Verkey v. Hebard

• Decision Date: 05 October 2012
• Citation: 99 A.D.3d 1205,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06672,952 N.Y.S.2d 356
• Parties: Dennis VERKEY, Plaintiff–Respondent–Appellant, v. Roy F. HEBARD, Jr. and Roy W. Hebard, Defendants–Appellants–Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

99 A.D.3d 1205

952 N.Y.S.2d 356

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06672

Dennis VERKEY, Plaintiff–Respondent–Appellant,

v.Roy F. HEBARD, Jr. and Roy W. Hebard, Defendants–Appellants–Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Oct. 5, 2012.

Hagelin Kent, LLC, Liverpool (Keith D. Miller of Counsel), for Defendants–Appellants–Respondents.

William K. Mattar, P.C., Williamsville (April J. Orlowski of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent–Appellant.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when a vehicle owned by defendant Roy F. Hebard, Jr. and driven by defendant Roy W. Hebard collided with a vehicle driven by plaintiff. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of the three categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) alleged in the complaint, as amplified by plaintiff's bill of particulars, i.e., the permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use, and 90/180–day categories of serious injury. Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability, i.e., on the issues of negligence and serious injury ( see generally Ruzycki v. Baker, 301 A.D.2d 48, 51–52, 750 N.Y.S.2d 680).

Addressing first the issue of negligence, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting that part of plaintiff's cross motion with respect to that issue. We therefore modify the order accordingly. Although plaintiff met his initial burden by establishing “ ‘that the sole proximate cause of the accident was [defendant driver's] failure to yield the right of way’ to plaintiff” ( Guadagno v. Norward, 43 A.D.3d 1432, 1433, 842 N.Y.S.2d 844;see Kelsey v. Degan, 266 A.D.2d 843, 843, 697 N.Y.S.2d 426), defendants raised a triable issue of fact by presenting evidence that the collision was head-on and that defendant driver was stopped in his lane of travel at the time of the collision ( see Phillips v. Bartholomew, 20 A.D.3d 920, 921–922, 798 N.Y.S.2d 286;see generally S.J. Capelin Assoc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 341, 357 N.Y.S.2d 478, 313 N.E.2d 776). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the fact that defendant driver entered a plea of guilty to a Vehicle and Traffic Law offense is only some evidence of negligence and does not establish his negligence per se ( see Kelley v. Kronenberg [appeal No. 2], 2 A.D.3d 1406, 1407, 770 N.Y.S.2d 217;Canfield v. Giles [appeal No. 1], 182 A.D.2d 1075, 1075, 585 N.Y.S.2d 242).

The court properly denied both defendants' motion and that part of plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of serious injury. We note at the outset that plaintiff's contention that his injury constitutes a permanent loss of use under Insurance Law § 5102(d) is not properly before us inasmuch as it is raised for the first time on appeal ( see Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora, 202 A.D.2d 984, 985, 609 N.Y.S.2d 745).

We conclude that there are issues of fact on the record before us with respect to the categories of permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use, based on the conflicting expert opinions submitted by the parties ( see Cooper v. City of Rochester, 16 A.D.3d 1117, 1118, 791 N.Y.S.2d 239). Notably, we reject defendants' contention that the affirmed report of their retained physician established that plaintiff's injury was related to a preexisting condition and thus that, as a matter of law, it was not causally related to the instant accident ( see generally Spanos v. Fanto, 63 A.D.3d 1665, 1666, 879 N.Y.S.2d 878). Here, although plaintiff had a preexisting degenerative disc disease as noted on a CT scan...