Vicknair v. State
| Decision Date | 17 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 036-84,036-84 |
| Citation | 751 S.W.2d 180 |
| Parties | James Wallace VICKNAIR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Don Ervin, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. and Winston E. Cochran, Jr., Patricia Saum and J. Sidney Crowley, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant pled guilty before the court, pursuant to a plea bargain, to possession of more than five and less than fifty pounds of marihuana. The court assessed five years. The First Court of Appeals (Houston) reversed the conviction, holding that the search of appellant's automobile resulted from an illegal stop. Vicknair v. State, 670 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1983). We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to examine this holding.
A hearing was held on appellant's motion to suppress. Houston Police Officer D.W. Illingworth testified that on the evening of November 27, 1981, he was on patrol with his partner. Illingworth testified concerning the stop of appellant's vehicle as follows:
Illingworth and his partner then stopped the vehicle. Appellant was the driver. Illingworth asked to see appellant's driver's license. Appellant stated "that his license had been revoked in another state." Illingworth asked again if appellant had a Texas driver's license. When appellant replied that he had not, and was unable to produce a driver's license, Illingworth placed him under arrest. Subsequent events led to the discovery of a quantity of marihuana in plain view in appellant's car.
On cross-examination, Illingworth testified further concerning his reason for stopping appellant, as follows:
The Court of Appeals wrote: "Both appellant and the State agree that the violation the officer was describing was that in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d, Sec. 111 (Vernon 1977) ..."
The Court of Appeals held that a cracked taillight emitting white light is not a violation of Art. 6701d, Sec. 111, 1 supra, because the statute requires only that a plainly visible red light be emitted and does not prohibit the emission of light of another color. Since the evidence established that appellant's taillight did emit a visible red light at all times, the Court of Appeals ruled the initial stop of appellant invalid and that the fruits thereof should have been suppressed.
We need not reach the issue of whether the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Art. 6701d, Sec. 111, supra, is correct. We will focus on a separate part of Art. 6701d entitled ARTICLE XV--INSPECTION OF VEHICLES.
Section 140(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Section 141 provides, in pertinent part:
Section 142(a) provides, in pertinent part:
The Administrative Code contains the "list of items to be inspected" in the form of a chart. We set out the text appearing adjacent to the chart in the Administrative Code:
Tex. Public Safety Comm'n, 37 Tex.Admin.Code Sec. 23.41 (November 1977) (Inspection Items, Procedures, and Requirements).
We now set out the pertinent provisions of the Rules and Regulations for Official Vehicle Inspection Stations and Certified Inspectors:
Section 141(d) of Art. 6701d, supra, provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall drive or move on any highway any motor vehicle ... unless the equipment upon any and every said vehicle is in good working order and adjustment as required in this Act and said vehicle is in such safe mechanical condition as not to endanger the driver or other occupant or any person or property."
Section 140(g) provides in pertinent part:
"Any person operating a vehicle on the highways of this State ... in violation of the provisions of this Act or without displaying a valid inspection certificate or having equipment which does not comply with the provisions of Article XIV of this Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction shall be punished as provided in Section 143 of this Act."
We summarize the requirements of the statute. The lighting equipment of every motor vehicle must be inspected. (Sec. 140(a)). If the inspection discloses the necessity for adjustments or repairs, the equipment must be adjusted or repaired before a certificate of inspection may issue. (Sec. 140(b)). By what criteria is an inspector guided in his determination of the necessity for adjustments or repairs? The Department is authorized to furnish instructions to the inspector for the inspection of motor vehicles "for the proper and safe performance of the required items of inspection." (Sec. 141(a)). The inspector must "inspect for and reject if" the tail lamp does not completely emit a red light or if the lens is cracked. (Rules and Regulations for Official Vehicle Inspection Stations and Certified Inspectors). The Act commands that no person shall drive a motor vehicle on any highway unless its equipment is "in good working order and adjustment as required" in the Act. (Sec. 141(d)). Is a cracked taillight lens emitting white light "in good working order and adjustment" as required in the Act? Not by the criteria promulgated by the Department pursuant to authority conferred in Article XV of the Act. According to those criteria, a cracked taillight...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fillmore v. Eichkorn
...with a cracked lens cover on a taillight does not violate statutes similar to K.S.A. 8-1706 and K.S.A. 8-1759a) and Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (when taillight emitted red light visible to the officer, there was no reason to stop car for a defective taillight even th......
-
State v. Brown
...dime-sized hole because there was no evidence the hole affected the visibility of the light to another vehicle); Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180, 189–90 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (taillight in proper condition despite crack in a taillight because it still emitted a red light visible within the ......
-
State v. Mazuca
...law requiring an automobile to display red light to the rear did not mean that all other colors of light are barred. Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Vicknair was stopped by a police officer because a taillight lens was cracked, and the crack “permitted some white ligh......
-
State v. Farish
...other jurisdictions. Id. ¶ 32 (citing Kroft v. State , 992 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), then citing Vicknair v. State , 751 S.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ); see Spurlin v. Nardo , 145 W.Va. 408, 114 S.E.2d 913, 918 (1960) (determining that brakes were not in good workin......