Victory Cab Co. v. City of Charlotte

• Decision Date: 12 December 1951
• Docket Number: No. 526,526
• Citation: 234 N.C. 572,68 S.E.2d 433
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: VICTORY CAB CO. et al. v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al.

Page 433

68 S.E.2d 433

234 N.C. 572

VICTORY CAB CO. et al. v.CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al.

No. 526

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 12, 1951

Henry L. Strickland, Charlotte, for plaintiffs, appellants.

John D. Shaw, Charlotte, for defendants, appellees.

JOHNSON, Justice.

It is admitted in the pleadings that the plaintiffs paid the City of Charlotte for each of the three years in question the sum of $51.00 for each taxicab in operation, '1.00 thereof being for automobile license tag,' and $50.00 thereof being assessed by special taxicab ordinance of the City as a fee 'for franchised operations' of the cabs.

The plaintiffs contend that by the terms of G.S. § 20-97 (a) and (b) the City was limited to the collection of $1.00 for the 'license tag' and $15.00 for all other purposes,--a total of $16.00.Accordingly, the plaintiffs insist they are entitled to a refund of $35.00 on each cab licensed.The statute on which they rely, G.S. § 20-97, is a part of the composite motor vehicle statute law of the State.It reads as follows:

'20-97.Taxes compensatory; no additional tax.--(a) All taxes levied under the provisions of this article are intended as compensatory taxes for the use and privileges of the public highways of this state, and shall be paid by the commissioner to the state treasurer, to be credited by him to the state highway fund; and no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the state of North Carolina, except that cities and towns may levy not more than one dollar ($1.00) per year upon any such vehicle resident therein: Provided, however, that cities and towns may levy, in addition to the one dollar ($1.00) per year, herein set forth, a sum not to exceed fifteen dollars ($15.00) per year upon each vehicle operated in such city or town as a taxicab.

'(b).No additional franchise tax, license tax, or other fee shall be imposed by the state against any franchise motor vehicle carrier taxed under this article nor shall any county, city or town impose a franchise tax or other fee upon them, except that cities and towns may levy a license tax not in excess of fifteen dollars ($15.00) per year on each vehicle operated in such city as a taxicab as provided in subsection (a) hereof.'(Italics added.)

The defendantCity of Charlotte relies on the provisions of G.S. § 160-200 (36a), as amended byChapter 564, Session Laws of 1945, to sustain the validity of the ordinance under which it collected the franchise license fee of $50.00 on each cab.This statute is one of a series of enactments by which the Legislature conferred upon cities and towns broad discretionary powers of control over taxicab operators and drivers.These enactments as codified are embraced in the following three sections of the General Statutes of North Carolina: (1)G.S. § 20-37;(2)G.S. § 20-87(c); and (3)G.S. § 160-200(36a).These statutes were in force and effect at the times laid in the plaintiffs' complaint.

G.S. § 20-37 grants to cities and towns 'power to license, regulate and control drivers and operators of taxicabs * * *.'

G.S. § 20-87(c), as amended, precludes the State Department of Motor Vehicles from issuing a license for the operation of any taxicab until the governing body of the city or town in which such taxicab is principally operated, if the principal operation is in a city or town, has issued a certificate showing inter alia 'that the convenience and necessity of the public requires the operation of such taxicab.'

G.S. § 160-200(36a) confers power upon cities and towns to require drivers and operators of taxicabs operating over its streets to apply for and receive a driver's permit before operating any such vehicle, with the governing board being vested with power to reject applications and revoke permits previously issued for failure to meet or comply with certain requirements as to moral character and proficiency as a driver.The statute contains this further provision which is pertinent to this appeal: 'The governing body is also authorized to establish the rates which may be charged by taxicab operators, and may grant franchises to taxicab operators on such terms as it deems advisable.'(Italics added.)

The City Council of the City of Charlotte on 3 October, 1946, acting under the provisions of the foregoing statutes, adopted a comprehensive taxicab ordinance by which it set up the office of Taxicab Inspector and prescribed his duties.The ordinance sets up rules under which taxi-driver permits may be issued and revoked.It also establishes terms and conditions under which taxicab operators may be granted certificates of public convenience and necessity, and prescribes various other rules and regulations in respect to the operation of taxicabs in the City of Charlotte.Among other things, the ordinance provides that each certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the City Council shall expire 'on December 31 of the year during which such certificate was granted,' with provisions prescribed for renewal from year to year.The ordinance contains the following requirement for payment of fees in connection with the issuance of certificates:

'Section 16.Fee For Certificate.The owner of each taxicab which is granted a certificate shall pay annually to the General Treasury of the City the sum of $50.00 for each cab so licensed; provided, however, that in the case of certificates issued on or after July 1st, in each year, the fee shall be $25.00.Such license fees shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other license fees or charges established by proper authority and applicable to taxicabs in this city.'

The question thus posed for decision here is this: Is the ordinance of the City of Charlotte requiring taxicab operators to pay an annual franchise or license fee of $50.00 authorized by G.S. § 160-200(36a), as amended, or is it prohibited by the provisions of G.S. § 20-97(a) and (b)?

The salient facts seem to be pleaded in the complaint and admitted in the answer so as to present squarely for interpretation these two statutes upon which decision rests.

In view of the limitations imposed by G.S. § 20-97(a) and (b), the defendantCity of Charlotte concedes that the fees collected in excess of $16.00, to wit: $35.00, for each cab may not be justified as items of revenue.Cox v. Brown, 218 N.C. 350, 11 S.E.2d 152.It contends, however, that under the City Taxicab ordinance the $50.00 (in addition to the license tag fee of $1.00) may be exacted as a charge for granting and renewing the annual certificates of public convenience and necessity (denominated by the defendants as 'franchised certificates ').Thus the City of Charlotte takes the position that the $50.00 charge is not a revenue exaction, but is rather a police power measure, designed to produce funds with which to pay the costs of regulating taxicabs in the City under its regulatory ordinance, and that such comes within the powers conferred upon the City of G.S. § 160-200(36a), as amended, permitting it to 'grant franchises to taxicab operators on such terms as it deems advisable.'It is urged that the word 'terms' as used in the statute is referable to and authorizes the assessment and collection of fees by a city or town in consideration for franchise privileges to be granted taxicab operators.The City of Charlotte contends there is no conflict between G.S. § 20-97(a) and (b) and the City Taxicab ordinance passed under G.S. § 160-200(36a), as amended, but that if there be conflict the ordinance passed under the latter act must prevail.

Thus we face the question of statutory construction.In the final analysis decision here turns on the legislative intent and meaning of the word 'terms' as used in G.S. § 160-200(36a), as amended.

It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that ordinarily words of a statute will be given their natural, approved, and recognized meaning.Commissioners of Johnston County v. Lacy, 174 N.C. 141, 93 S.E. 482, 2 A.L.R. 726;Randall v. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 107 N.C. 748, 12 S.E. 605, 11 L.R.A. 460;50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 238.

It is also an accepted rule of construction that in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature in cases of ambiguity, regard must be had to the subject matter of the statute, as well as its language, i. e., the language of the statute must be read not textually, but contextually, and with reference to the matters dealt with and the objects and purposes sought to be accomplished, and in a sense which harmonizes with the subject matter.Gill v. Board of Com'rs of Wake County, 160 N.C. 176, at top of page 188, 76 S.E. 203, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 293;Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 137 N.C. 107, at page 119, 49 S.E. 96, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 604;50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 292.

It is the policy of the courts to avoid giving statutory phraseology an unusual, artificial, or subtle meaning.Richmond Guano Co. v. Walston, 187 N.C. 667, at page 672, 122 S.E. 663, and cases cited;50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 238.

And where the meaning of a statute is doubtful, the history of legislation on the general subject dealt with, including statutory changes over a period of years, may be considered in connection with the object, purpose, and language of the statute, in order to arrive at its true meaning.Nance v. Southern R. Co., 149 N.C. 366, 63 S.E. 116;Erie R. Co. v. Steinberg, 94 Ohio St. 189, 113 N.E. 814, L.R.A.1917B, 787.See also50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 294, p 276; Annotation: 70 A.L.R. p. 5(footnotes).It is also accepted practice in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute for the court to take into consideration the settled policy of the state where such is clearly deducible from consistent acts of the Legislature, and tends to shed light on the legislative intent as to the statute under consideration.50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 299.Thus, in the construction of a statute, reference...