Vill. of Elm Grove v. Brefka

• Decision Date: 26 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2011AP2888.,2011AP2888.
• Citation: 2013 WI 54,832 N.W.2d 121,348 Wis.2d 282
• Parties: VILLAGE OF ELM GROVE, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Richard K. BREFKA, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

348 Wis.2d 282

832 N.W.2d 121

2013 WI 54

VILLAGE OF ELM GROVE, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Richard K. BREFKA, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner.^†

No. 2011AP2888.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued March 13, 2013.

Decided June 26, 2013.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by Andrew Mishlove and Lauren Stuckert, and Law Offices of Andrew Mishlove, Glendale, and oral argument by Andrew Mishlove.

For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Douglas Hoffer, and de la Mora & de la Mora, Elm Grove, and oral argument by Douglas Hoffer.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

[348 Wis.2d 285]¶ 1 The petitioner, Richard K. Brefka (Brefka), seeks review of an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals affirming a decision of the circuit court, denying Brefka's request for an extension of time.¹ Brefka was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and apparently refused a chemical test to ascertain his blood alcohol concentration. He subsequently filed a request for a refusal hearing, but did not file his request within ten days after he was served with a notice of intent to revoke his operating privileges as required by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) (2009–10). He sought to extend the time period in which he was allowed to file a request for a refusal hearing due to excusable neglect.

¶ 2 The circuit court concluded that because Brefka did not file a request for a refusal hearing within the required ten-day time limit, it lacked competency to hear his request to extend that time limit. It therefore denied Brefka's motion to extend the ten-day time limit and dismissed his request for a refusal hearing, remandingthe case to the Village of Elm Grove municipal court (the municipal court) for disposition.

¶ 3 The Village of Elm Grove (the Village) argues that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) set forth a mandatory requirement to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day time limit that may not be extended due to excusable neglect. It asserts that because the statute does not allow the circuit court to extend the ten-day time limit, the circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request.

¶ 4 We conclude that the circuit court is without competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time limit set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a). The ten-day time limit is a mandatory requirement that may not be extended due to excusable neglect. Because the mandatory ten-day time limit is central to the statutory scheme, the circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to extend it. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

I

¶ 5 The facts of this case are undisputed.

¶ 6 On December 12, 2010, law enforcement officers from the Village arrested Brefka and issued him a “Notice of Intent to Revoke Operating Privilege” (the Notice of Intent). The Notice of Intent stated that Brefka had refused a chemical test and identified the date of refusal as December 12, 2010. It also notified Brefka that he had ten days from the date of the notice to file a request for a refusal hearing:

You refused a request to submit to a test or tests under 343.305(3) Wis. Stats. Because of this refusal, your operating privilege may be revoked.

You have 10 days from the date of this notice to file a request for a hearing on the revocation with the court named below.... If you do not request a hearing, the court must revoke your operating privileges 30 days from the date of this notice.

¶ 7 Brefka filed a request for a refusal hearing on December 28, 2010. The municipal court scheduled a refusal hearing, but the Village filed a motion to strike Brefka's request for the refusal hearing because Brefka had not submitted his request within the required ten days under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a).²

[348 Wis.2d 288]¶ 8 Although Brefka conceded that his request for a refusal hearing was untimely, he requested that the municipal court extend the ten-day time limit. He alleged that “judgment was entered due to ... excusable neglect.”

¶ 9 At a hearing, the municipal court concluded that Brefka's failure to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day time limit meant that it lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the time limit:

I can't even hear this matter because the refusal wasn't requested within the 10 day time frame under 343.305(9). It wasn't requested within 10 days.... Counsel for the defense ... I would like to hear from you ... I know you're making the request that I extend the time limit but when we're talking about competency of the court I can't even hear the Motion. I don't have competency to do anything on this matter and it's my position that I can do nothing.

The municipal court therefore denied Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time limit and dismissed his request for a refusal hearing.³

¶ 10 Brefka appealed to the Waukesha County Circuit Court. The Village filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time limit.

¶ 11 At a motion hearing, the circuit court determined that it lacked competency. Examining the text of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4., the circuit court reasoned that the statute is “very clear, very specific” and that it “clearly says ten days without question.” Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that it was “without competency to really address the appeal,” and granted the Village's motion to dismiss, remanding the case to the municipal court for disposition.

¶ 12 Brefka appealed to the court of appeals following the circuit court's determinations. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that “[t]he plain language of the statute is abundantly clear.” Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, No. 2011AP2888, unpublished slip op., ¶ 6, 2012 WL 2300271 (Ct.App. Jun. 19, 2012). Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) “impose a mandatory obligation on the circuit court to revoke a person's operating privilege if he or she does not file a request for a refusal hearing within ten days of the notice of intent to revoke.” Id., ¶ 10. The court of appeals noted that the ten-day time limit is a “different procedure” from the general rules of civil procedure, and that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2), the rules of civil procedure that allow for relief due to excusable neglect do not apply.⁴Id. Ultimately, it concluded that the circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time limit, stating that “failure to observe statutory time limits deprives a court of competency.” Id., ¶ 13.

II

¶ 13 In this case, we are called upon to review whether the circuit court has competency to hear Brefka's motion to extend the ten-day time limit for requesting a refusal hearing set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) due to excusable neglect. Whether a court has competency presents a question of law that we review independently of the determinations of the circuit court and the court of appeals. Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶ 7, 273 Wis.2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.

¶ 14 In order to determine whether the circuit court has competency, we must interpret Wis. Stat. § 343.305, also known as the implied consent law. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we also review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶ 16, 253 Wis.2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341.

III

¶ 15 The Village argues that the circuit court does not have competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time limit set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a). It advances that the ten-day time limit to request a refusal hearing and the subsequent requirement that operating privileges be revoked commencing 30 days after refusal if no hearing is requested are mandatory requirements. Finally, it contends that the mandatory nature of the statutory requirements demonstrates that the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme can be fulfilled only if the ten-day time limit cannot be extended due to excusable neglect.

¶ 16 The circuit court's determination of competency refers to its “ability to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction vested in it” by Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Mikrut, 273 Wis.2d 76, ¶ 9, 681 N.W.2d 190. That section of the constitution states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state.” Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8. Although the circuit court may not be deprived of jurisdiction “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” it may lack competency to render a valid order or judgment in a civil or criminal matter when the parties fail to meet certain statutory requirements.⁵Mikrut, 273 Wis.2d 76, ¶ 9, 681 N.W.2d 190.

¶ 17 A statutory time limit is one type of statutory requirement that may result in a loss of the circuit court's competency, if a party fails to satisfy it. Id., ¶ 13. However, noncompliance with a mandatory statute does not always translate into a loss of competency. State v. Bollig, 222 Wis.2d 558, 566, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct.App.1998) (citing State v. Kywanda F., 200 Wis.2d 26, 33, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996)). Sometimes the “legislativepurpose of the statutory scheme [can] be fulfilled, without strictly following the statutory directive.” Id. at 567–68, 587 N.W.2d 908.

¶ 18 To determine whether the circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's motion to extend the ten-day time limit set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a), we must evaluate “the effect of noncompliance on the court's power to proceed in the particular case before the court.” Mikrut, 273 Wis.2d 76, ¶ 10, 681 N.W.2d 190. Failures to abide by statutory mandates that are “central to the statutory scheme” of which they are a part will deprive the circuit court of competency. Id.

¶ 19 We therefore look to the...