Vega v. Chi. Park Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 13 C 451
• Citation: 351 F.Supp.3d 1078
• Parties: Lydia VEGA, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

351 F.Supp.3d 1078

Lydia VEGA, Plaintiff,

v.CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Defendant.

Case No. 13 C 451

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed November 16, 2018

James Bryan Wood, Ryan Odell Estes, The Wood Law Office, LLC, Bernadette Marie Coppola, Matthew Christian Douglas, Catherine Simmons-Gill, Kyle Christopher Aurand, Offices Of Catherine Simmons-Gill, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Annette Michele McGarry, Marianne C. Holzhall, McGarry & McGarry, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JORGE L. ALONSO, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Lydia Vega brought this lawsuit asserting claims of national-origin discrimination and retaliation against her former employer, the Chicago Park District ("CPD"), arising out of her termination in September 2012. A jury found in her favor on her discrimination claims, and the Court now considers her requests for equitable relief.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Hispanic woman, began working for CPD in 1990 and was promoted to park supervisor in 2004. CPD operates a telephone hotline that citizens and employees can call to make anonymous reports of wrongdoing by CPD employees, and in September 2011, a CPD employee called the hotline to accuse plaintiff of time-sheet falsification. CPD commenced an investigation. After the investigators filed their report in March 2012, plaintiff had a Corrective Action Meeting ("CAM") with CPD in July. In September 2012, plaintiff received a disposition notice terminating her employment for time-sheet falsification. Plaintiff appealed her termination to the Personnel Board, and her termination was affirmed. This lawsuit followed.

The case went to trial on four of the seven claims that survived summary judgment, Vega v. Chi. Park Dist. , 165 F.Supp.3d 693, 705 (N.D. Ill. 2016), including national-origin discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The jury returned a verdict for defendant on the retaliation claims but for plaintiff on the discrimination claims.

STANDARDS

"Under Title VII, after an employer has been found to have intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the district court may order back pay, reinstatement, and ‘any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.’ " Washington v. Office of the State Appellate Defender , No. 12 C 8533, 2016 WL 3058377, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) ). In deciding what forms of equitable relief are appropriate in a particular case, the district court is vested "with broad discretion to fashion a remedy." EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary , 108 F.3d 1569, 1580 (7th Cir. 1997).

The guiding principle in exercising that discretion is that the court "has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "And where a legal injury is of an economic character, [t]he general rule is, that ... [t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." Id. at 418-19, 95 S.Ct. 2362 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC , 458 U.S. 219, 230, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982) (the statutory aim is "to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole by restoring them, so far as possible ... to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination") (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Ortega v. Chi. Bd. of Educ. , 280 F.Supp.3d 1072, 1078 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (internal citations altered).

DISCUSSION

I. REINSTATEMENT

Plaintiff seeks reinstatement to her former position as park supervisor, at a park comparable to the one for which she was previously responsible as it existed at the time of her employment. The Seventh Circuit has explained that, in determining whether to award the equitable remedy of reinstatement, a district court must "strike a delicate balance" by carefully weighing the key factors, which may include competing interests:

On the one hand, reinstatement is the preferred remedy for victims of discrimination, and the court should award it when doing so is feasible. On the other hand, a court is not required to reinstate a successful plaintiff where the result would be a working relationship fraught with hostility and friction. Reinstatement in such situations could potentially cause the court to become embroiled in each and every employment dispute that arose between the plaintiff and the employer following the plaintiff's reinstatement. A court must be careful, however, not to allow an employer to use its anger or hostility toward the plaintiff for having filed a lawsuit as an excuse to avoid the plaintiff's reinstatement.

The court's task of identifying the source of the friction between the employer and the plaintiff following the litigation may be straightforward when there is absolutely no evidence that there was friction in the relationship before the plaintiff filed suit. However, reinstatement may become particularly infeasible if the plaintiff would no longer enjoy the confidence and respect of his superiors once reinstated. Reinstatement may also be more problematic when the plaintiff holds a management position, or would be supervised by the same individuals who discriminated against him in the first place.

Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc. , 239 F.3d 848, 861-62 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).

Notwithstanding that reinstatement is the "preferred remedy," McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992) (" McKnight II "), defendant argues that reinstatement is not appropriate in this case because its employment relationship with plaintiff would be fraught with "undue friction and controversy," McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 908 F.2d 104, 117 (7th Cir. 1990) (" McKnight I "). Defendant explains that, due to this lawsuit and the underlying investigation, there is such hostility between plaintiff and defendant that defendant "wouldn't be able to trust" plaintiff in a park supervisor position again, and reinstating her to that position would only invite conflict that would likely require "continuous judicial intervention in the employment relation[ship]." Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assocs., Inc. , 966 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992). Further, defendant argues that (1) plaintiff's career path has diverged from parks and recreation since her termination (she now works in medical billing for a hospital), (2) she has placed conditions on her reinstatement, and (3) she has testified that working at the CPD caused her such stress that her mental and physical health suffered—all of which, according to defendant, make it unclear whether plaintiff genuinely wants reinstatement to her old position or could ably fill it. Additionally, according to defendant, there is no available park supervisor position in which to place plaintiff, and defendant argues that it would be unfair to "bump" an incumbent park supervisor to make room for her.

Defendant's arguments do not persuade the Court to withhold the "preferred" remedy of reinstatement in this case. Critically, the fact that defendant and some of its employees resent that plaintiff prevailed in her lawsuit is not an appropriate basis for denying reinstatement, as it would essentially punish plaintiff for succeeding in standing up for her own rights. See Bruso , 239 F.3d at at 862 ; McKnight I , 908 F.2d at 116 ("Mere hostility by the employer or its supervisory employees is of course no ground for denying reinstatement."); EEOC v. Century Broad. Corp. , 957 F.2d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1992) ("If ‘hostility common to litigation’ would justify a denial of reinstatement, reinstatement would cease to be a remedy except in cases where the defendant felt like reinstating the plaintiff.") (quoting Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1331 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds , 486 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 1990, 100 L.Ed.2d 223 (1988) ). The record does not support defendant's contention that there is such deep-rooted and pervasive hostility to plaintiff throughout CPD that plaintiff could not productively work in a park supervisor position.

Defendant called Michael Simpkins, one of its human resources officers, to testify that he resented plaintiff for the allegations she had brought against the CPD and felt he could not trust her, but this appears to be little more than "hostility common to litigation"; Mr. Simpkins does not identify any preexisting reason for hostility or resentment. Further, it does not appear that plaintiff and Mr. Simpkins would have to interact on a regular basis to perform their job duties, nor does the record reveal other hostile or resentful employees with whom plaintiff would have to interact regularly. See Stephenson v. Aluminum Co. of Am. , 915 F.Supp. 39, 56–57 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (in a large organization, "it is unlikely that friction between the parties will be of serious concern"). In this respect, this case is unlike some defendant has cited. See Price , 966 F.2d at 323, 325¹ (reinstatement not appropriate because defendant would be supervised by the very person who had discriminatorily discharged him, so "every time he is denied credit for a sale, or denied a raise or a bonus, or has a squabble with [that supervisor], he will be tempted to run to the district court for further equitable relief"); McKnight II , 973 F.2d at 1370 (affirming district court decision not to reinstate plaintiff because of, among other reasons, the parties' "acrimonious" relationship and "the management level position involved," McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 705 F.Supp. 464, 469 (E.D. Wis. 1989) ); Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC , No. 12-CV-6859, 2017 WL 2985649, at *13 (...