Velilla v. VIP Care Pavilion Ltd.
Decision Date | 22 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 4D02-2162.,4D02-2162. |
Citation | 861 So.2d 69 |
Parties | Myrna VELILLA, as Next Friend to Sara Velilla, Appellant, v. VIP CARE PAVILION LTD., a Florida corporation d/b/a Vip Care Pavilion, and Scott Colton, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Jane Kreusler-Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, Jeffrey M. Fenster and Stacie L. Cohen of Fenster and Faerber, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.
Kenneth R. Drake of Demahy Labrador & Drake, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellees.
Myrna Velilla ("Myrna"), on behalf of her deceased mother Sara Velilla ("Sara"), filed an action alleging that VIP Care Pavilion, an assisted living facility, violated her mother's rights under the Florida Assisted Living Facility Act. After deliberating for under an hour, a jury ruled in favor of VIP. Myrna raises three arguments on appeal. First, Myrna contends a new trial is warranted due to the erroneous admission of collateral source evidence. Second, she claims VIP improperly shifted the emphasis away from VIP's violation of her mother's rights and on to the availability of Medicare to pay for her mother's care. Last, she asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion to strike the affirmative defense alleging her (Myrna's) comparative fault. For the reasons expressed below, we agree on all three points and reverse the judgment, remanding for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
Sara Velilla lived at home with her husband, daughter, and son-in-law prior to being relocated to VIP. She was blind, had diabetes, dementia, Alzheimer's and other medical issues associated with old age. In March of 2000, her husband and daughter were both hospitalized and the family determined that Sara should be placed in an assisted living facility.
Myrna, Sara's daughter and health care surrogate, contacted the state who sent her a list of assisted living facilities. Myrna and her husband met with VIP's director of marketing and activities, Stacey Hamilton. Hamilton explained that VIP was trained to deal with patients like Sara. Hamilton then met with Sara at home to assess her and evaluate whether VIP was appropriate. Hamilton accepted Sara into the facility. Sara moved into VIP on March 14, 2000.
On March 20, 2000 an entry was made in Sara's chart that read The family was notified of the incident. The family decided not to send her to the hospital, but to have a mobile x-ray done. The x-ray came back negative.
Ms. Parola was the director of nursing at VIP. Parola allegedly called the family and advised them they should put on a private duty nurse who could provide one-on-one care. She explained that a one-on-one nurse would reduce the risk of falls, but not prevent them. Parola testified that the family told her they could not afford that option and that they can barely afford the monthly payment now. Myrna denied that anyone from VIP ever told her that her mother needed that type of care or offered her that option.
On April 8, 2000 another report was made. That report stated that Sara The x-ray results, received two days after the fall, indicated Sara had bilateral hip fractures and a broken pelvis. She was brought to the hospital, had surgery, and stayed in the hospital for about a week. After being discharged from the hospital, Sara went to a rehabilitation center. The family was not interested in sending her back to VIP. Sara ended up in a nursing home in North Miami. She never walked after the incident, was bedridden, could no longer feed herself, was totally dependent on others for her care and did not recognize anyone. The Velilla family brought this cause of action alleging that VIP violated Sara Velilla's statutory rights under section 400.429, Florida Statutes. A jury found no liability on the part of VIP.
Velilla initially seeks reversal based on the admission of collateral source evidence. Velilla contends that the trial court erred in allowing in testimony that Sara was entitled to Medicaid benefits which would help cover the cost of her care.
In Florida Physician's Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1984), a medical malpractice action, the trial court permitted the admission of evidence that there were free or low-cost charitable and governmental programs available in the community to meet the needs of the plaintiff's injured child. The district court determined the admission of such evidence was error and held that the admission of the evidence violated the collateral source rule. Id. at 515. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that Id. at 515.
As stated by the Third District, Stanley "modified the collateral source rule to allow admission of evidence of the existence of governmental or charitable health care benefits." Winston Towers 100 Ass'n, Inc. v. De Carlo, 481 So.2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Id. at 428 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
On appeal, VIP asserts that the evidence was not collateral source evidence, and therefore properly admitted, because it did not address any benefits actually received by Sara Velilla. In Parker, this court specifically rejected this argument. Moreover, Parker emphasized that even if the evidence comes in under the Stanley exception, it is admissible only on the issue of the reasonable cost of a plaintiff's future medical care. The record makes clear, and VIP acknowledges, that the evidence of Medicaid benefits in this case did not go to the issue of Sara Velilla's future medical care. For that reason we conclude the trial court erred in allowing this testimony to come in.
In Sheffield v. Superior Insurance Co., 800 So.2d 197 (Fla.2001) the court recognized the inherently damaging effect of a jury hearing such evidence. This record does not support a conclusion that this error was harmless. Further, we find no support in the record for VIP's assertion that the Plaintiff opened the door to this testimony. Th...
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