Vill. of Linndale v. State
| Decision Date | 16 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 14AP–21.,14AP–21. |
| Citation | 19 N.E.3d 935 |
| Parties | VILLAGE OF LINNDALE et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. STATE of Ohio et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., Charles A. Nemer, Leslie E. Wargo, Cleveland, and David A. Schafer; Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Mark A. Vander Laan and Bryan E. Pacheco, Cincinnati; George Simon, Law Director of Linndale, for appellants.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Richard N. Coglianese and Holly W. Wallinger, for appellees State of Ohio, Secretary of State Jon Husted, Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine, and Governor John R. Kasich.
Frost Brown Todd LLC, Philip K. Hartmann, Columbus, Stephen J. Smith, Kent, and Yazan S. Ashra Wi, for amicus curiae The Ohio Municipal League.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, the villages of Linndale, Brice, West Mifflin, Belmore, Amesville, West Millgrove, and Nashville (“appellants”), appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees, State of Ohio, Attorney General Michael DeWine, and Governor John R. Kasich (collectively “the state”). Because we conclude that the legislation challenged by appellants violated the one-subject rule under the Ohio Constitution because it incorporated amendments to R.C. 4511.204 and 4511.205 regarding the use of handheld electronic communications devices while driving, we reverse.
{¶ 2} This appeal involves legislation, House Bill No. 606 (“H.B. 606”), that was introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives and read for the first time on November 21, 2012. As introduced, H.B. 606 made a single change to R.C.1901.08, reducing the number of full-time judges on the Youngstown Municipal Court by one. H.B. 606 was read for a second time in the House on November 27, 2012, and referred to the House Committee on Judiciary and Ethics. It was reported out of committee, read for a third time, and passed the House on December 5, 2012. H.B. 606 was then read in the Senate for the first time on December 6, 2012. The bill was read a second time and referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary on December 11, 2012. The committee added amendments to H.B. 606 eliminating certain mayor's courts and clarifying the effect of state and municipal measures prohibiting texting while driving and returned a substitute bill containing those amendments to the Senate, which read the bill for a third time and passed it on December 13, 2012. The following day, the House of Representatives voted to concur in the Senate amendments to H.B. 606. The statutory changes contained in H.B. 606 became effective on March 22, 2013.
{¶ 3} The final version of H.B. 606, as amended by the Senate Committee on Judiciary, made changes to four statutes. It amended R.C.1901.08 to reduce the number of full-time judges on the Youngstown Municipal Court by one (“the Youngstown-judgeship provision”). The bill amended R.C.1905.01 to provide that, with certain exceptions, mayor's courts may be held in municipal corporations with a population of more than 200; it also created a specific exception to the population requirement for any municipal corporation located entirely on an island in Lake Erie (“the mayor's-court provision”). Finally, H.B. 606 amended R.C. 4511.204 and 4511.205 to provide that prosecution under the state law prohibiting the use of a handheld electronic wireless communications device to write, send or read a text-based communication while operating a motor vehicle or the state law prohibiting any use of an electronic wireless communications device by a holder of a probationary driver's license or a holder of a temporary instruction permit under the age of 18 while operating a motor vehicle did not preclude a prosecution for a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance based on the same conduct and that, if an offender was convicted or pled guilty to both offenses, the two offenses were allied offenses of similar import (“the texting-while-driving provision”).
{¶ 4} Appellants filed a complaint asserting that H.B. 606 was unconstitutional because it violated the one-subject rule under the Ohio Constitution by combining the mayor's-court provision and the texting-while-driving provision into the same legislation as the Youngstown-judgeship provision. Appellants further claimed that the manner in which the General Assembly adopted H.B. 606 violated the three-reading rule under the Ohio Constitution. Finally, appellants argued that H.B. 606 was unconstitutional because it classified municipal corporations differently based on population and did not apply uniformly throughout Ohio.
{¶ 5} The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The common pleas court issued a judgment denying appellant's motion for summary judgment and granting the state's motion to dismiss, concluding that H.B. 606 was not unconstitutional.
{¶ 6} Appellants appeal from the trial court's judgment, assigning one error for this court's review:
The trial court erred in denying the Villages' motion for summary judgment, and granting the State's motion to dismiss, because H.B. 606 is unconstitutional.
{¶ 7} We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Modern Office Methods, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist., 2012-Ohio-3587, 975 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 9. Under the de novo standard, we independently review the record and afford no deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Romage, 10th Dist., 2012-Ohio-3381, 974 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 6. “Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is proper if, after all factual allegations are presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences are made in favor of the non-moving party, it appears beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts warranting the requested relief.” Modern Office at ¶ 9.
{¶ 8} Additionally, because appellants' complaint involves challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, we note that there is a presumption of constitutionality for lawfully enacted legislation. State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar, 129 Ohio St.3d 240, 2011-Ohio-2939, 951 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 24. “[B]efore a statute is struck down ‘it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.’ ” Id., quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 9} Within appellants' sole assignment of error, they assert four arguments. First, they argue that H.B. 606 violates the one-subject rule set forth in Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution. Second, they assert that the General Assembly violated the three-reading rule in enacting H.B. 606, in violation of Article II, Section 15(C) of the Ohio Constitution. Third, they claim that H.B. 606 violates Article XVIII, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution because it classifies municipalities differently based on population. Fourth, appellants argue that H.B. 606 violates Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution because it does not apply uniformly to all areas of the state. We will consider each of these arguments in turn.
{¶ 10} Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” The primary purpose of the one-subject rule is to prevent legislative “logrolling”—i.e., “ ‘the practice of several minorities combining their several proposals as different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating their votes so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill where perhaps no single proposal of each minority could have obtained majority approval separately.’ ” State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 142–43, 464 N.E.2d 153 (1984), quoting 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Section 17.01 (4th Ed.1972). Appellants argue that H.B. 606 is an example of impermissible logrolling, claiming that the mayor's-court provision and the texting-while-driving provision were taken from another bill that was stuck in committee and added at the last minute to an otherwise noncontroversial bill intended solely to eliminate one judge from the Youngstown Municipal Court.
{¶ 11} The one-subject rule is mandatory and may result in the invalidation of legislation. In re Nowak, 104 Ohio St.3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, 820 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 54. However, there is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Dix at 142, 464 N.E.2d 153. Accordingly, only “a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation” of the one-subject rule will cause this court to invalidate a legislative enactment. Id. at 145, 464 N.E.2d 153. Where a court determines that legislation contains more than one subject, it may determine which subject is primary and which is an unrelated addition. The court may then sever the unrelated provisions and preserve the portions of the bill relating to a single subject. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 500, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999) ; State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 580 N.E.2d 767 (1991).
{¶ 12} Determining a statute's constitutionality depends primarily on a Dix at 145, 464 N.E.2d 153. The fact that legislation contains multiple topics is not necessarily fatal, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has declared that “disunity of subject matter, not aggregation, is the polestar in assessing a violation of the one-subject rule.” In re Nowak at ¶ 59. Where legislation...
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