Ventura v. Town of E. Haven

Decision Date22 January 2019
Docket NumberSC 19898
Citation330 Conn. 613,199 A.3d 1
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
Parties Thomas VENTURA v. TOWN OF EAST HAVEN et al.

James J. Healy, Hartford, with whom was Joel T. Faxon, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Aaron S. Bayer, Hartford, with whom was Tadhg Dooley, New Haven, for the appellee (named defendant).

Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, Kahn and DiPentima, Js.*

PALMER, J.

The plaintiff, Thomas Ventura, commenced this action against the named defendant, the town of East Haven, seeking damages for injuries he sustained when he was struck by an unregistered vehicle driven by a third party, Vladimir Trnka. The plaintiff maintained that the defendant is liable for those damages because he would not have incurred them if Jeffrey R. Strand, an East Haven police officer who had been dispatched to respond to an incident involving Trnka shortly before he was struck, had directed that Trnka's vehicle be towed in accordance with certain police department tow rules.1 According to the plaintiff, those rules require the towing of unregistered vehicles like Trnka's. Following a trial, the jury rejected the defendant's claim of governmental immunity,2 finding that Strand had a ministerial duty under those tow rules to have had Trnka's vehicle towed, and awarded the plaintiff $12,200,000 in damages. The trial court thereafter granted in part the defendant's motion for remittitur and reduced the verdict to $6,200,000. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the defendant was immune from suit because its tow rules did not impose on Strand a clear ministerial duty to tow Trnka's vehicle. See Ventura v. East Haven , 170 Conn. App. 388, 414–15, 154 A.3d 1020 (2017). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that governmental immunity barred the plaintiff's action. Ventura v. East Haven , 325 Conn. 905, 156 A.3d 537 (2017). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court because we agree that the plaintiff's action is foreclosed by governmental immunity.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following procedural history and relevant facts, which the jury reasonably could have found. "On November 4, 2006, Strand was dispatched to investigate a [p]ossible domestic’ incident occurring inside a [l]arge white work van in the McDonald's drive-[through] with an [i]rate male ... operator.’ The person who called 911 described the driver as possibly being ‘on drugs’ or ‘drunk’ and ‘nodding out.’ The caller further described the driver as ‘punching the ceiling’ and ‘not normal.’ After arriving at the McDonald's, Strand identified a vehicle in the drive-through lane that he believed might be the white work van described by dispatch. He pulled his cruiser ‘face to face’ with the white work van, and walked around the van to approach the driver from behind, as he was ‘on a ... domestic violence call.’

"While approaching the driver, Strand radioed in the license plate number, which dispatch confirmed as ‘an '89 FORD cutaway cargo van, white ... out of Townsend Ave. Val Trnka, '07 expiration.’ Despite believing that the ‘white work van’ that dispatch described was the vehicle in front of him, Strand was mistaken in that it was actually a 1997 white [Chevrolet] box truck. He did not ask for registration or proof of insurance, and did not check the emblems on the vehicle to ensure that it was the make and model dispatch had described. Strand then instructed Trnka, the driver, to pull into a parking spot so he could continue his investigation. Victoria Conte, another police officer, arrived on the scene and helped Strand separate and interview Trnka and his girlfriend, Kristen D'Aniello, who was a passenger in the truck. After determining that there was no probable cause for arrest because there was no physical violence between Trnka and D'Aniello during the period of time they were in the drive-through, Strand and Conte further concluded that there was no need to administer a field sobriety test to Trnka.3 Strand asked Trnka and D'Aniello for their driver's licenses, but neither could produce one. He subsequently called dispatch to run their names through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database to check for valid driver's licenses and [the] National Crime Information Center database to check for any outstanding warrants. The dispatcher ... was able to confirm [only] that there were no outstanding warrants for either individual, because the DMV database was malfunctioning. Because Strand could not confirm that Trnka had a valid driver's license, he decided to drive Trnka home and directed Trnka to leave his truck parked in the McDonald's parking lot and keep his keys. Conte drove D'Aniello to her residence.

"Fifty-six minutes later, Trnka retrieved his truck from the McDonald's parking lot and drove it to the intersection of Townsend Avenue and Park Lane in New Haven, less than one mile from Trnka's residence. The plaintiff, an eighteen year old high school student at that time, was entering his vehicle, which was parked on the side of the road. Trnka hit the plaintiff with his vehicle, causing him to suffer severe injuries ...." (Footnotes added and omitted.) Ventura v. East Haven , supra, 170 Conn. App. at 391–92, 154 A.3d 1020.

"Trnka was [later arrested and] charged with evasion of responsibility in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 and failure to drive in the proper lane in violation of General Statutes § 14-236.... [A]s part of the motor vehicle investigation, [it was also] determined that the license plate affixed to the truck did not match the description of the vehicle to which that plate had been assigned and that Trnka was driving without valid insurance or registration, determinations that were not made by Strand at the time he investigated the report of the domestic violence incident. Trnka was, therefore, further charged with misuse of plates in violation of General Statutes § 14-147, operating an unregistered motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-12a, and operating a motor vehicle without insurance in violation of General Statutes § 14-213b....

"The plaintiff subsequently sought to recover damages for his injuries and commenced the present action against Strand4 and the defendant, alleging that Strand negligently violated a ministerial duty imposed on him by the East Haven Police Department Tow Board Rules & Regulations5 (tow rules) by failing to have Trnka's truck towed from the McDonald's parking lot. The plaintiff's operative complaint alleged that Strand ‘failed to have Trnka's [truck] towed and impounded as required in every case involving misuse of plates, lack of insurance or registration by rules promulgated by and for the East Haven police,’ and ‘failed to secure Trnka's [truck] so that he could not return and operate it unlawfully in violation of due care and police procedures.’ In particular, he alleged that paragraph 7 of the tow rules required that [a]ll motor vehicle violations are to be towed to include unregistered and misuse of plates. Operators of these vehicles are not allowed to park [the] vehicle or leave [it] in private parking areas.’ The complaint further alleged that the defendant was directly liable for Strand's negligence under General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (1) (A).6 In its answer, the defendant raised several special defenses, including that of governmental immunity.

"During the trial, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a copy of the tow rules. This document, effective September 1, 1998, was prefaced by a memorandum issue by then Chief of Police Leonard I. Gallo stating that [a]ll establishments who tow for the East Haven Police Department [department] must adhere to these Rules & Regulations.’ The first paragraph of the tow rules provides that ‘any company or person with towing equipment and having their business within the [t]own of East Haven may make application to the [department] to be on the [department] rotating tow list provided they conform to the following rules and regulations.’

"The defendant moved for a directed verdict after the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief. The court reserved decision on the motion for directed verdict, as permitted under Practice Book § 16-37, and allowed the defense to proceed. In his closing argument, the [plaintiff's counsel] argued to the jury that the tow rules applied in equal force to police officers and to businesses conducting towing operations at the direction of the police. [Counsel] further argued that Strand was negligent in not towing and impounding, or otherwise securing, Trnka's truck on the basis of the motor vehicle violations that he knew existed at the time of his investigation of the possible domestic violence incident in the McDonald's parking lot, and, because of that knowledge, he did not have the discretion to decline to tow the truck. The defendant argued that Strand did not know of the motor vehicle violations existing at the time of the stop and that, even if he was aware of such violations, the decision to tow was discretionary, and, thus, the defendant was protected by governmental immunity.

"Regarding the defendant's special defense of governmental immunity, the court instructed the jury that ‘[i]n this case, the parties agree and the court instructs you that ... Strand was a municipal employee engaged in a governmental function at the time of the plaintiff's alleged injuries. The parties disagree, however, as to whether ... Strand was free to exercise discretion when acting or failing to act as he did.

" ‘The question for you ... [to decide] is whether ... Strand was performing a discretionary or ministerial act when the plaintiff was allegedly injured by his conduct. As I stated earlier, the burden is on the defendant, who desires the benefit of governmental immunity, to persuade you by...

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