties of a wife under the marriage contract, which marriage contract was the consideration for the antenuptial contract between the parties.
The record shows that the decedent lived five years, lacking one day, after the marriage, and during said period of time the appellee lived with him and maintained the relation of wife to him for an aggregate total of about 3 1/2 months, or approximately 105 days.
An antenuptial contract of this character is valid, binding, and enforceable. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 42 Iowa 600; Ditson v. Ditson, 85 Iowa 276, 52 N.W. 203; Peet v. Peet, 81 Iowa 172, 46 N.W. 1051; Fisher v. Koontz, 110 Iowa 498, 80 N.W. 551, 81 N.W. 702; In re Estate of Mansfield, 185 Iowa 339, 170 N.W. 415; In re Estate of Thorman, 162 Iowa 316, 144 N.W. 5; Weis v. Bach, 146 Iowa 320, 125 N.W. 211.
The first question for our consideration in this connection is: Assuming that the appellee failed to fulfill her duties as a wife under the marriage contract, did such failure on her part constitute such a breach of the antenuptial contract by her as precludes her from recovering under the terms and conditions of said antenuptial contract?
The rule of the English courts is that, where a marriage settlement has been agreed upon between the parties, a woman does not forfeit her rights thereunder, even though she violates the marriage vows.
In Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. Jr. 439 (33 Eng. Rep. 358), it was held that a woman did not forfeit her rights to the benefit of a marriage settlement, even though she were living separate from her husband, in a state of adultery.
In Moore v. Moore, 1 Atk. 272 (26 Eng. Rep. 174), it appeared that a wife had deserted her husband without just cause, and gone to a foreign country, and this was held not sufficient to excuse the husband from paying the annuities due the wife under a marriage settlement contract.
The same rule is recognized in Sidney v. Sidney, 3 N.W. 269 (24 Eng. Reprint 1060).
This rule of the English courts in respect to rights under a marriage settlement has not met with approval or adoption by the courts of the United States. Where parties enter...
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