Village of Northbrook v. Cook County

• Decision Date: 29 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 53082,No. 83-804,E,53082,83-804
• Citation: 126 Ill.App.3d 145,466 N.E.2d 1215,81 Ill.Dec. 413
• Parties: , 81 Ill.Dec. 413 VILLAGE OF NORTHBROOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF COOK, a Body Politic and Corporate, William F. Harris, Cook County Building Commissioner, LaSalle National Bank, as Trustee under Trustquity Associates, Inc., a Corporation, Edward Schwartz, William Sellas, Kathleen Sellas, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1215

466 N.E.2d 1215

126 Ill.App.3d 145, 81 Ill.Dec. 413

VILLAGE OF NORTHBROOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF COOK, a Body Politic and Corporate, William F Harris, Cook County Building Commissioner, LaSalle National Bank, as Trustee under Trust No. 53082, Equity Associates Inc., a Corporation, Edward Schwartz, William Sellas Kathleen Sellas, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-804.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Third Division.

June 29, 1984.

Clifford L. Weaver, Piper Wentz Rothschild (Village of Northbrook) Burke, Bosselman, Freivogel, Weaver, Glaves & Ryan, Pedersen & Houpt, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants; Richard V. Houpt and Arthur Sternberg, Chicago, of counsel.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County Bldg. Com'r, Henry Hauser, Matthew Klein, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

McNAMARA, Justice:

Plaintiffs, the Village of Northbrook and certain individuals, brought this action seeking to enjoin the issuance of a building permit by defendants Cook County and William Harris to defendants Edward Schwartz and Equity Associates for the construction of two ten story office buildings on property adjacent to the Village. The subject property, a 20 acre parcel in unincorporated Cook County, is located near the Tri-State Tollway and Lake Cook Road. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the height of the proposed buildings was unreasonable and that the Village would be injured in its corporate capacity by the proposed development. The trial court found that the Village had standing to bring the suit but that the complaint was barred by laches because the Village failed to object to the zoning classification of the property in 1976 when Cook County amended its zoning ordinance. Only the Village appeals from the dismissal of count I of the amended complaint.

When Cook County adopted a comprehensive amendment to its zoning ordinance in 1976, the subject property was zoned C-7 office/research park district. The height of any developments was governed by a floor to area ratio. The county conducted hearings prior to the adoption of its amendment, and pursuant to its rights under sections 2 and 5 of "An Act in relation to county zoning" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 34, pars. 3152, 3158), the Village filed objections to the proposed zoning of several parcels of land within one and one-half miles of its borders. The Village, however, made no objections to the C-7 zoning of the subject property.

In July 1977, Schwartz purchased 16.5 acres of the 20 acre parcel. He entered into an agreement with Equity Associates to jointly develop the property with two seven story office buildings. In May 1981, they petitioned the Village to annex the property and to provide water and sewer facilities. The Village refused to grant the petition because the plans called for office buildings in excess of 65 feet. Schwartz and Equity Associates contracted to purchase the remaining 3.5 acres from defendants William and Kathleen Sellas and then submitted a second development proposal. The developer had reduced the number of stories but had added a third building to the plan.

When it appeared that the Village Plan Commission would deny the second petition for annexation, Schwartz and Equity Associates arranged for a direct connection to the Metropolitan Sanitary District interceptor sewer. They withdrew their annexation petition on April 16, 1982, and they applied for a Cook County building permit on May 19, 1982. On June 8, 1982, the Village filed this action seeking to enjoin the issuance of a permit and requesting the court to find that the Cook County zoning ordinances were void insofar as they allow buildings over 65 feet on the subject property.

While defendants urge that the trial court correctly found that the Village's cause of action was barred by laches, they also maintain that the Village lacks standing to challenge Cook County's zoning ordinance. Defendants argue that the Village does not have standing under the test established in Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates (1980), 81 Ill.2d 392, 43 Ill.Dec. 37, 410 N.E.2d 37, cert. denied (1981), 449 U.S. 1126, 101 S.Ct. 943, 67 L.Ed.2d 112. There, the court required a clear demonstration that a municipality "would be substantially, directly and adversely affected in its corporate capacity" before it had standing to challenge the zoning laws of another governmental entity. (81 Ill.2d 392, 398, 43 Ill.Dec. 37, 410 N.E.2d 37.) Defendants contend that the Village's allegations of injury are conclusory and reflect injury not to itself, but to other persons not parties to this action. Furthermore, defendants urge that the Village has not alleged any injury due to the lack of an absolute height limitation in the zoning ordinance.

The Village's complaint alleges that the proposed development is inconsistent with the residential character of the adjoining area; that property values in the Village will diminish; that roads will be more congested resulting in safety hazards; that the development will place an increased burden on well water supplies; and that there is insufficient storm water drainage on the subject property. Although several of these allegations represent possible injury to individual property owners, the Village's complaint also alleges injury to itself. The decreasing property values will directly affect the Village's tax revenues, and the road congestion and increased water use will affect its ability to provide police and fire protection. The complaint sufficiently alleges injury to the Village in its corporate capacity to meet the Barrington Hills test.

Defendants also contend that the Village is alleging a substantive due process claim which it has no standing to raise because a village is not a "person" under the Illinois and United States constitutions. A municipality cannot assert a constitutional claim against the State or its statutes (Franciscan Hospital v. Town of Canoe Creek (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 490, 34 Ill.Dec. 738, 398 N.E.2d 413; Village of North Pekin v. Riviere (1979), 73 Ill.App.3d 1032, 29 Ill.Dec. 882, 392 N.E.2d 439), by a direct claim against the state or by a claim against one of its municipalities. (City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (9th Cir.1980), 625 F.2d 231, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 1039, 101 S.Ct. 619, 66 L.Ed.2d 502; Village of Arlington Heights...