Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota Cnty.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. SC15–2292,No. SC15–2289,SC15–2289,SC15–2292
• Citation: 228 So.3d 76
• Parties: VENICE HMA, LLC d/b/a Venice Regional Medical Center, Appellant, v. SARASOTA COUNTY, et al., Appellee. Sarasota Doctors Hospital, Inc., et al., Appellant, v. Sarasota County, et al., Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

228 So.3d 76

VENICE HMA, LLC d/b/a Venice Regional Medical Center, Appellant,

v.SARASOTA COUNTY, et al., Appellee.

Sarasota Doctors Hospital, Inc., et al., Appellant,

v.Sarasota County, et al., Appellee.

No. SC15–2289

No. SC15–2292

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 6, 2017

Geoffrey D. Smith, Timothy B. Elliott, Kara L. Gross, and Susan C. Smith of Smith & Associates, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant Venice HMA, LLC, d/b/a Venice Regional Medical Center

Raoul G. Cantero, David P. Draigh, and Ryan A. Ulloa of White & Case LLP, Miami, Florida; and Stephen A. Ecenia and J. Stephen Menton of Rutledge Ecenia, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellants Sarasota Doctor's Hospital, Inc., and Englewood Community Hospital, Inc.

Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., and Amy S. Farrior of Buell & Elligett, P.A., Tampa, Florida; Robert L. Nabors of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen E. DeMarsh, County Attorney, and Frederick J. Elbrecht, Deputy County Attorney, Sarasota, Florida, for Appellee Sarasota County

David A. Wallace of Bentley & Bruning, P.A., Sarasota, Florida, for Appellee Sarasota County Public Hospital District

POLSTON, J.

These consolidated cases are before the Court on appeal from the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County, 198 So.3d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), which held that the indigent care provision of the special law applicable only to Sarasota County constitutes an unconstitutional privilege because it provides for reimbursement to the public and private hospitals only in Sarasota County rather than in the entire State of Florida.¹ However, because a special law by definition operates only in a defined subdivision of the State, we reverse the Second District's decision. The indigent care provision does not grant a privilege to a private corporation in violation of article III, section 11(a)(12) of the Florida Constitution because it applies equally to all hospitals in Sarasota County, whether public or private.

BACKGROUND

The Second District described the background of the statutory provision at issue and the factual history of these cases as follows:

[B]y special law in 1949, the legislature established the Sarasota County Public Hospital District, one of thirty-four special hospital districts. The special law granted the hospital district its own taxing authority separate from Sarasota County. See ch. 26468, Laws of Fla. (1949). Sarasota County voters approved the special act in a 1950 referendum.

Almost a decade later, in 1959, the legislature amended the special law. The legislature added an indigent care provision requiring Sarasota County to reimburse the hospital district for medical services provided to indigent patients at hospital district facilities. See ch. 59–1839, § 8(i), at 3884–85, Laws of Fla. Significantly, the indigent care provision also required reimbursement to any other hospital in Sarasota County providing indigent care. See id.

The indigent care provision was not submitted for voter approval. Our record does not contain documentation of public notice; presumably, such notice was published pursuant to article III, section 20 of the 1885 Constitution as an alternative to a referendum. The parties do not claim otherwise.

....

[I]n 2003, the legislature repealed the 1959 special law. See ch. 03–359, § 2, at 316, Laws of Fla. It enacted a 2003 special law for "the codification of all special acts relating to [the] Sarasota County Public Hospital District" to provide "a single, comprehensive special act charter for the District including all current legislative authority granted to the District by its several legislative enactments." Seeid. § 1. The 1959 indigent care provision, with only minor nonsubstantive changes, remained a part of this 2003 comprehensive legislation. Compare 1959 Laws of Fla. § 8(i), 3884–85 with ch. 03–359, § 8(9), at 321, Laws of Fla. Notice of the 2003 special law was published in compliance with article III, section 10 of the 1968 Constitution. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Local Gov't & Veterans Affairs HB 1113 (2003) Staff Analysis 5 (Mar. 7, 2003).

....

Beginning in November 2008, and monthly thereafter, the Private Hospitals² submitted to the County a list of costs associated with providing hospital care to the indigent in Sarasota County. The Private Hospitals requested reimbursement for these costs pursuant to section 8(9) of the 2003 special law[.] The County refused to pay.

Venice HMA, 198 So.3d at 25–28 (footnotes omitted).

In 2011, the Private Hospitals "sought a declaration establishing their right to reimbursement from the County for providing indigent care under the indigent care provision of the 2003 special law." Id. at 28. However, "[t]he County maintained that such reimbursement would provide an unconstitutional privilege to private corporations" in violation of article III, section 11(a)(12). Id. The trial court entered summary judgment agreeing with the County. Id. at 29.

On appeal, the Second District affirmed, stating that "[t]he correct analysis is whether the 2003 special act gives the Private Hospitals in Sarasota County a privilege that private hospitals elsewhere in the state do not share." Id. at 30 (quoting and agreeing with the County). The Second District explained that "[b]efore addition of the indigent care provision in the 1959 special law, no non-District hospital was entitled to reimbursement for providing medical care to the indigent" and that "[t]he Private Hospitals, if they prevail, certainly would have an advantageous position relative to other private hospitals in Florida, indeed, even as to those that may exist in adjacent counties." Id. at 29–30.³

ANALYSIS

"The constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law subject to de novo review." City of Fort Lauderdale v. Dhar, 185 So.3d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 2016). "[A] determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid."

Pub. Defender, Eleventh Jud. Cir. v. State, 115 So.3d 261, 280 (Fla. 2013).

Article X, section 12(g) of the Florida Constitution explains that " ‘[s]pecial law’ means a special or local law." And this Court has described special and local laws as follows:

[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal.

Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 967 So.2d 802, 807 (Fla. 2007) (quoting State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 120 Fla. 555, 163 So. 237, 240 (1934) ) (emphasis added). In contrast, "[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or instrumentality." Id. No one disputes that the law at issue here is a local law (which is included in the constitutional definition of special law) in that it operates only in Sarasota County.

Article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o special law shall be passed unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by general law;" however, such notice is unnecessary if the special law is "conditioned to become effective only upon approval by vote of the electors of the area affected." As the Second District explained, no one is claiming that the provision at issue in this case was not properly noticed as a special law. See Venice HMA, 198 So.3d at 26.

Furthermore, article III, section 11 provides a list of subjects that may not be addressed by special law. Specifically, according to article III, section 11(a) (emphasis added), "[t]here shall be no special law or general law of local application pertaining to:"

(1) election, jurisdiction or duties of officers, except officers of municipalities, chartered counties, special districts or local governmental agencies;

(2) assessment or collection of taxes for state or county purposes, including extension of time therefor, relief of tax officers from due performance of their duties, and relief of their sureties from liability;

(3) rules of evidence in any court;

(4) punishment for crime;

(5) petit juries, including compensation of jurors, except establishment of jury commissions;

(6) change of civil or criminal venue;

(7) conditions precedent to bringing any civil or criminal proceedings, or limitations of time therefor;

(8) refund of money legally paid or remission of fines, penalties or forfeitures;

(9) creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of liens based on private contracts, or fixing of interest rates on private contracts;

(10) disposal of public property, including any interest therein, for private purposes;

(11) vacation of roads;

(12) private incorporation or grant of privilege to a private corporation;

(13) effectuation of invalid deeds, wills or other instruments, or change in the law of descent;(14) change of name of any person;

(15) divorce;

(16) legitimation or adoption of persons;

(17) relief of minors from legal disabilities;

(18) transfer of any property interest of persons under legal disabilities or of estates of decedents;

(19) hunting or fresh water fishing;

(20) regulation of occupations which are regulated by a state agency; or

(21) any subject when prohibited by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house. Such law may be amended or repealed by like vote.

The Private Hospitals argue that the indigent care provision of the special law at issue here does not grant a privilege to...